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I. INTRODUCTION
Upon the emergence of the European Economic Community (EC
or EEC) in 1957,' the Commission of the European Community and
the respective business communities realized that the existing differ-
ences between the company laws of each signatory nation formed a
barrier against the creation of a Common Market as prescribed in
the Treaty of Rome. 2 The creation of a Common Market mandates
that companies be able to easily engage in transnational transactions
* Attorney, DeBandt, Van Hecke & Lagae, Brussels, Belgium. J.D. 1987, Uni-
versity of Ghent; LL.M. 1990, University of Georgia. Member, Belgium Bar.
I The Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC)
was signed on March 25, 1957 and went into effect on January 1, 1958. The six
signatory countries were the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Belgium,
Luxembourg, and The Netherlands. Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
2 The basic principles creating the Common Market as expressed in article 2 of
the Treaty of Rome have been reaffirmed in the Single European Act. See 30 O.J.
EuR. Com. (No. L 169) 1 (1987) [hereinafter Single European Act]. Article 2 of
the EEC Treaty provides:
It shall be the aim of the Community, by establishing a Common Market
and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States,
to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of ec-
onomic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in
stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations
between its Member States.
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and be able to easily establish new subsidiaries in other EC countries.3
The Commission has taken a twofold approach to achieve these
objectives. First, it has tried to harmonize the Member States existing
company laws by initiating directives which must be implemented by
the national authorities within their legal systems. These directives
will be discussed in part II. 4 This harmonization of company law is
aimed at realizing the complete freedom of establishment in the EEC.5
Second, to avoid the disadvantages of the harmonization process and
to realize a more European outlook, the Commission has proposed
two new company forms to be governed mainly by Community law
instead of national law. These are the so-called "societas Europaea"
or "SE ' 6 and the "European Economic Interest Grouping" or
"EEIG." ' 7 The former constitutes the main part of this article, but
a discussion of the SE, and especially a discussion of the necessity
of the SE, would not be complete unless situated in the context of
these other related subjects. Therefore, parts II and III contain a
See generally Carreau & Lee, Towards A European Company Law, 9 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 501 (1989); Vagts & Waelde, The societas Europaea: A future
Option for U.S. Corporations?, 29 Bus. LAW 823 (1973-74); Hood, The European
Company Proposal, 22 INr'L & Comp. L. Q. 434 (1973); Konstandinidis, The
Historical Evolution of the Concept of the European Company and Their Impact
on Greek Law, 5-6 HELLENIC REV. INT'L REL. 285 (1989); Dine, The Community
Company Law Harmonization Programme, 14 EuR. L. Jua. 322 (1989); Commission,
Commission Sets Out Latest Proposal for European Company Statute, 636 COMMON
MKT. REP. 1 (1989); Commission, Company Law in the European Community, 14
EuR. FILE 3 (1989); Storm, Statute of a Societas Europea, 5 Co mON MKT. REP.
(1967-68); Sanders, The European Company on its Way, 8 CommON MKT. REP. 29
(1971); Scholten, The European Company, 5 COMMON MKT. REP. 9 (1967); Norton,
The European Type Company and its Meaning for the American Enterprise in the
European Community, 6 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 111 (1973); Ficker, A Project for a
European Corporation, J. Bus. L. 156 (1970); Mann, The European Company, 19
INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 468 (1970); Van Rijn, Faut-il instituer la "soci~t& europ&enne"?,
JOURNAL DES TRIuwuAux 377 (1967); M. BnzALY & C. QUIGLEY, COMPLETING THE
INTERNAL MARKET OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNrrY, 1992 HANDBOOK (1989).
4 See infra Section II. A.
I However, harmonization by the use of directives cannot create a completely
uniform set of laws since each Member State is free to establish its own laws
implementing the directive. The objective of complete freedom of establishment
cannot thus be realized through this process.
Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Company.
32 O.J. EutR. Comm. (No. C 263) 41 (1989) [hereinafter Proposal for a European
Company Regulation].
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2137/85 of 15 July 1985, on the European
Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG). 28 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 199) 1 (1985)
[hereinafter EEIG Regulation).
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brief discussion of the harmonization of the European company laws
and the EEIG.
II. THE EUROPEAN HARMONIZATION EFFORTS
The Commission's efforts to harmonize existing company law is
based on Article 54(3)(g) of the EEC Treaty and is an attempt to
coordinate each Member State's company laws through directives.8
This harmonization is necessary to avoid distortions in the market
which may result from the differences in each Member State's eco-
nomic development and the varying corporate requirements of their
national company laws. If no harmonization between the company
laws of the different Member States existed, companies would seek
to operate from the Member State that has the least restrictive com-
pany laws. 9
The United States experience has proven that competition to attract
corporate resettlement through lenient corporate laws results in a
general lowering of corporate standards. 0 If the European Community
does not prescribe minimum standards, by using directives or by
introducing compulsory Community company law, then it risks a
similar situation as the United States where a "pygmy among the 50
states" dictates the primary policy of American corporate law; sat-
isfying big corporations and increasing their revenues." In order to
remedy this "Delaware syndrome," harmonization of national com-
pany laws appears to be necessary.' 2
Article 54(3)(g) provides:
The Council and the Commission shall carry out the duties devolving upon
them under the preceding provisions, in particular:(g) by coordinating to the necessary extent the safeguards which, for the
protection of the interest of members and others, are required by Member
States of companies or firms within the meaning of the second paragraph
of article 58 with a view to making such safeguards equivalent throughout
the Community.
EEC Treaty, supra note 1.
9 Unless at least some harmonization is realized, the "Delaware effect", feared
by the Commission and countries with strict and well developed company laws (such
as Germany), will be realized. See Dine, The Community Company Law Harmo-
nization Programme, 14 Euri. L. REv. 322, 328 (1989).
10 For a general article about the predominance of Delaware and the lowering
of corporate standards in the United States, see Cary, Federalism and Corporate
Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
I d. at 701.
12 Id. at 700.
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A. The Different Company Directives
The seven Directives which have already been adopted by the
Council will now be discussed briefly. 3 The First Council Directive
of 196814 provides for a system requiring all companies to publicly
disclose basic commercial data; i.e. paid capital, balance sheets, profit
and loss accounts, and articles of incorporation. The Directive also
provides for provisions which protect third parties by limiting the
doctrines of constructive notice and ultra vires. 5
The Second Council Directive'6 applies to public companies and
lays down minimum requirements for their formation and mainte-
nance and the increase and reduction in their capital. A public limited
company must exceed 25,000 ECU in minimum subscribed capital.' 7
The Third Council Directive of 197811 regulates internal mergers
between public undertakings where the assets and liabilities of the
acquired company are simultaneously transferred to the acquiring
11 Of the directives proposed by the Commission concerning a European company,
five have yet to be adopted by the Council and will therefore not be discussed.
These five directives are as follows: the Fifth Directive concerning the structure of
public limited companies, 26 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. C 240) 2 (1983); the Tenth
Directive concerning cross-border mergers of public limited companies, 28 O.J. EuR.
Com. (No. C. 23) 11 (1985); the Eleventh Directive concerning disclosure require-
ments of branches opened in a Member State by certain types of companies governed
by the law of another state, 29 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. C. 203) 12 (1986); the Twelfth
Directive concerning the single-member private limited companies, 32 O.J. EuR.
Comm. (No. C. 152) 10 (1989); and the Thirteenth Directive concerning takeovers
and other general bids, _ O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. .) -(1988).
l, First Council Directive of 9 March 1968, on the Coordination of Safeguards
which, for the Protection of the Interests of Members and Others, are Required by
Member States of Companies within the Meaning of the second Paragraph of article
58 of the Treaty, with a View to Making such Safeguards Equivalent Throughout
the Community, 11 J.O. Comm. EuR. (No. L. 65) 8 (1968). See also Commission
of the European Community, Harmonization of Company Law in the European
Community, Measures Adopted and Proposed, BULL. EuR. Comm. Supp. 4/75 (1975)
[hereinafter Harmonization of Company Law].
1 As already indicated, a Directive must be implemented by the different Member
States and is normally not self-executing. All the Member States except Spain have
implemented this Directive. See Dine, supra note 9, at 323.
16 Second Council Directive of 13 December 1976, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L.
26) 1 (1977). See also Harmonization of Company Law, supra note 14, at 15;
Nieuwdorp, Corporate Law: Recent Development-EEC, 18 INT'L Bus. LAW. No.
1, 31, 32 (1990).
1 ECU is the European Currency Unit and is a basket composed of currencies
of the twelve Member States of the European Community.
IS Third Council Directive of 9 October 1978, 21 O.J. EuR. Com. (No. L. 295)
36 (1978). See also Harmonization of Company Law, supra note 14, at 13.
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company.' 9 The Fourth Council Directive of 197820 provides the rules
regarding the drawing up of the accounts of undertakings. 2' The Sixth
Council Directive of 1982 2 is the most recent directive that has been
accepted by the Council and implemented by most of the Member
States.23 This Directive provides for a public company's division into
entities and the allocation of its assets and liabilities among the various
beneficiary companies. It also contains specific provisions for the
protection of creditors. The Seventh Council Directive of 1983 2 con-
tains detailed rules regarding the drawing up of consolidated accounts
and rules about publication of these accounts by companies with
subsidiaries. 25 The Eighth Council Directive of 198426 ensures the
independence and the integrity of auditors in carrying out their stat-
utory audits of company accounts. 27
B. Evaluation of the Directives
The harmonization of company laws has the advantage of mini-
mizing problems caused by discrepancies between the company leg-
islation of different nations without forcing the Member States to
accept a supranational company law. In order to ensure that a directive
has a harmonizing effect, the directive must be detailed and inflexible.
Consequently, the Council has encountered difficulties in formulating
and adopting directives.
28
,9 This directive protects the rights of creditors, shareholders and employees, and
thus does not in principle have antitrust implications. This directive has not yet
been implemented by Belgium, Italy, and Spain.
10 Fourth Council Directive of 25 July 1978, 21 O.J. EUri. Com. (No. L. 222)
11 (1978). See also Harmonization of Company Law, supra note 14, at 41. This
directive has not yet been implemented by Belgium, Italy, and Spain.
21 See Dine, supra note 9, at 324-25; Nieuwdorp, supra note 16, at 31.
2 Sixth Council Directive of 17 December 1982, 25 O.J. EUR. Comm. (No. L.
378)'1 (1982). See also Harmonization of Company Law, supra note 14, at 69. The
Fifth Directive has yet to be adopted by the Council. See supra note 13.
Belgium, Italy and Spain have not yet implemented the Sixth Directive.
24 Seventh Council Directive of 13 June 1983, 26 O.J. EuR. Com. (No. L. 193)
1 (1983). This Directive has not yet been implemented. See also Harmonization of
Company Law, supra note 14, at 79.
25 The Seventh Directive has been implemented only by France, Germany, Greece,
Luxembourg, and The Netherlands. See Dine, supra note 9, at 325-26; Nieuwdorp,
supra note 16, at 32.
Eighth Council Directive of 10 April 1984, 27 O.J. EUR. Com. (No. L. 126)
20 (1984). See also Harmonization of Company Law, supra note 14, at 99.
27 The Eighth Directive has so far been implemented only by Belgium, Germany,
Luxembourg, and Spain. See Dine, supra note 9, at 322.
2 Dine, supra note 9, at 328-29. The Commission has tried to include social,
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It has been argued that the technique of harmonization and the
mutual recognition of more or less identical companies is enough of
a guarantee for European business.29 The Commission, however, has
reasoned that this coordination would not bring about complete unity
of national conditions under which enterprises are allowed to un-
dertake their business.3 0 Because of the legal and tax obstacles in-
volved, harmonization alone would not realize the possibility of formal
cross-border mergers in the EC.31 Although there are several proposals
for additional directives for the harmonization of European company
law,3 2 this coordination, even if pursued to the maximum extent, will
not bring complete unity of national conditions.
III. TIH EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPING (EEIG)
The absence of any legal framework facilitating a collaboration
between EC undertakings of different Member States was seen as an
impediment to economic growth because some firms were either too
tentative or unwilling to take the necessary step towards a higher
level of business integration involving a takeover or merger.33 For
political reasons the European Community was not yet ready in 1985
for the European Company;34 therefore, the Commission wanted to
human, and other reforms in these directives which, of course, makes it even more
difficult to make them acceptable for all twelve Member States. Typical examples
are the Fifth and the Thirteenth Directives. See infra note 29 and accompanying
text.
- Often reference has been made to the United States situation where companies
are still incorporated in one state and there is no "Federal Company." See Cary,
supra note 10, at 700-05; Note, Federal Chartering of Corporations: A Proposal,
61 GEo. L. J. 89 (1972).
- See infra section III for arguments in favor of creating a European company.
3. Statute for the European Community: Commission Memorandum to Parlia-
ment, the Council and the Two Sides of Industry, BULL. EuR. Comm. Supp. 3/88,
at 10 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 Memorandum]; see also Carreau & Lee, Towards a
European Company Law, 9 Nw. J. INT'L & Bus. 501, 506 (1989).
32 See, e.g., the Fifth, Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth, and Thirteenth Council Directives,
supra note 13.
13 See generally Murphy, The European Economic Interest Group (EEIG): A New
European Business Entity, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 65 (1990); Nieuwdorp, supra
note 16; M. BREALY & C. QUIGLEY, COMPLETING THE INTERNAL MARKET OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 1992 HANDBOOK 191-93 (1989); Commission, The European
Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG), THE EUROPEAN FILE 3 (1989) [hereinafter
Commission: The EEIG]; Commission, The EEIG Arrives, 63 CoMMoN MKT. REP.
1 (1989).
34 The different forces opposing the European company will be discussed infra
section IV.
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provide the European undertakings with a legal framework which
would allow certain cross border transactions without creating a
European corporation."
The European Economic Interest Grouping is a legal entity governed
mainly by European Community law, aimed at the collaboration of
companies of separate EC Member States.36 The EEIG is based on
the successful French corporate form called the "Groupement d'In-
t6ret Economique ' 3 7 and can be described as a cross between a small
company and a partnership with non-profit motives. By using the
EEIG, firms are able to engage in certain joint activities such as
research and development, purchasing, sales, production, and other
business activities.38
The most important feature of the EEIG Regulation is that it
creates a supra-national European institution, governed not by na-
tional laws, but by European Community law. The EEIG has full
capacity, it can make contracts or accomplish other legal acts, and
sue and be sued in its own name. Thus, it appears that the EEIG
is a true European company; 9 however, some very strict rules limit
and differentiate the EEIG from the classic company traditionally
found in most European countries and in the United States.
The EEIG constitutes an instrument for collaboration, aimed at
facilitating and developing the economic activities of its members and
improving or increasing the results of these activities.4 Consequently,
" See infra section IV.
36 The EEIG could be used as of July 1, 1989.
31 See Murphy, supra note 33, at 67; J. LE GALL, FRENCH COMPANY LAW 28-36
(1976). The most striking example of the "Groupement d'Int6r~t Economique" is
Airbus Industries which consists of French, German, English, and Spanish companies.
It cannot become a EEIG because it employs centrally more than 500 people.
18 Commission: the EEIG, supra note 33. The European Commission has indicated
that about 85 EEIGs have been established. More than half are in commercial
activities like marketing, purchasing, and import/export; 12 are in services ranging
from audiovisual and transport to professional training and the financial sector; and
14 consist of groups of professionals like law firms. Only five are classified as
"industrial." The Financial Times, July 30, 1990, § 1, at 2, col. 4. See Israel, The
EEIG-A Major Step Forward for Community Law, 9 COMPANY LAW 14, 15 (1990);
Murphy, supra note 33, at 67.
19 The EEIG Regulation, however, leaves essential aspects of the EEIG's legal
status and operation to the legislation of the Member States. The result of the fact
that the EEIG Regulation does not create an entity governed by European law alone
gives rise to uncertainties, inefficiencies, and conflict of laws issues. Murphy, supra
note 33, at 67.
40 Article 3 of the EEIG Regulation reads, "[tlhe purpose of a grouping shall
be to facilitate or develop the economic activities of its members and to improve
or increase the results of those activities; its purpose is not to make profits for
itself". EEIG Regulation, supra note 7, at Art. 3(1).
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the EEIG neither replaces its members nor absorbs all their activities
and is therefore inadequate to use as an instrument for a legal merger.
Moreover, the EEIG may neither borrow on the financial markets
nor act as a holding company. 4'
Another important limitation is that the EEIG cannot have more
than 500 employees; 42 however, the labor force of the EEIG member
companies are not included in this calculation. This restriction is the
main reason why important firms such as Airbus Industry use the
French "Groupement d'Int6rt Economique" and not the EEIG. 43 In
addition, the members of the grouping are jointly and severally liable
for all debts and liabilities of whatever nature of the Group. 44
Regarding the taxation of an EEIG, the Regulation applies the
principle of fiscal transparency, according to which the profits of the
EEIG are taxed by the different Members States. 45 The Regulation,
however, does not determine the source of such profits; whether the
EEIG is taxed in the country in which it is registered, the country
in which it resides, or both, is determined by national laws." Also,
41 Carreau & Lee, supra note 31, at 505.
42 EEIG Regulation, supra note 7, at Art. 3(2)(c).
' The French Groupement d'Int6ret Economique (GIE) does not have the em-
ployment restriction that exists in the EEIG.
Article 24 of the EEIG Regulation provides:
1. The members of a grouping shall have unlimited joint and several
liability for its debts and other liabilities of whatever nature. National law
shall determine the consequences of such liability.
2. Creditors may not proceed against a member for payment in respect
of debts and other liabilities, in accordance with the conditions laid down
in paragraph 1, before the liquidation of a grouping is concluded, unless
they have first requested the grouping to pay and payment has not been
made within an appropriate period.
EEIG Regulation, supra note 7, at Art. 24.
41 Profits are apportioned and taxed under the rules of the home country of each
member. However, Tom Dickson notes, "Nobody is sufficiently confident that the
authorities in each country will always accept this arrangement and there are worries
that some Member States may demand more tax." Therefore, he indicates that this
risk can be limited if "the EEIG act[s] as a broker or agent rather than a principal,
so that the profits are made in the hands of the members." The Financial Times,
July 30, 1990, § 1, at 2, col. 4; see also Goldsworth, Taxation of European Economic
Interest Groupings, 8 TAx NOTES INT'L 856 (1990); Legal brief, Taxation of European
Economic Interest Groupings (EEIGs), 18 INT'L Bus. LAW 296, 296-97 (1990);
Murphy, supra note 33, at 79.
Silvestro, The EEIG Regulation-A Year After, 18 INT'L Bus. LAW 387 (1990).
Allessandra Silvestro mentions in this article that some EEC Member States try to
consider contributions to an EEIG as remuneration for services which, of course,
are subject to VAT. Thus, it appears that the EEIG has not only failed to offer a
common tax regime for direct taxes, but it also causes problems in the field of
indirect taxes.
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it is unclear how this situation fits into the existing bilateral and
unilateral treaties for the avoidance of double taxation.47
The most valuable innovation of the EEIG is that it is the first
truly European legal formula which is available to economic agents
interested in developing certain activities on a Community scale.4
Apart from these limited restrictions, the EEIG Regulation allows
the parties a wide measure of contractual freedom and thereby makes
the EEIG a flexible business tool.49 The Regulation imposes only
minimal obligations regarding the organization and management of
the grouping, allows different arrangements for financing, and re-
quires no minimum capital. 50
IV. THE EUROPEAN CoMPANY (SE)
A. History of the SE
1. Before the Creation of the EEC
The idea of forming a company with an international legal capacity
and personality was first developed by the Italian lawyer Fedozzi in
1897.11 He proposed the creation of companies under an international
statute which would facilitate the creation of large enterprises suitable
for the rapid development of industry.
At the beginning of this century, the need for an international
legal personality and a common uniform corporate law was discussed
in several international congresses and meetings.5 2 These gatherings
concluded that an "International Company" was a necessary tool in
the fast moving international business environment.53
,- Goldsworth, supra note 45, at 856.
" Commission, The EEIG Arrives, supra note 33, at 1-2.
49 Vinck, 2 TAx NoTEs INT'L (No. 6) 636 (1990).
See generally EEIG Regulation, supra note 7.
,' Konstandinidis, The Historical Evolution of the Concept of the European
Company and Their Impact on Greek Law, 5-6 HELLENic REv. INT'L REL. 285
(1989).
52 These included, for example, the Congresses held by the International Law
Association in Paris (1889 and 1890), Antwerp (1903), and Brussels (1910).
11 It must also be mentioned that in 1952 the Council of Europe recommended
that a European company be pursued. These proposals actually originated in 1949
but trade union opposition halted this early project in 1952. Hood, The European
Company Proposal, 22 INT'L & Comu'. L. . L. Q. 434 (1973); Konstandinidis, supra
note 51, at 288.
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Despite these efforts, no true international company has yet been
created.- After World War II a new phenomena appeared which had
not been previously observed. Increasing numbers of international
business projects developed involving transactions between different
countries. However, differences in the national laws and the conflict
of law rules of the different states constituted obstacles to the res-
olution of problems that arose from these international projects. The
obstacles were usually resolved in the conventional manner between
the governments." Noteworthy illustrations of companies created be-
tween different states include the Bdle Airport Company5 6 the Scan-
dinavian Airlines System (SAS), 57 and the Mont Blanc Tunnel
Exploitation Company.5 Each one of these companies was founded
by states, according to the rules of international public law.59
2. After the Creation of the EEC
The history of the European Company within the framework of
the EEC started in 1959 when the European Community was barely
one year old. Pieter Sanders, a Dutch professor, launched the concept
for an SE based on EEC law in his inaugural speech in Rotterdam.
At about the same time, the French Notaries Public suggested in
their 57th Annual Congress that it might be desirable to adopt some
form of company law for the Common Market.60 During the next
few years the idea of a European company was discussed and ex-
1, There is of course the EEIG, which if adopted, could be considered a real
international company. However, as already mentioned, many restrictions apply to
the use of this entity. The Commission hopes that its proposal for a European
company will be accepted by the Council and become effective in 1992.
1 Konstandinidis gives the example of an international company created by the
actions of companies rather than governments. It would seem, however, that the
example given is really a dividend equalization contract whereby the contracting
parties were obliged to pay the shareholders in their respective countries the same
dividend and to grant other equivalent advantages to each other. This arrangement
cannot be considered a true international company. See Konstandinidis, supra note
51, at 287-88.
, Id. at 286. The Bale Airport Company is a joint Swiss-French venture created
in 1949 to build and operate an airport.
" Id. at 286. SAS is an airline created and operated by the various Scandinavian
countries.
I8 Id. at 287. The Mont Blanc Tunnel Exploitation Company is a joint French-
Italian venture created in 1953 to build and operate the Mont Blanc Tunnel.
11 See Kahn, International Companies-A Study of Companies Having Interna-
tional Legal States, 3 J. WoRLD TRADE L. 498 (1970).
6 See Carreau & Lee, supra note 31, at 501; Hood, supra note 53, at 434;
Konstandinidis, supra note 51, at 288.
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amined in different congresses and by several scholars. However, it
took almost six years before there was any official reaction on the
part of the EEC. 61
The idea of creating a European company gained momentum in
1965 when France proposed in a note to the Council that a detailed
study on the possibilities of creating an SE should be undertaken. 62
This proposal was favorably accepted by the Commission and a team
of experts, under the chairmanship of Pieter Sanders, was invited to
draw up a draft statute for a European company. After the draft
was completed, the Commission submitted to the Council a Mem-
orandum about the problems of creating a European company. The
COREPER63 set up an ad hoc working group under the leadership
of Pieter Sanders. Since the sole task of this group was to study the
problem and not to draft a statute, the Commission of the EEC
decided to make its own proposal for a European company. On May
13, 1975, the Commission proposed an amended version of its 1970
Proposal for a European Company"4 to the Council. 65 The Council
appointed a new ad hoc committee which proceeded with a first
reading of the proposal.6 However, the working party suspended
discussions in 1982 because of a conflict with the Council over
legislation concerning groups of companies.6 7
The Commission tried to revive the idea of a European company
in its "White Paper" of June 1985.6 On June 8, 1988, the Commission
adopted a memorandum proposing a Societas Europaea. 69 After hav-
ing submitted this memorandum to the European Parliament, to the
employers, and to the labor unions, the Commission, on August 25,
1989, presented to the Council its latest Proposal for a Council
Regulation on the Statute for a European company.70
61 For a detailed list of the various Congresses and events relating to the concept
of the European company see Hood, supra note 53, at 434-35.
6, Foyer, La proposition franeaise de creation d'une socikt de type Europenne,
RMC 268-73 (1965).
63 Commission des repr~sentants permanents (Commission of the Permanent Rep-
resentatives of the Council).
64 13 0.J. EuR. Comm. (No. C 124) 1 (1970).
65 See Harmonization of Company Law, supra note 14, at 150.
6 Carreau & Lee, supra note 31, at 502.
67 Id. at 502, 509.
6 The ideas of the White Paper have since been formalized by the adoption of
the Single European Act, supra note 2.
6 See 1988 Memorandum, supra note 31.
70 Proposal for a European Company Regulation, supra note 6. A few questions
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B. The 1989 Proposal
The 1989 Proposal for a European company covers all aspects of
modern company law. This is necessary because this proposal is
designed to provide European companies with an additional option
to those corporate forms currently available under the national laws
of the Member States. Consequently, the same kinds of interests as
those existing under national law need to be sufficiently protected. 7'
The 1989 Proposal will create a single European corporate status
and will thus be separate from existing national laws. 72 Although the
of principle remained to be resolved before the Commission could propose a European
company regulation. On each question there were two or more options, each sup-
ported by at least one Member State. These questions of principle have proven to
be the most intractable obstacle to achieving agreement on a European company
regulation.
The first and politically most difficult question confronting the Commission was
that of employee participation in the decision making process of the SE. In order
to facilitate acceptance of the proposal by the Member States, the Commission
decided to address the question of employee participation in the form of a separate
directive rather than in the form of a regulation. Proposal for a Council Directive
complementing the State for a European company with regard to the involvement
of employees in the European company, 32 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. C 263) 69 (1989)
[hereinafter Proposed Employee Participation Directive]. It was hoped that this
would facilitate acceptance of the proposal since under article 189 of the EEC Treaty
a Member State retains some flexibility in adopting regulations implementing the
directive's goals whereas a Council regulation is self-executing and must be imple-
mented as passed. The proposed directive allows the Member States to choose between
three different forms of employee participation. Id. at Arts. 4, 5, and 6.
The second remaining question of principle requiring resolution was whether the
SE should be a company of "European law" or one of "European type," i.e.
whether to harmonize national laws or to introduce a supranational system governed
by community law. Although there has been some support for the "European type"
company, most notably France, the Commission itself has always favored the com-
pany of "European law." See Konstandinidis, supra note 51, at 293 and n.42.
The third remaining question of principle confronting the Commission was the
issue of "accessibility." The question was whether to make the SE widely available
to any entity whose business might conceivably expand to a European level or to
limit the SE to entities with a strong possibility of operating on a European level.
West Germany supported limited accessibility and proposed a high minimum capital
requirement coupled with a showing that the entity will operate on a European level
in order to qualify as a SE. The Commission has adopted both suggestions in its
proposal albeit with requirements less stringent than those proposed by Germany.
71 1988 Memorandum, supra note 31, at 12. The fact that the various aspects of
modern company laws are covered in the proposal, however, has not precluded the
Commission from proposing a legal entity that possesses relative flexibility and other
useful attributes such as to make it a sufficiently attractive form for existing com-
panies.
72 Proposal for a European Company Regulation, supra note 6, at Art. 7(1).
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SE may contain elements that are unknown or different from those
of the various Member States, the impact of these differences between
the European company Proposal and the various national company
laws should not be overestimated for two reasons. 7 First, Article
7(2) of the 1989 Proposal provides that matters covered by the
proposed regulation but not mentioned therein shall be governed by
the general principles upon which the proposal is based, and if this
is not sufficient, national law will govern.74 Therefore, matters which
are not governed by the 1989 Proposal will be governed by national
law and general principles of Community law.75
The second reason that one should not fear the SE is that incor-
poration under the proposed European company regulations is op-
tional and firms will retain the alternative right of operating under
national company law. 76 Because of these harmonization efforts by
the EEC, the SE will not be a completely different legal instrument
but an entity with characteristics which are already well known in
most Member States.
1. Description and Legal Foundation of the SE
a. Description of the SE 7
In the 1989 Proposal, the SE consists of a commercial company78
having a legal personality79 and a minimum capital of ECU 100,000.80
71 Carreau & Lee, supra note 31, at 508.
74 In addition to article 7, reference to national law can also be found in Articles
14, 54, and 55 of the 1989 Proposal.
75 Article 7 provides:
1. Matters covered by this Regulation, but not expressly mentioned herein,
shall be governed:
a) by the general principles upon which this Regulation is based;
b) if those general principles do not provide a solution to the problem,
by the law applying to public limited companies in the State in which the
SE has its registered office ....
3. In matters which are not covered by this Regulation, Community law
and the law of the Member States shall apply to the SE.
4. In each Member State and subject to the express provisions of this
Regulation, an SE shall have the same rights, powers and obligations as a
public limited company incorporated under national law.
76 Carreau & Lee, supra note 31, at 508.
7 The French "Soci6t6 Anonyme" company form has from the beginning served
as the model of a European company by the drafters of the SE. The Socit6 Anonyme
was chosen as the model for the SE because it was well known throughout Europe,
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The registered office must be situated within the Community and
must be located where the SE has its central administration. 8' Where
an SE has a branch in a Member State other than that in which it
has its registered office, the branch may be registered in that Member
State.8 2
An SE can only be set up by legal persons. 3 Article 2 provides
that public companies formed under the law of a Member State and
having their registered office and central administration within the
Community may form an SE by merging or by forming a holding
company, provided that at least two of them have their central
administration in different Member States. s4 An SE may also be
created by forming a joint subsidiary.85 Such a joint subsidiary can
be created by an existing SE, together with one or more other existing
SEs, or with one or more companies or legal bodies.8 6 Finally, an
SE may form subsidiaries in the form of SEs; however, these sub-
sidiaries may not establish further subsidiaries in the form of SEs.87
For United States companies, it is important to note that the
restriction under Article 2 of the 1989 Proposal prohibits them from
creating or participating directly in an SE. However, nothing prevents
a United States company from using an EC-based subsidiary to obtain
the same result.
and because it was considered to be best suited from the management, financial,
and third party protection perspectives.
78 Proposal for a European Company Regulation, supra note 6, at Art. 1(3).
"' Id. at Art. 1(4).
10 Id. at Art. 4(1). There are two exceptions to the ECU 100,000 minimum capital
requirement in article 4. SEs operating as credit institutions (Art. 4(2)) or as insurance
carriers (Art. 4(3)) are excepted from the minimum capital requirement of the
Community but made subject to the minimum capital requirements set by the Member
State in which the entity has its registered office. Id. at Arts. 4(2) and 4(3).
11 Proposal for a European Company Regulation, supra note 6, at Art. 5. This
clause differs from the Commission's first proposal for an SE which would have
required the SE to register with the European Commercial Register at the European
Court of Justice. It would also have required the Member States to maintain a
register supplementary to the European Register and to register all SEs having
registered office in their territory. See First Commission Proposal (1975) in Har-
monization of Company Law, supra note 14. This change between the 1975 and
1989 Proposals shows the influence of the parties supporting greater national and
less Community control of the SE.
12 Proposal for a European Company Regulation, supra note 6, at Art. 8(2).
11 Id. at Art. 12(1).
I4 d. at Art. 2(1).
8, Id. at Art. 3(1).
86 Id. at Art. 3(2).
17 Id. at Art. 3(3).
[Vol. 21:191
EC CoMPANY LAW
b. The Legal Foundation
Although the Treaty of Rome, prior to 1986, did not authorize
the Council to create an SE, a sufficient legal basis has been found
for the first Proposal for a European company"' in Article 235 of
the Treaty. This is a catch-all provision which expressly validates the
doctrine of the implicit powers of the Community. The implicit powers
are necessary to realize one of the objectives of the Treaty and are
used when the goal to be accomplished is not dealt with by a specific
article of the Treaty.8 9
By 1989, however, a new legal basis became available under Com-
munity law29 In 1987, the Single European Act introduced Article
100a which gives the Community a more adequate and easier legal
basis to adopt a European company.9' The adoption of a European
company is made easier since a Commission proposal under Article
100a can be adopted by a qualified majority, whereas unanimity is
the rule under Article 235 of the EEC Treaty.
2. The Internal Organization of the SE
a. The Management System
The 1989 Proposal requires the SE to hold a general meeting of
shareholders and to elect either a two-tier management system con-
sisting of a management board and a supervisory board, or a single-
8s For the First Proposal of 1975 see Harmonization of Company Law, supra
note 14, at 122. See also the opinions of the European Parliament and ECOSOC
in 17 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C. 93) 22 (1974) and 15 O.J. EUR. Comm. (No. C.
131) 32 (1972).
89 See Carreau & Lee, supra note 31, at 505; Konstandinidis, supra note 51, at
301.30 If there is an independent legal basis available in the Treaty of Rome, article
235 cannot be used.
91 Single European Act, supra note 2, at Art. 100a. article 100a provides:
1. By way of derogation from article 100 and save where otherwise pro-
vided in this Treaty, the following provisions shall apply for the achievement
of the objectives set out in article 8a. The Council shall, acting by a
qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission in cooperation with
the European Parliament and after consulting the Economic and Social
Committee, adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States
which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal
market.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to fiscal provisions, to those relating to
the free movement of persons nor to those relating to the rights and interests
of employed persons.
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tier management system consisting of only an administrative board.92
In the two-tier system the SE must be managed and represented by
a management board under the supervision of a supervisory board.93
The members of the management board are appointed by the su-
pervisory board and may be removed by them at any time. 94 At no
time may a person be concurrently a member of both the management
board and the supervisory board of the same SE. 95 The supervisory
board may not participate in the management of the company nor
represent it in dealings with third parties. However, the supervisory
board may represent the company in its relations with members of
the management board.96 At least every three months, the management
board must report to the supervisory board on the management and
progress of the company's affairs, and on the company's prospects. 97
Under the one-tier system, the SE must be managed and represented
solely by an administrative board to be composed of at least three
members. 9s The management of the SE must be delegated by the
administrative board to one or more of its members. 99 The admin-
istrative board must meet at least once every three months to discuss
the management and progress of the company's affairs.' °°
The management systems as described in the Proposal are well
known in the EEC. The one-tier system is similar to the French
Socit6 Anonyme and has the advantage of strong collective respon-
sibility among the members of the board.'0 ' The dual board system
on the other hand seems to be a useful system for larger under-
takings.102 The most important innovation, however, is that the SE
allows its founders to choose the management system that best suits
its needs.
b. Employee Participation
The proposed Directive for workers' participation is the most sen-
sitive element of the 1989 Proposal and must be seen within the
92 Proposal for a European Company Regulation, supra note 6, at Art. 61.
13 Id. at Art. 62(1).
94 Id. at Art. 62(2).
- Id. at Art. 62(3).
96 Id. at Art. 63(1).
97 Id. at Art. 63(2).
Id. at Art. 66.
Id. at Art. 66(2).
Id. at Art. 67(1).
01 Konstandinidis, supra note 51, at 310.
102 Id. at 310-11.
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larger social European context. 03 On May 17, 1989, the Commission
put forth a Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights in
which the Commission attempted to elaborate ways for a more social
Europe.' 04 This Social Charter has been received with much criticism
and has often been called "socialism by the back door."' 0 5 According
to the Commission, "the social dimension of the internal market is
not a new phenomenon .... It was already present in the EEC
Treaty,'06 which provided that there should be an improvement in
living and working conditions enabling them to be approximated
while progress continued. It is among the objectives consolidated and
developed by the Single European Act.'" ° The proposal for employee
participation in the SE should be considered from this angle.
Because of the controversies surrounding the issue of employee
participation, the Commission has chosen a flexible approach which
permits the Member States to choose among three nonexclusive al-
ternative formulas. In addition, the commission excluded the issue
of workers' participation from the Proposal. Instead, the Commission
created a separate directive'0° based on Article 54 of the Treaty of
Rome and not on Article 100a.109
103 Proposed Employee Participation Directive, supra note 70.
- Bryan Harris, "Social Charter": the Legal Basis, 139 NEw L. J. 764 (1989).
os Johnson, Euro Firms Charter "Provokes" Britain, Daily Telegraph, July 13,
1989 at 4, col. 1; Johnson, EEC Worker Power Row Looms, Daily Telegraph, July
12, 1989 at 10, col. 1; Osborn, Delors Challenge to Mrs. Thatcher on Unity Issue,
Daily Telegraph, October 27, 1988 at 40, col. 3; Johnson, EEC Fears Wrath of
Thatcher over Plan for Workers, Daily Telegraph, June 1, 1989 at 14, col. 2; Harris,
supra note 104, at 764.
-' The Commission is referring to articles 48-51 of the EEC Treaty dealing with
the free movement of workers. For a general discussion see Movement of Workers,
1 CoM o N MKT. REP. (CCH) 1001.
101 Harris, supra note 104, at 768. Not everyone agreed that the social reforms
proposed by the Commission had been agreed upon by the 12 EEC Member States.
British Prime Minister Thatcher accused Jacques Delors, President of the Commis-
sion, of "trying to race ahead with moves towards European union that had not
been agreed [upon] by the Member States." Osborn, supra note 105, at 40. Answering
Thatcher's charges, Delors told the European Parliament that everything the Com-
mission was doing, and planned to do, had been approved by Britain and the other
EEC countries through the signing of the Single European Act in 1986. Id.
108 Proposed Employee Participation Directive, supra note 70.
"09 Harris, supra note 104, at 764. It was impossible to base the proposal concerning
employee participation on article 100a because article 100a(2) explicitly precludes it;
it provides that article 100a(l) (permitting harmonization by qualified majority)
"shall not apply to fiscal provisions, to those relating to the free movement of
persons nor to those relating to the rights and interests of employed persons."
A separate directive addressing the issue of employee participation enjoys a double
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The proposed employee participation directive provides that an SE
may not be formed unless one of the three employee participation
models has been chosen by means of an agreement between man-
agement and administrative boards of the founder companies and
their employee's representatives. If no agreement is reached, the
management and administrative boards are permitted to choose the
model most appropriate to the SE." 0 However, each Member State
will determine the manner in which the participation models must
be applied for SEs having their registered office in its territory.", A
Member State may also restrict the choice of the different models
available to the SE. 112
In the first model, at least one-third but not more than one-half
of the members of the supervisory board or the administrative board
are to be appointed by the employees or their representatives, or they
shall be co-opted by the board."' This is the so-called "German
system" of co-management.'14
In the second model, a separate independent body must represent
the employees of the SE." 5 This body shall have the right to be
informed of important company matters by the managing board or
the administrative board at least once every three months. 116 Moreover,
the employee's representatives can require a report concerning certain
aspects of the company's business or any other pertinent information
or documents. 117 Further, the representatives have the right to be
informed and consulted before any important decision referred to in
Article 72 of the proposed directive is implemented."" Belgium, France
and Italy currently use this system.
advantage. First, the rejection of this proposal will probably not thereby jeopardize
the possible acceptance of the SE. Second, by using a directive, the Member States
will more readily accept the employee parties' action proposal because they will
retain more control over its outcome since a directive is not self-executing and must
be implemented through national law. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at Art. 189.
11 Proposed Employee Participation Directive, supra note 70, at Art. 3(1).
"I Id. at Art. 3(4).
'12 Id. at Art. 3(5).
"I Id. at Art. 4.
11 Carreau & Lee, supra note 31, at 509.
"I Proposed Employee Participation Directive, supra note 70, at Art. 5.
116 Id. at Art. 5(2)(a).
117 Id. at Art. 5(2)(b).
18 Id. at Art. 5(2)(c). The most important operations requiring prior authorization
are the closure or transfer of establishment or of substantial parts thereof, substantial
reduction, extension or alterations of activities, and substantial organizational change.
Proposal for a European Company Regulation, supra note 6, at Art. 72.
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The third possibility provided for by the proposed directive allows
for the establishment of other models through an agreement between
the SE's management and administrative boards and the employees."19
There is, however, a minimum requirement that the employees must
be informed of the progress of the SE's business at least once every
three months.' 20 Employees must also be informed and consulted
before any decision referred to in Article 72 of the proposed employee
participation directive.' 2' The German Industry Commissioner who
developed this statute, Herr M. Bangemann, clearly hoped that this
third option would be weak enough in order to assure the acceptance
of the SE Proposal by countries which are less social minded, such
as Great Britain. 22
From a United States perspective, compulsory employee partici-
pation in the management of a corporation constitutes an unacceptable
interference in corporate management and ownership rights and is
not actively sought by labor organizations.'2 In Europe, however,
employee participation is considered to be a normal and legitimate
part of the business environment. Moreover, some countries have
proven that employee participation in management is neither dam-
aging to company profitibility, nor to the countries' economies gen-
erally. 2 4 The best example to be found is Germany where companies
are forced by law to have a employee participation program similar
to the first model. Apparently, this has not prevented Germany from
becoming the strongest economy within the EC.
In a multinational context such as the EC, the employee partici-
pation provisions can be a source of conflicts. For instance, a German
employee of an English SE will likely have fewer rights to participate
in the management of his corporation than his colleagues who work
for German corporations. On the other hand, English employees,
who usually do not participate in the management of a corporation,
will have to send representatives to the supervisory board of the board
of directors of an SE incorporated in Germany.
119 Proposed Employee Participation Directive, supra note 70, at Art. 6(1).
120 Id. at Art. 6(2)(a).
121 Id. at Art. 6(2)(b).
122 See Johnson, Euro Firms Charter "Provokes" Britain, supra note 105, at 4.
123 See Cary, supra note 10, at 699; Vagts, Reforming the "Modern" Corporation:
Perspectives from the German, 80. HAgv. L. REV. 23, 66-67 (1966).
124 Vagts, supra note 123, at 66-67.
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3. Tax Implications of the SE121
As noted, the Commission has sought to add a social dimension
to the SE. Jacques Delors, the French President of the European
Commission, would especially like the SE to play a key role in ensuring
that employees gain a share of the benefits of the single market. In
order to compensate European business for the added cost burdens
imposed by the social program, and in order to make the SE more
attractive to the European business community, the Commission in-
troduced a tax incentive program. 26
The 1989 Proposal provides that if the operations of an establish-
ment in one Member State lead to losses, these may be used to offset
the profits of the SE in the State where it is resident for tax purposes. 27
The subsequent profits of the permanent establishment of the SE in
another State will constitute taxable income for the SE up to the
amount of the previous losses of the permanent establishment.128
However, the Member States are free not to apply these principles
if they avoid double taxation by allowing the SE to set the tax already
paid by its permanent establishments against the tax due from it with
125 See generally Tax Incentives for the European Company, World Tax Rep.
(Financial Times) Nov. 1988, Finance/Business; Germany Remains Principle Obstacle
to EC Company Tax Package, World Tax Rep. (Financial Times) Apr. 1989, Finance/
Business; International Taxes, New EC Commission Proposal on Corporate Law
Compromises on Tax Consultation, Daily Rep. for Exec. (BNA) No. 134 (July 14,
1989) [hereinafter International Taxes).
16 Proposal for a European Company Regulation, supra note 6, at Art. 133.
article 133 includes the tax incentive and reads:
1. Where an SE has one or more permanent establishments in a Member
State or a non-member State, and the aggregation of the profits and losses
for tax purposes of all such permanent establishments results in a net loss,
that loss may be set against the profits of the SE in the State where it is
resident for tax purposes.
2. Subsequent profits of the permanent establishments of the SE in another
State shall constitute taxable income of the SE in the State in which it is
resident for tax purposes, up to the amount of the losses imputed in
accordance with paragraph 1.
3. Where a permanent establishment is situated in a Member State, the
imputable losses under paragraph I and the taxable profits under paragraph
2 shall be determined by the laws of that Member State.
4. Member States shall be free not to apply the provisions of this article
if they avoid double taxation by allowing the SE to set the tax already
paid by its permanent establishments against the tax due from it in respect
of the profits realized by those permanent establishments.
Id.
127 Proposal for a European Company Regulation, supra note 6, at Art. 133(1).
,28 Id. at Art. 133(2).
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respect to the profits realized by those permanent establishments.1 29
This is a considerable tax advantage, and it will surely be an
important incentive for European firms to adopt the SE form. How-
ever, this particular advantage may become less important in the
future if, as the Commission has indicated, this tax incentive is
extended to all companies operating in the EC and not only to the
SEs. 130
Britain is unhappy with the tax implications of the 1989 Proposal.
In the words of an English official, "[i]t would be legitimi[z]ing
doubtful transfer pricing practices.' 1 3' It appears, however, that the
United Kingdom's dissatisfaction is based on principle rather than
technical objections.
The other countries were clearly in favor of this tax proposal. The
French Minister for European Affairs, Edith Cresson, went a step
further and made it clear that this Proposal was a priority for her
country. 132 Since France held the presidency of the European Council
in 1989, the issue of the SE came to the top of the Council agenda.'3
C. The Necessity of the SE
An interesting question is whether the proposed SE is necessary,
useful but unnecessary, or neither useful nor necessary for the Eur-
opean Community. The Commission seems to be convinced that the
EC needs a European company. 34 It calls the European company a
priority for the EC and states in its Memorandum that "[a] European
Market calls for a European Company.' 35
However, not everyone shares this opinion. The opposition comes
from four sides. First, as already mentioned, some Member States
129 Id. at Art. 133(4). It seems that there were serious changes made in the weeks
before the actual proposal came out. Compare the actual proposed text with the
article International Taxes, supra note 125.
130 International Taxes, supra note 125; See also International Taxes, EC Tax
Commissioner Introduces Two Proposals to Remove Tax Barriers, Daily Rep. for
Exec. (BNA) at G3 (Dec. 3, 1990). This intention of the Commission is also indicated
in the preamble of the 1989 SE Proposal for a European Company Regulation,
supra note 6, at preamble.
"I Tax Incentives for the European Company, supra note 125.
132 Id.
'33 Id. As indicated supra section III, this tax incentive must be viewed in con-junction with the social aspects. It would seem that the main reason France supports
the 1989 SE Proposal is because it supports the introduction of these social aspects
into Community law.
,' See supra section III.
133 1988 Memorandum, supra note 31, at 5.
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oppose a European company. 136 Second, opposition comes from scho-
lars. The Belgian Professor Van Rijn has always been one of the
most fervent writers opposing the European company' 37 Third, there
is the continuing opposition of the workers who consider that their
rights are not sufficiently guaranteed under the proposed regulation.'3 8
Finally, opposition comes from industry, which believes that the social
aspects proposed by the Commission go too far.'3 9 The industry argues
that the added cost for employee participation would endanger the
competitive situation of European business. 4°
In its Memorandum, the Commission lists the five main obstacles
to cooperation between companies from different Member States.' 4'
The first obstacle mentioned by the Commission is the impossibility
of carrying out cross border mergers if there is no European com-
pany. 42 In the last decade the European business community has
sufficiently demonstrated that this is a strong overstatement. In ac-
'- England has always been one of the most important opponents of the SE.
Although other countries have also opposed this company form, their opposition
has generally been limited to various aspects of the SE and not to the very concept
itself. Although England has never formally opposed the concept of a European
company, its opposition to virtually all the various elements of the SE is essentially
equivalent to a repudiation of the concept of a European company. England has
even opposed the term "European company." It apparently believes that SE refers
to the French "Socit6 Europ~enne." In fact, it stands for the Latin "Societas
Europea," as indicated in the 1989 Proposal itself. The British considered this to
be "a real continental trick." Johnson, Row Looms Over Euro "Companies", Daily
Telegraph, Nov. 13, 1989, at 26.
17 He has made his opinion very clear in a short but convincing article in a
Belgian law review. Van Rijn, Faut-il instituer la "socit europkenne"?, 1967
JouRNA. DES TRmUNAUX 377.
I's As already indicated, there are three different options for employee partici-
pation. See Proposed Employee Participation Directive, supra note 70. Labor unions
consider the third option as unsatisfactory and would prefer that it be either excluded
or that it include more guarantees for minimum employee participation in company
decision making.
139 Independents Turn Against "Eurofirms", Daily Telegraph, Oct. 24, 1988, at
35. The Union of Independent Companies has joined the growing British opposition
to the EEC Proposal for a European company statute because of concern over its
social engineering implications. Id. See also Johnston, Businessmen Opposed to Euro
Mergers, Daily Telegraph, Oct. 27, 1988, at 11.
40 Johnston, supra note 139. This, however, is a discussion that has occurred in
most European countries in relation to national laws concerning employee partici-
pation and is thus not unique to the SE.
14 1988 Memorandum, supra note 31, at 6.
142 Id. Van Rijn attacks this argument by asserting that the SE will not make
mergers easier because mergers do not avoid the tax and legal problems of firms
involved in international business. Van Rijn, supra note 137, at 377.
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tuality, though not technically, international mergers are taking place
all the time. To accomplish these mergers, European lawyers use
different legal techniques such as the creation of a common holding
company, a parent-subsidiary relationship 143 or a joint venture. 14
However, it is true that technically a merger between two companies
of two different EC countries is legally impossible.' 45 It seems that
the tax and psychological problems are much greater obstacles to
sccessful cross-border mergers than the lack of a European company.
The second obstacle to international company cooperation is the
problem of taxation.'" Professor Van Rijn has indicated that the tax
burden is the most important obstacle for a cross border merger, but
he has also stated that the creation of a European company would
not change this situation.' 47 Two different tax problems must be
distinguished. On the one hand, a capital gains tax must be paid on
asset gains when a company stops operating as a legal entity. 48 On
the other hand, a company encounters tax obstacles when it operates.
A new directive on the tax implications of mergers appears to
supply a solution to the first problem. 49 It provides that "[a] merger
... shall not give rise to any taxation of capital gains calculated by
reference to the difference between the real values of the assets and
liabilities transferred and their values for tax purposes."' 50 This pro-
vision clearly eliminates the taxation of asset gains when a company
stops operating and merges in an SE.
,41 Konstandinidis, supra note 51, at 299.
" Carreau & Lee, supra note 31, at 506.
, Apart from the tax obstacles, a cross-border merger entails a change of na-
tionality and, more importantly, a loss of the legal personality of the acquired
company. 1988 Memorandum, supra note 31, at 12.
46 Id. at 6.
,47 Van Rijn, supra note 137, at 377.
141 Article 17(1) of the Proposal for a European Company Regulation, supra note
6, appears to provide a solution to this problem. It provides that in an SE formed
by merger, the merging companies shall be wound up without going into liquidation
by transferring their assets and liabilities to the SE in exchange for the issue of
stock in the SE. This means that there are, in principle, no tax burdens upon SEs
formed by mergers. However, the new SE will be liable for the capital gains tax.
The proposal also permits the formation of an SE in the form of a holding company,
the formation of a joint subsidiary in the form of an SE, and the formation of a
subsidiary by an SE. Respectively, id. at Arts. 31, 43, and 36.
149 Council Directive of 23 July 1990, on the Common System of Taxation Ap-
plicable to Mergers, Divisions, Transfers of Assets and Exchanges of Shares Con-
cerning Companies of Different Member States, 33 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L. 225)
1 (1990) [hereinafter Council Directive 90/434].
110 Id. at Art. 4(1).
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The second tax problem is more difficult. The preamble of the
1989 Proposal states that for tax purposes, the SE must be subject
to the legislation of the Member State in which it resides. 5' Taxes
would continue to be paid in each of the Member States where
operations take place. 52 This provision will cause difficulties because
of the varying tax systems in the different Member States; double
taxation on dividends and on some of the economic transactions will
also present problems. Thus, the Proposal will not eliminate all the
tax problems. However, the Council of the European Community
has recently adopted a Directive'" and a Convention'5 4 on double
taxation. These measures, which apply to all EC companies, and not
only to SEs, will largely solve the problem of double taxation in the
EC.
The third obstacle to cooperation between companies from the
different Member States is the variance in company laws of the
Member States.'55 It is easier to do business with a company organized
under a familiar structure than with one formed under a completely
unfamiliar structure. Unfamiliar company law may produce unex-
pected results regarding such matters as protection of parties and
ultra vires. This obstacle appears to be of minor importance because
the directives, as described, have already realized a high degree of
unification between the different company laws. 5 6
The fourth obstacle indicated in the Commission's Memorandum
is the difficulty of managing a group of companies as a single
economic unit. 57 The Commission indicates that the:
[D]ifficulties under present company law in virtually all Member
States of managing a group of enterprises as a single economic unit
Proposal for a European Company Regulation, supra note 6, preamble at 42.
The principle that the SE would be subject to the tax laws of the state in which it
is domiciled, in the same way as any other company, means that all tax agreements
made by the state of domicile with other states would apply equally to the SE. See
M. Brealy & C. Quigley, supra note 33, at 205.
25 European Company Statute; Commission Issues Revised Proposal; Compro-
mised Made on Tax Consultation, 1992-The External Impact of European Unifi-
cation (BNA) No. 8, at 1 (July 14, 1989).
-3 Council Directive 90/434, supra note 149, at 6.
- Convention on the Elimination of Double Taxation in Connection with the
Adjustment of Profits of Associated Enterprises, 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L. 225)
10 (1990).
-5 1988 Memorandum, supra note 31, at 6.
256 The harmonization of national company laws is discussed supra section II.
257 1988 Memorandum, supra note 31, at 11.
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rather than in the interests of its individual component companies
[and] [t]he lack of recognition in many Member States of the "groups"
phenomenon continues to make such cooperation across frontiers
too complex, too burdensome and thus too risky. 5
Again, the importance of this difficulty should not be exaggerated.
It has never been so burdensome that companies which wanted to
merge were not able to do so, or that companies which were merged
were not able to run the group as a single unit. Moreover, most
countries do not recognize the group interest in their company law
and, according to domestic company law, the managers are not
allowed to take this group interest into consideration when making
a decision. 5 9 The successful operation of thousands of such companies
in the European Community proves that this is not a real problem.
However, the SE will undoubtedly make it easier to manage a group
enterprises as a single unit. 6'
The fifth obstacle to cooperation between companies from different
Member States without the existence of a European company are the
administrative difficulties and expenses inherent in setting up com-
panies.1 61 Naturally, entrepreneurs are not as familiar with foreign
requirements as with those of their own national system. This makes
it more expensive and psychologically more difficult to decide in
favor of a cross-border merger. Here again, the SE form will lessen
the administrative difficulties and reduce the cost of setting up a
European operation, but these difficulties have not proven to be so
burdensome that European businessmen have been unable to realize
cross-border mergers.
V. CONCLUSION
The 1989 SE Proposal may in two ways be characterized as a
political move. First, it is a move towards a more social Europe by
forcing the Member States to adopt at least one of the employee
participation schemes. Second, it is a move towards a closer and
more intensive European integration because entities of different Eur-
opean countries will be able to cooperate more easily with each other.
,Id. at 11.
159 "Group interest" refers to the interests of all daughter and parent companies
rather than the interests of a single company.
6 See, e.g., Seventh Council Directive of 13 June 1983, based on article 54(3)(g)
of the Treaty on Consolidated Accounts, 26 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L. 193) 1 (1983).
161 1988 Memorandum, supra note 31, at 11.
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There is no absolute necessity for an SE so long as there is available
what the Treaty of Rome describes as the "right of establishment"
or what is known in the United States as the "freedom of interstate
commerce." 6 2 And so long as there exists within the EEC a movement
to harmonize the different company laws of the Member States, there
will be no absolute necessity for an SE.
The main benefit of the 1989 SE Proposal is psychological. A
company operating under this form constitutes a real European com-
pany. Having a European character and no longer being completely
dependent on any particuar Member State for its legal existence, it
will thus be more likely to act in accordance with European interests
and less likely to be governed by national sentiment and pride.
However, it remains an open question whether this will be enough
of an incentive for existing large European corporations to opt for
an SE. Smaller firms are more likely to be attracted to the SE form
for the psychological benefits, the additional mobility and the smaller
operation costs.
162 VAN RUN, L'HARmoNISATION DNs LES CommuNAuT s 65 (1968).
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POLICE, STATE SECURITY FORCES AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ZAMBIA
Charles Mwalimu*
I. POLICE AND STATE SECURITY FORCES IN ZAMBIA
A. Introduction
Zambia was a British colony of Northern Rhodesia from 1889 to
1963.' It attained independence from Britain as a Republic within
the Commonwealth of Nations on October 24, 1964 under an In-
dependence Constitution attached to the Zambia Independence Act
of 1964.2 The Constitution of 1964 was a multi-party constitution
which lasted until 1973 when a one-party system of government was
introduced pursuant to the One Party Constitution of 1973.1 The
party presently in power is the United National Independence Party
(UNIP).4 Currently, therefore, Zambia functions with a strong ex-
ecutive presidency governed by Kenneth Kaunda, its only president
* Senior Legal Specialist, Near Eastern and African Law Division, Law Library,
Library of Congress. Ideas and opinions expressed in this study are those of the
author with no reflection on the Law Library of Congress.
The author wishes to express sincere gratitude to Dr. Munira Mwalimu for her
untiring efforts to oversee the technical outlay of this article. Our exchange of ideas
on police and human rights in Zambia has ensured clarity of subject matter. I am
deeply grateful.
To the author's knowledge, this is the first ever study on police, state security
forces and human rights practices in Zambia other than the Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices by the United States Department of State, referred to in
this article.
See generally ZAmiBA: A COUNTRY STUDY (I. Kaplan 3d ed. 1987).
2 The two were incorporated into the Zambia Independence Order in Council,
No. 1652 STAT. INST. 4477 (1963).
' ZAMBIA CONST. (1973). The text of the Constitution is appended to the Con-
stitution of Zambia Act, No. 27 Z. Gov'T GAZETTE 191 (Supp. 1973).
4 For a detailed discussion on constitutional ramifications of UNIP and the one-
party state, see generally, Mwalimu, The Influence of Constitutions on the Devel-
opment of a Nation's Law and Legal System: The Case of Zambia and Nigeria, 8
ST. Louis U. PUB L. REv. 157 (1989).
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since independence, with the advice of the Central Committee, Cabinet
and Parliament.5
B. Historical Development and Current Structure
Pre-colonial policing in Zambia functioned through unwritten cus-
tomary laws of the indigenous people.6 The advent of British colonial
rule in Northern Rhodesia altered the political landscape of the coun-
try. The British South African Company (B.S.A. Company) of Cecil
Rhodes was granted a Royal Charter in 1889. 7 This instrument rec-
ognized the authority of the Company to acquire and exploit mineral
rights in North-Western and North-Eastern Rhodesia in exchange for
colonial armed protection against threats to local chiefs in the ter-
ritories.8 To provide this military protection, a small constabulary
was formed in 1891.9 It primarily functioned as a buffer against Arab
slave traders and protected commercial interests of the B.S.A. Com-
pany. Two sections of the constabulary, the North-Eastern and Bar-
otse Native Police, were established under the Barotseland North-
Western Rhodesia Order in Council (1899).0 In North-Eastern Rho-
desia, police were subject to the North-Eastern Rhodesia Order in
Id. at 167. It is believed that article 4 of the Constitution of 1973 which
entrenched the supremacy of UNIP as the sole political party has been repealed to
accomodate the opposition parties, in particular, the Movement for Multi-Party
Democracy (MMO). However, this amendment has not been received anywhere in
the United States. Elections are scheduled to take place in October of 1991. These
elections are being conducted under the same Constitution of 1973. The party in
power is still UNIP and the infrastructure as well as institutions of government
remain the same. Essentially, no change in the conduct of the affairs of government
has been effected.
6 See generally J. CRAMER, THE WORLD's POLICE 221 (1964). Traditional forms
of police are found in well-established institutions of kingships and chieftainships
such as the Lozi of western Zambia. Reportedly, they operated under a hierarchy
of police powers from the village headman to the paramount chief. In this system,
police arrangements appear to have been based on tribal customs and practices,
effected largely by personalities of local potentates. These policing traditions were
designed for both internal and external protection as well as to maintain law and
order.
18 HERTSLET'S Comm. TREATIES 134 (1907).
See generally RuBIN, TARANrlNO AND LARKIN, CONSTITIONS OF THE COUNTRIES
OF THE WORLD 1 (A.P. Blaustein & G.H. Flanz eds. Supp. 1985).
9 STAT. L.N.W. RHOD. 1899-1901, 1 (1905). Under this law, although a majority
of the constabulary constituted an infantry unit, other members performed civil
police duties.
'o STAT. L.N.W. RHOD. 1899-1909, 7 (1910); see also High Commissioner's Pro-
clamations Nos. 15 & 19 (1901) on discipline and other provisions on the Barotse
Native Police. Id. at 15.
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Council, No.1 (1911)." It was also in 1911 that the two Rhodesias
in the East and West were fused. 12 Consequently, the Northern Rho-
desia Proclamation No. 17 (1912) 3 was issued to form a combined
civil police, designated as the Northern Rhodesia Police.
British South African Company rule lasted from 1889 to 1924.' 4
To reflect the change in government and administration from the
B.S.A. Company to direct British rule, the Northern Rhodesia Police
Ordinance, No. 16 (1926)," was issued to regulate matters regarding
police in the territory. In 1937, the Northern Rhodesia Police Force
was overhauled, evidenced in a new Northern Rhodesia Police Or-
dinance, No. 15 (1937).16
A federation uniting Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) with Southern
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (Malawi) to form the Federation
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was established in 1953 to last until
1963.17 As on previous occasions of administration change, a police
STAT. L.N.E. RHOD. 101 (1917).
22 No. 438 STAT. R. & 0. 85 (1911).
'3 STAT. L.N.E. RHOD. 253 (1912). It was amended by Proclamation No. 16
(1915) and effected by Proclamation No. 14 (1914) and Amendment Order in Council
(1916), which revoked section 20. The Law of 1912 superseded Proclamations Nos.
15 and 19 of 1901. Peculiarly, however, it was not mandatory under this law for
police to consent to the merger and be amenable to the Law of 1912. Where officers
opted to remain separate, they continued to be governed by the previously existing
police instruments in Barotseland or North-Eastern Rhodesia. As a result, initial
numbers of the Northern Rhodesia Police Force were very small. In 1912, for
example, this force consisted of 19 British officers and 750 enlisted Africans. For
details on the background of the Northern Rhodesia Police Force, see CRAMER,
supra note 6, at 221-226.
'4 Northern Rhodesia Order in Council, No. 324 STAT. R. & 0. 395 (1924); see
also Northern Rhodesia Order in Council, No. 325, STAT. R. & 0. 407 (1924).
'" ORD. PROC. & 0. n. COUNCIL N. RHOD. 35 (1927). Under this law, police
functioned as a military force during times of war and other public emergencies.
Supreme authority was vested in the Governor-General of Northern Rhodesia. How-
ever, command, superintendence and control of the force was vested in a Com-
mandant under section 5 of the Police Ordinance (1926). The Commandant was an
appointee of the Governor General as approved by the Secretary of the Colonies
in England. This law was partial to Europeans, who readily qualified to command
ranks under section 6 of the Ordinance of 1926. In 1933, the military portion of
the Northern Rhodesia Police Force was detached from the regular police force and
designated as the Northern Rhodesia Regiment. The Civil Police Force showed an
increase in European police at 80 persons and a decrease in the African enrollment
at 447 persons. For details, see CRAMER, supra note 6, at 221-226. The Law of 1926
was consolidated in the Northern Rhodesia Police Ordinance, 1 L.N. RHOD. Ch.
46, 393 (1930).
26 Supp. L.N. RHOD. 126 (1946).
27 No. 1199 STAT. INST. 1804 (1953); see also Rhodesia and Nyasaland Order in
Council, No. 1635 STAT. INST. 3090 (1963). The Federation dissolved under Order
in Council, No. 2088 STAT. INST. 4477 (1963).
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ordinance followed: the Northern Rhodesia Police Ordinance, No. 5
(1953), 18 was issued to cater to federal law enforcement needs in the
Northern Rhodesian territory. At independence in 1964,19 the Northern
Rhodesia Police Force became the Zambia Police Force (the Force)
under the same law of 1953.20
The Independence Constitution of 1964 in Part IX, articles 48 and
49, provided for the Zambia Police Force as an integral part of the
public service. 21 Colonial statutory regimes were modified in 1965 by
the Police Act, No. 46 (1965).22 This law forms the basis of policing
institutions in the country today. 23
The organization and administrative structures of the Zambia police
force are largely predicated on the Zambia Police Act.24 This Act
11 2 L.N. RHOD. Ch. 44, 1 (1965 ed.). In this pre- independence era, native
authorities operated largely unarmed rural police forces to maintain law and order.
Limited fiscal resources and the lack of a clearly articulated statutory authority
hampered their enforcement functions. In a large number of cases, local police
operated as messengers enforcing native authority edicts and summons. CRAMER,
supra note 6, at 221-226. The Northern Rhodesia Police Reserve, consisting of 1400
Europeans and 750 Africans, was formed in 1950 under ordinance No. 45, 2 L.N.
RHOD. Ch. 39, 1 (1964 ed).
,9 Zambia Independence Order in Council, No. 1652 STAT. INST. 3643 (1964).
20 2 L.N. RHOD. Ch. 44, 1 (1965 ed.). Under this enactment, police strength is
estimated at approximately 6000, catering to a population of about four million
people. Most expatriate officers remained on the force for a few years to ensure
continuity and the orderly transfer of police functions to Zambian forces. See
generally Z. POLICE ANN. REP. FOR TnO YEAR 1964 1-39 (1964).
21 1 L.Z. arts. 48-9 (rev. ed. 1972). Articles 48 and 49 of the Constitution vested
powers of appointment and disciplinary control of police in the President. As part
of his executive functions, command of the armed forces (including the Zambia
Police Force) was vested in the President alone. However, the Commissioner of
Police was in charge of day-to-day operations of the force coincident with the Police
Ordinance of 1953, still deemed applicable. See supra note 20, 2 L.N. RHOD. Ch.
44, 1-72. Furthermore, under articles 48 and 49 of the Independence Constitution
of 1964, in conjunction with article 114 (9) and (10), powers of appointment and
disciplinary control over police officers below the rank of superintendent were vested
in the Commissioner of Police.
21 Z. GOv'T GAZETrE 273-309 (Acts Supp. 1965); consolidated in 3 L.Z. Ch. 133,
1 (rev. ed. 1972); see also Amendment Act, No. 40 Z. GOV'T GAZETTE 209 (Acts
Supp. 1974). The Police Reserve still functions under Act 4, 1950, 3 L.Z. Ch. 130,
1 (rev. ed. 1972).
13 Under the One Party Constitution of 1973, articles 130 (1) and (c) established
a Police and Prison Service Commission to supersede the Public Service Commission
as the controlling authority of police. However, even under the One Party Consti-
tution of 1973, power to appoint the Inspector-General of Police, who replaced the
Commissioner as the most superior police officer, was vested in the President. The
President also enjoys powers of disciplinary control and removal of the Inspector-
General and his second in command, according to article 132 (1) and (c) of the
Constitution of 1973.
24 3 L.Z. Ch. 133, 1-81 (rev. ed. 1972).
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also controls the structure, functions, and discipline of the force. 25
Hierarchy of command of the Force runs through a Constable, Cor-
poral, Sergeant, Sergeant Major, Sub-Inspector, Assistant Superin-
tendent, Superintendent, Chief Superintendent, Assistant
Commissioner, Senior Assistant Commissioner, Deputy Commis-
sioner, Commissioner, Inspector General of Police, and the Presi-
dent.26 Three departments hold the structural organization together;
namely, the Administration, Technical, and Operations departments .27
The Zambia Security Intelligence Service (ZSIS) was established in
1973 .28 The ZSIS deals with matters of intelligence and other activities
pertaining to the security interests of the country pursuant to the
State Security Act of 1969 as amended, 29 together with the Preser-
vation of Public Security Act of 1960 as amended,30 and the Regu-
lations of 1964. 3 ' It consists of a director and officers as determined
by the President under section 3 of this law. Rule-making powers
25 According to section 5 of the Act, the term "security forces of Zambia" refers
to the three components of the Zambian armed forces, namely, the Army, which
may also include the National Service and Home Guards, the Air Force, and the
Zambia Police Force. A small marine force operates on lakes bordering other
countries such as Mweru with Zaire, Kariba bordering Zimbabwe, and Lake Tan-
ganyika sharing borders with Tanzania. Cooperation for purposes of law enforcement
with other sections of the armed forces is regulated through the Ministry of Home
Affairs, which is responsible for the preservation of peace, prevention and detection
of crime and apprehension of offenders.
26 Z. POLICE ANN. REP. FOR THE YEAR 1981, 1-33 (1981).
27 See generally supra notes 28 and 29. Command of the force rests with the
Inspector-General of Police assisted by the Commissioner of Police and three Deputy
Commissioners. Each department in turn is under the command of a Senior Assistant
Commissioner of Police. The force is jurisdictionally apportioned into 13 divisions,
corresponding to the provinces of the country, which are Central, Copperbelt,
Eastern, Luapula, Lusaka, North-Western, Southern and Western Provinces. The
remaining units are organized according to function, such as the Mobile Police Unit,
Training Schools, Para-Military, State House and Tazara Police for the security and
patrol of the Chinese-built Zambia-Tanzania Railway. The Police Act was amended
in 1985 by No. 23 Z. GOv'T GAZETTE 101 (Acts Supp. 1985), to establish Vigilante
Groups in the country. See also Vigilante Regulations, No. 122 Z. Gov'T GAZETTE
.323-334 (S.I. Supp. 1986). The Zambia Police Force is assisted by the Zambia
National Defense Forces, the Anti-Corruption Commission, the Special Investigation
Team for Economy and Trade (SITET), Flying Anti-Robbery and Anti-Drug Squads,
the Office of the President, Zambia Police Force Reserve, Mine Police, and private
and security guard operations. For details, see Z. POLICE ANN. REP. FOR THE YEAR
1979, 1-45 (1979); see also Z. POLICE ANN. REP. FOR THE YEAR 1976, 1-49 (1976);
Z. POLICE ANN. REP. FOR THE YEAR 1974, 1-47 (1974).
28 Act No. 43 Z. GOV'T GAZETTE 369 (Acts Supp. 1973).
29 2 L.Z. Ch. 110, 1 (rev. ed. 1972).
30 2 L.Z. Ch. 106, 1 (rev. ed. 1972).
3- 2 L.Z. Ch. 106, 8 [Subsidiary] (rev. ed. 1972).
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are vested in the President.12 A Staff Board subject to the instructions
of the Director-General appoints, promotes, and disciplines officers
in the ZSIS below the rank of Director. 3 The Board advises the
Director-General on incidental matters affecting the general welfare
of the ZSIS. 34
It should be emphasized that a close relationship is revealed between
the actions of police and the performance of a government.3 5 From
the public point of view, police performance mirrors the functions
and actions of the government. No other agency of the government
influences the development of sound constitutionalism more than the
police.
36
In Zambia, due to the strict nature of the one-party system, an
independent and impartial law enforcement system must exist. 37 With
this in mind, police independence comes only from its integrity and
desire to ensure the preservation of individual rights.38
The mandate for a police force to enforce law and order requires
a reasonable exercise of control to ensure peaceful enjoyment of
fundamental human rights. Colonial and post-colonial policing in
Zambia was and is hierarchical in nature, reflecting the British in-
fluences. State security forces are also a part of this hierarchical
system. Since Zambia has been under some form of national emer-
32 Z. Gov'T GAZETTE 191 (Acts Supp. 1973).
33 Id.
14 See generally State Security (Amendment) Act, No. 27 Z. GOV'T GAZETTE 153
(Acts Supp. 1985).
31 See, e.g., Carter & Marenin, Police in the Community: Perception of a Gov-
ernment Agency in Action in Nigeria, 15 AFRICAN L. STUD. 9-28 (1977).
36 See, e.g., Carter & Marenin, The Political Role of the Police and the Nigerian
Draft Constitution, 1 NIGERIA BEHAV. SCI. J. 93-103 (1978).
17 Mwalimu, supra note 4, at 157.
11 The social milieu of police operation in Zambia is characterized by an over-
whelming increase in crime rates and other acts of anti-social behavior. See generally
Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS): Daily Rep. Sub-Saharan Africa
[hereinafter FBIS: D.R.S.S.A.], Tuesday May 30, 1989, at 29-31. This atmosphere
of lawlessness coupled with the general economic hardships affecting the whole.
country exposes police to tendencies unpalatable to consonant law enforcement. For
examples of reported instances see Z. POLICE ANN. REP. FOR THE YEAR 1964, 1-39
(1964); see also Z. POLICE ANN. REP. FOR THE YEAR 1974, 1-47 (1974); Z. POLICE
ANN. REP. FOR THE YEAR 1976, 1-49 (1976); Z. POLICE ANN. REP. FOR THE YEAR
1979: GEN. REP. AND SURVEY OF THE YEAR 1979, 1-45 (1979); Z. POLICE ANN. REP.
FOR THE YEAR 1981, 1-33 (1981); POLICE AND PRISON SERVICE COMMISSION ANN.
REP. FOR THE YEAR 1979, 1-4 (1980); POLICE AND PRISON SERVICE COMMISSION ANN.
REP. FOR THE YEAR 1980, 1-5 (1981); ANN. REP. OF THE POLICE AND PRISON SERVICE
COMMISSION FOR THE YEAR 1981, 1-5 (1982); ANN. REP. OF THE POLICE AND PRISON
SERVICE COMMISSION FOR THE YEAR 1982, 1-5 (1983).
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gency continuously since just prior to 1964, the President, police,
and state security forces enjoy extraordinary powers, including the
right to detain persons. Use of these powers in certain instances
results in abuse and infringement of individual rights.
Accountability of police and state security forces is constitutional
in nature. Case law has developed within the Zambian constitutional
framework that restricts the expansive modalities of police power and
state security forces. Administrative accountability has also developed,
as reflected in disciplinary sanctions imposed against rogue law en-
forcement agents.
The law of human rights in Zambia typifies similar regimes in
other Commonwealth African countries that limit complete enjoyment
of fundamental human rights in the interests of national security,
public order, safety, general welfare of the state, and other policy
considerations. This "misapplication" of human rights law can be
traced to colonial formulation of human rights norms as part of a
"second-tier" of states' rights, ordinarily reflected in the "public
order" laws (such as criminal law). Contemporary formulation of
human rights in Zambia and other sub-Saharan African states con-
stitutes an usurpation of individual rights by the state because these
two levels differ from one another in a basic sense-namely, fun-
damental human rights are regarded as the basis upon which all other
constitutional norms rest, while second tier norms are the basis for
government rights. To ensure that Zambia and other sub-Saharan
nations recognize the full enjoyment of basic rights, the police and
state security forces must function independently and focus on law
enforcement rather than regime protection.
C. Theoretical Antecedents of Police
A police force represents the government department established
primarily to maintain law and order. 9 The caveat in the exercise of
police authority is that reasonable control must always accompany
its practical utility. However the police force itself, following the
traditional concept of this government department, is granted dis-
cretion to determine the manner in which it safeguards both individual
rights and government security.
Applying a test of reasonableness, the police exceed their mandated
authority with actions considered arbitrary, capricious, or influenced
39 See generally WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 910 (1984); see also BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1041 (5th ed. 1979).
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by improper motivation. Where these actions adversely affect liberties
and freedoms of individuals, they must be deemed a breach of
fundamental human rights. Furthermore, if police action is not for
the common good or the welfare of society at large, it must be
declared a violation of fundamental human rights. Finally, police
violations of laws restricting their powers are an abridgment of basic
human rights.
This article employs a standard of "reasonable control" to examine
police and state security forces in Zambia and follows a philosophy
of unrestricted enjoyment of fundamental human rights as aspects
of Zambian constitutionalism °
II: ACCOUNTABILITY OF POLICE AND STATE SECURITY FORCES IN
LAW AND PRACTICE
Police accountability exists in the constitutional context through
administrative regulations and through the judicial process. The courts
act as sentinels of individual liberties, ensuring that police powers
(including those of state security forces) are utilized in accordance
with the Constitution.4' Therefore, the legal accountability of any
police force is constitutional in nature. 42
40 The test of "reasonable control" regarding police powers can conceptually be
manipulated in a variety of ways to predicate other aspects of police powers. For
example, secret police and other state security forces are founded on expansive
modalities of state sovereignty in the philosophical tensions between fundamental
human rights and rights of the state. The design of these forces, though not illegal
by any means, is founded on a circumvention of the restrictive nature of the traditional
authority of police as a unit of government. This article postulates that policy
justifications emanating under notions of public security, public order and the general
welfare of the state which are otherwise impermissible from the traditional outlook
of police mandate, namely the exercise of "reasonable control" over persons, il-
lustrate the extension in scope of powers enjoyed by state security and other secret
police. Any unit of government established for the execution of secret police goals
requires a tighter process of oversight in order to monitor possible erosion of basic
individual rights. Contemporary national states invariably have blurred the requisite
distinction between the regular political functions of the executive branch of a
government and the authority of police as sentinels of law in public or civil service.
The obliteration of this necessary demarcation invites undue political interference in
the law enforcement function of police. As a result, the police force, as an organ
of the law to safeguard society, acquires an identity as an instrument of the executive
branch of government to warrant political interference. It must function as an
independent entity of the state, primarily to follow the law and not the executive
branch.
41 ZAMBIA CONST. art. 26.
42 Id.
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Constitutional underpinnings of this accountability give rise to
actions under tort law, administrative law, criminal law, and other
legal branches. These actions arise only to the extent that police
action has been subjected to its mandate to exercise reasonable control
over persons and property for the common good and not to protect
dominant classes. Since fundamental human rights constitute organic
norms of the Constitution, all other norms, whether issued in the
Constitution itself or purporting to follow it, must be conscionable
under the spirit of fundamental human rights provisions. Thus, the
test, is a constitutional one which ascribes legality and liability to
police and state security force actions.
In Zambia, the parameters of the police mandate are contoured
under article 26 of the Constitution, 43 balancing between individual
rights and the domain of a sovereign state. Article 26, in addition
to other articles limiting individual rights, stipulates that, notwith-
standing guaranteed rights in other articles," a law or action under
it is consistent with these provisions insofar as it is shown that this
particular law permits preemption of these rights because the country
is under a declaration of war or a state of emergency sustainable
under article 30 of the Constitution. 4 Any such law or action can
only be held invalid if it is adjudged excessive, taking into account
the test of reasonableness in view of prevailing circumstances. 46
Article 30 of the Constitution stipulates when the President may
preempt the exercise of fundamental human rights. The President
may declare that a state of emergency exists under the Emergency
Powers Act of 1964. Alternatively, the President may declare that a
situation exists which may develop into a state emergency under the
Preservation of Public Security Act .47
Under these measures, the President, police, and state security
forces enjoy extraordinary powers. Since the exercise of executive
43 Id.
" Id. Article 15 relates to the protection of the right to personal liberty; article
18 protects from deprivation of property; article 19 protects from deprivation of
privacy of home and other property; article 21 relates to the protection of freedom
of conscience; article 22 addresses protection of freedom of expression; article 23
covers protection of freedom of assembly and associations; article 24 protects freedom
of movement; and article 25 protects from discrimination on the grounds of race.
45 Id. art. 30.
46Id.
47 See generally ZAMBiA: A COUNTRY STUDY (I. Kaplan 3d ed. 1987); see also
Parker, Control of Executive Discretion Under Preventive Detention Law in Zambia,
13 COMP. & INT'L. L. J. SOUTHERN AFRICA 159 (July 1980).
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power must conform to the Constitution's boundaries, notwithstand-
ing the necessary draconian nature of such actions, a process must
be established to review exectuve action and police powers.
An accord between these two sets of values, basic individual rights
and government authority embodied in emergency executive and police
powers, has been reached in article 27 of the 1973 Constitution.4
Under this article, where a person's liberties to freely move about
are curtailed or limited in any way as a result of executive action,
the following conditions must be complied with by the detaining
authority.
First, as soon as reasonably feasible, but not in excess of fourteen
days from the date the detention commenced, the victim must be
provided with a written statement in a language he or she understands,
articulating in detail the specific grounds of detention.4 9
Second, not more than thirty days from the time the detention or
restriction began, a notice must be published in the Government
Gazette stipulating that the individual concerned is in detention.
Detaining authorities also must provide the specific provisions of a
law which permits such restriction or detention.50
Third, only after a year in confinement or detention and upon a
request from the detainee during the term of the detention, the victim's
case must be reviewed by an autonomous tribunal constituted under
law.5 Legal representation must also be provided either in the tribunal
or in the court of adjudication according to article 27 of the Con-
stitution .52
Case law has emerged under these provisions to challenge the liberal
exercise of presidential and police powers of detention. The cases are
primarily founded on notions of constitutional accountability, but
give rise to such torts as false imprisonment and malicious prose-
cution. In Banda v. Attorney General," for example, petitioner, a
suspect in a murder trial,- was detained by police under powers
ZAMBIA CONST. art. 27.
49 Id. art. 27(a).
50 Id. art. 27(b).
I' Id. art. 27(c). See also RuBN, TARANTINO & LARIN, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 52 (A.P. Blastein & G.H. Flanz eds. Supp. 1985).
52 ZAMBIA CONST. arts. 27(d)-(e). These provisions require that the detainee consult
a legal representative of her choice. The attorney appears with the victim before
the tribunal adjudicating her case. Facilities for legal representation under articles
27(d) and (e) of the Constitution are in respect to both the court and the review
tribunal.
13 1978 Z.L.R. 233 (1978).
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contained in Regulation 33(6) of the Preservation of Public Security
Regulations of 196414 for nine days and then released without being
provided grounds of detention as required by article 27 of the Con-
stitution. The petitioner successfully maintained an action against the
government for false imprisonment.55 In Mulwanda v. The People,5 6
petitioner, a Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs,
was detained by police under the same Regulation 33(6) of the Re-
gulations of 1964 for corrupt practices. The police officer who de-
tained him believed that the case was a peculiar one which demanded
similar unusual methods of investigation. The Court denounced the
officer's detention of the petitioner. 7
14 2 L.Z. Ch. 106, at 8 [Subsidiary] (rev. ed. 1972).
5 The Court criticized abuse of police powers under this Regulation stating:
A person may be arrested and detained under Regulation 33(6) if, and only
if, the police officer in question has reason to believe that there are grounds
which would justify the making of a Presidential order under Regulation
33(1). It is unlawful to use Regulation 33(6) for the purpose of investigating
a criminal offense unrelated to public security. It is incorrect to say that
in the case of a detention order under Regulation 33(6), the police act only
on suspicion and do not have any grounds as envisaged by article 27 and
which therefore applies only when grounds are established. As a matter of
construction of the language used, there must be grounds for the police
detention itself, and if that were not the proper construction, Regulation
33 (6) would be ultra-vires.
1978 Z.L.R. at 238.
In Mwaba v. Attorney General, 1975 Z.L.R. 218 (1975), which disapproved Chimba
& Others v. Attorney-General, 1972 Z.L.R. 165 (1972) on the same subject, the
court held that a person detained under the Preservation of Public Security Regu-
lations of 1964 does not surrender all her rights as a citizen of Zambia except those
which are vitiated by virtue of the detention. But this detention under these Re-
gulations is a mere preventive act, and no stipulations can be imposed except those
which reasonably can be adjudged to facilitate the process of detention. In Mwangala
v. Attorney-General, 1974 Z.L.R. 97 (1974), where the plaintiff was arrested by
police, kept in a prison cell for twenty-four hours, released on a police bond, and
never prosecuted, such police action was held to be an illegal act.
56 1976 Z.L.R. 133 (1976).
17 The High Court in Mulwanda's case disagreed with the police officer and his
use of police powers, warning:
This is a thoroughly reprehensive attitude which must be unreservedly
condemned. We share the deep anxiety which every right thinking member
of society must feel at the prevalence of corruption in high places, but if
the law enforcement agencies of the state knowingly resort to illegal methods
to combat this type of social evil, they simply replace it with an even
greater evil, namely an arm of the executive which regards itself as being
above and beyond the law. Far from protecting society, these methods will
inevitably lead to its destruction.
Id. at 136.
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There are also cases decided within the parameters of criminal law
and criminal procedure. For example, in Mbandangoma v. Attorney
General,58 the plaintiff successfully made a case against the police
for misuse of detention powers in a police bond. The courts strongly
reprimanded the police, cautioning that they must show justifications
to arrest the plaintiff and at the time of arrest, reasonable grounds
must exist linking the plaintiff with the offense. 9
Other than judicial accountability, the police force is subject to
administrative control under the Constitution and the Police Act.6
" 1979 Z.L.R. 45 (1979).
19 Id. at 49; see also In the Matter of the Criminal Procedure Code and In the
Matter of R.S. Siuluta & 3 Others, 1979 Z.L.R. 14 (1979). In this case, the state
admitted to the detention of the applicants while further inquiries were being made
against them. The police intended to charge them with an offense in the distant
future. Judge Hadden of the High Court found this conduct of the state improper
and a gross violation of law. Id. at 16.
60 3 L.Z. Ch. 133, 1 (rev. ed. 1972). Recall that article 27 of the Constitution
of Zambia provides caveats in the exercise of police powers which affect fundamental
human rights enumerated in articles 13 to 26. These caveats pertain to rights to life,
personal liberty, protection from slavery and forced labor, inhuman treatment,
deprivation of property, privacy of home and other property, provisions to secure
protection of law, protection of freedom of conscience, freedom of expression,
freedom of movement, freedom of assembly and association, and freedom from
discrimination on the basis of race, gender or other grounds. Under article 27, where
a person's freedom of movement is restricted or detained, the detaining authority,
which includes police and state security forces above the rank of superintendent,
must comply with a number of conditions.
In any case, article 29 of the Constitution requires that if any person alleges that
fundamental human rights provisions in articles 13 to 27 have been, are being, or
are likely to be infringed in relation to him, then such a person must apply to the
High Court for redress. Article 27 ensures compliance with the letter and spirit of
constitutional mechanisms in respect to tenets of fundamental human rights. Article
29 is the culmination of the process and practice of the arena of basic rights under
Part III of the Constitution. Should abuse by police or other authorities occur,
notwithstanding the conditions stipulated in article 27, then the person is at liberty
to seek court action.
In regard to administrative controls under the Constitution, these are mainly
reflected in the work of the Police and Prison Service Commission established under
articles 130-134 of the Constitution. Its membership is determined by the President
and therefore, members may be removed by him for inability to discharge respective
functions including misconduct in office. However, the Commission's powers are
limited to enable the President to direct the Police and Prison Service Commission
under article 131(9) and (10) of the Constitution. The President could further order
the Commission to refer any matter under its consideration to him for a determination
according to article 131 (10) of the Constitution. However, the courts have held
that once a Commission has decided that the case merits no further inquiry or
adjudication, then the matter ceases to be under consideration by the particular
Commission. Once the matter is no longer being considered by the Commission,
the President cannot exercise his constitutional powers to require the matter to be
referred to him. Kangombe v. Attorney-General, 1973 Z.L.R. 114 (1973).
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Administrative control under the above-cited Police Act by and large
constitutes internal acts of discipline. 61
Methods of administrative accountability exist in the form of su-
perior officers in the police force taking disciplinary measures against
rogue police officers under a recognized mechanism of internal dis-
cipline in conjunction with an independent commission. For example,
in 1980, 124 incidents of misconduct by police were reported, including
theft by public servants, careless driving, and others. 62 Such action
enhances the poor image of police in the minds of the public and
affects public respect for the law and government. 6 Thus far, the
work of the Police and Prison Service Commission is commendable. 64
It is true, however, that conditions under which the police operate
in Zambia and other countries in sub-Saharan Africa are not com-
mensurate with an effective policing system. 65
61 See Z. POLICE ANN. REP. FOR THE YEAR 1964, 1-39 (1964); see also, Z. POLICE
ANN. REP. FOR THE YEAR 1974, 1-47 (1974); Z. POLICE ANN. REP. FOR THE YEAR
1976, 1-49 (1976); Z. POLICE ANN. REP. 1979: GENERAL REP. AND SURVEY FOR THE
YEAR 1979, 1-45 (1979); Z. POLICE ANN. REP. 1980, 1-39 (1980); Z. POLICE ANN.
REP. 1981, 1-33 (1981). The 1981 report indicates on page three that 628 members
of the force were punished in police tribunals established under section 30(1) of the
Police Act of 1965 as amended.
62 Z. POLICE ANN. REP. FOR THE YEAR 1980, at 5 (1980). In 1981, criminal and
other court cases involving police numbered 112. Z. POLICE ANN. REP. FOR THE
YEAR 1981, at 4 (1982).
63 See generally Carter & Marenin, Police in the Community: Perception of a'
Government Agency in Nigeria, 15 AFRICAN L. STUD. 9 (1977).
61 For evidence of this positive performance, see POLICE AND PRISON SERVICE
COMMISSION ANN. REP. FOR THE YEAR 1979, 1 (1980); POLICE AND PRIsoN SERVICE
COMMISSION ANN. REP. FOR THE YEAR 1980, 1 (1981); POLICE AND PRISON SERVICE
ANN. REP. FOR THE YEAR 1981, 1 (1982); and POLICE AND PRISON SERVICE COMMISSION
ANN. REP. FOR THE YEAR 1982, 1 (1983).
65 These poor conditions include low wages, inadequate or unsavory working
conditions, inadequate transportation and poor communications equipment. These
are acknowledged by the Police and Prison Service Commission Annual Reports for
the Years 1974-82. To improve their service to the public, the security and welfare
of the police must correspondingly improve. Such improvements should reduce the
tendencies to engage in corrupt practices. The issue of corruption, not only in the
police force but also in the public service, generally is a major concern of the
government and has culminated in the Corrupt Practices Act of 1980. Z. GOV'T
GAZETTE 63 (Acts Supp. 1980). Under this Act, an Anti-Corruption Commission
controlled and supervised by the President was created. The Commission investigates
complaints and alleged conduct of any public officer suspected of engaging in corrupt
practices and initiates prosectutions in the courts. A report of such an officer is
made to the President under section 10 (1) of the Act. The Corrupt Practices Act,
supersedes the English Prevention of Corruption Act of 1916, extended to Zambia
under the English Law (Extent of Application) Act, 1963, 1 L.Z. Ch. 4, 1 (rev. ed.
1972).
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III: HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES AND THE INFLUENCE OF POLICE AND
STATE SECURITY FORCES IN ZAMBIA
A. The Law of Human Rights in Zambia
The law of human rights in Zambia is recognized, preserved, and
secured in Part III, articles 13 to 27 of the Constitution, with sup-
plementary provisions in articles 28-31.6 For the purposes of this
discussion, Part III of the Constitution of Zambia has been sub-
divided into four sections, as indicated below. Zambia was instru-
mental in the formulation of the Charter on Human and Peoples
Rights adopted by the Heads of State of the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) on June 27, 1981.67 Commitment to fundamental human
rights in Zambia is also evident in serial prescription of these rights6
in the Constitution immediately subsequent to the formulations of
principles of sovereignty and citizenship.
As in other countries of sub-Saharan Africa, these fundamental
human rights are abridged. For example, article 13, which declares
fundamental freedoms of life, liberty, security of the person in law,
and protection of privacy of the home and other property, is sus-
tainable only if these freedoms do not transgress on the rights and
interests of the state as contained in article 4 of the Constitution
prohibiting the formation of political parties outside the framework
of the United National Independence Party. Also, rights of any
individual must not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others or
the public interest.
Although the government guarantees extensive fundamental human
rights and observes basic freedoms, due process, and individual rights,
the government nevertheless restricted political rights as a one party
state.6 9 These restrictions are manifested in a variety of ways, such
as, the large concentration of power in the hands of the President.
6ZAMiIA CONST. arts. 28-31.
67 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982). The scheme of basic human rights espoused in this piece
calls for re-appraisal in the formulation of fundamental human rights initially,
followed by principles of sovereignty and citizenship. This view consonantly applies
to prescription of norms of basic rights in the Zambia Constitution. As societies
increasingly move away from regional or state identity, the suggested scheme is
appreciably more in tune with the commonality of human rights as a global tradition.
This schema is reflected in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Brazil, 1988.
" ZAMBIA CONST. arts. 13-27.
See generally U.S. DEP'T. ST. COUNTRY REP. HuM. RTS. PRAC. 1979-1988.
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Under the president's broad emergency and presidential powers,
he is at liberty to suspend "observance of human rights in the interests
of state security." 70 Through the emergency legislation "the president
has broad discretion to detain or restrict the movement of people,
and law enforcement personnel have extra-ordinary powers to detain
suspects and search homes." '7'
As a result of the ongoing state of emergency in Zambia since
1964, the President has wide powers of detention, which are readily
available to his police and state security forces. 72 In 1988, roughly
twenty people were still in detention, including eight people detained
in late 1988 for an alleged plot to overthrow the government. Although
detainees do have recourse to the courts, the legal process is generally
not expeditious .71 Between 1979 and 1988, the reports recorded no
denials of a free and public trial because the right to such a trial is
constitutionally guaranteed (except in the case of presidential detain-
ees) .74
Section Three of this part of the Zambian Constitution deals with
the governmental attitude and record concerning national, interna-
tional and non-governmental investigations of alleged human rights
violations. The government does not encourage, discourage, or impede
human rights inquiries by activists and organizations. Committed to
the principles of human rights, President Kaunda was instrumental
in seeking a mechanism in the Organization of African Unity for the
protection and preservation of human rights in Africa. Although
there are no local human rights groups in Zambia, the Law Asso-
ciation of Zambia and the University's law school cooperate in mon-
itoring human rights protection in the country. 75 In the period of
1979 to 1988,76 there is no public record of the Zambian government
70 See State Security Act, 2 L.Z. Ch. 110, 1 (rev. ed. 1973); The Preservation
of Public Security Act, 2 L.Z. Ch. 106, 1 (rev. ed. (1972); Regulations of 1964, 2
L.Z. Ch. 106, 8 (Subsidiary] (rev. ed. 1972); Emergency Powers Act, 2 L.Z. Ch.
108, 1 (rev. ed. 1972); U.S. DEP'T. ST. COUNTRY REP. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 1983, 421
(1984).
7' U.S. DEP'T. ST. COUNTRY REP. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 1988, 412 (1989). Because
of this continuous state of emergency, it is recognized generally that the gap between
rights accorded in the Constitution and those actually enjoyed by Zambians remains
to be narrowed.
72 U.S. DEP'T ST. COUNTRY REP. Hum. RTS. PROC. 1988, 413 (1989).
71 See infra note 96.
74 U.S. DEP'T ST. COUNTRY REP. Hum. RTS PROC. 1988, 413 (1989).
75 Id.
76 See infra note 96.
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being subject to an international, national or regional investigation
for the violation of human rights.
In 1982, however, Amnesty International reported concern regard-
ing detentions without trial and mistreatment of prisoners in Zambia. 77
Similar concerns were expressed by Amnesty International in 1983
and 1985. Because of these concerns, Amnesty International urged
the government in 1986 to investigate allegations of the torture of
imprisoned South-African security persons. President Kaunda replied
that no torture or ill treatment had been inflicted on the South
Africans and that their cases would be reviewed by the courts in
accordance with the law.78
In regard to cruel and inhuman or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment, Zambian practice between 1979 to 1988 is aptly summarized
by the Country Reports of 1988 which state:
The Constitution outlaws torture, but there are credible reports that
police and military personnel have resorted to excessive force when
interrogating detainees or prisoners. In September, 1988, a High
Court judge criticized 'overzealous' police officers and said that
innocent people were treated brutally to obtain statements of con-
fessions. Alleged abuses reported ... include beatings, the with-
holding of food, pain inflicted on various parts of the body and
long periods of solitary confinement. The courts have ordered in-
vestigations to ascertain if confessions or statements were made after
torture or mistreatment. All the Reports79 indicate that Zambian
prisons are over populated, critically understaffed, unsanitary, and
affected by the general lack of medical facilities throughout the
whole country.w°
The right of privacy in the family, in the home, and in corre-
spondence is guaranteed by the Constitution. Therefore, the police
and state security forces must have search warrants to enter homes,
except in cases involving a state of emergency or the deportation of
an illegal alien.8' A magistrate or police officer above the rank of
17 U.S. DEP'T ST. COUNTRY REP. HuM. RTS. PROC. 1982, 366-67.
71 Id. at 354. There is no public record of the Zambian Government having been
investigated during the course of 1988. Amnesty International maintains a chapter
in Lusaka according to the U.S. DEP'T. ST. COUNTRY REP. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 1988,
418 (1989).
79 See infra note 96.
90 U.S. DEP'T ST. COUNTRY REP. HuM. RT. PROC. 1988, 418.
SI U.S. DEP'T ST. COUNTRY REP. HUM. RTS PROC. 1988, 414 (1989). Consistent
detention of persons is revealed in practically all the Country Reports covered between
1979 and 1988.
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Sub-Inspector may issue a search warrant. To obtain a search warrant,
constructive probable cause must be demonstrated, just. as in the
American system. This requirement is typically met in Zambia. 2
Section Two of this portion of the Consititution deals with human
rights practices involving the respect for civil and political liberties.83
Freedom of speech and the freedom of the press are respected as
long as they do not involve derogatory commentary about the Head
of State, the philosophy of humanism, or the one-party State. 84
Exercising freedom of association and the right to peaceful assembly
is similar to exercising the right to free speech and press. In principle,
these rights were adversely affected by the nature of the political
system. Therefore, all political activism outside the ambit of the one-
party state was prohibited. 85 As a result, permits to hold public
association meetings, processions, rallies, assemblies, and other fra-
ternal gatherings must be obtained from the police as a matter of
course.86 These permits are easily secured unless the government be-
lieves that such assemblies will be disruptive and that they will des-
tablilize the local authorities. 7 The country possesses a multitude of
associations and other professional bodies. These associations function
as unofficial lobbying groups to exert pressure on the party and
government regarding numerous economic, political and social is-
sues.
81
In Zambia, the freedom of religion is constitutionally guaranteed
and supported by President Kaunda. A wide variety of Christian
denominations operate freely in the country. Even though the gov-
ernment specifically prohibits the Watchtower Sect (the Jehovah's
Witnesses) from conducting open air meetings and door to door
campaigns seeking converts, the Sect functions openly with other
religions. Zambia has a large population of Muslims and Hindus with
their own mosques and temples. Legal associations and religious
groups operate independently of party control or influence. President
R2 See infra note 96. Safeguards of fair and public trial as they exist at common
law also apply to Zambia in non-detention cases. When these issues are tried, the
trials are generally held in public. The Zambian judiciary is by and large known
for its independence. However, the President appoints and transfers judges.
83 Id.
91 See e.g., U.S. DEP'T ST. COUNTRY REp. HUM. RTS. PROC. 1988, 414; note
178.
:1 See infra note 96.
56 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
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Kaunda encourages independent community action by religious
groups .89
Another area of civil and political liberties involves the right of
unrestricted internal and external movement, which includes foreign
travel, emigration, and repatriation. 90 In Zambia, the President may
restrict the movement of individuals within the country according to
his emergency powers. For example, the government consistently
prohibits foreign diplomats from traveling outside of a forty to fifty
mile radius from Lusaka without the written permission of the Min-
istry of Home Affairs. Concerning internal travel, the government
routinely uses police road blocks to conduct vehicle and passenger
search and seizures. Although the government permits emigration,
strict currency regulations, a result of adverse economic conditions,
renders it difficult. Despite the government's travel restrictions, Zam-
bia has served as a haven for refugees in the region, thereby earning
the country high praise by the United Nations High Commission for
Refugees (UNHCR). During the war in Rhodesia, Zambia provided
refuge to more than 60,000 Rhodesian refugees. In 1980, Zambia
served as host to an estimated 17,500 refugees, including 11,000
Angolans and 4000 Namibians. Regarding foreign travel, the gov-
ernment reserves the right to refuse or withdraw a passport when an
individual's activities abroad seem to be inimical to the "interests of
the state."
The final and most important section of the Constitution involving
civil and political liberties relates to the rights of citizens to change
the government. 9' Approximately 100%0 of Zambia's adult population
are currently members of the ruling United National Independence
Party. 92 As the leader of the party and head of state, the President
possesses overwhelming powers that enable him to determine the
members of the Central Committee and the Cabinet, which are the
two premier organs of formal government. Political loyalty in both
of these institutions is exacted by a mixture of merit and tribal
balancing. All political and governmental offices at any level must
be filled by members of UNIP. In practice, however, the political
system was open to persons of divergent opinions as long as they
operate within the one party structure. 93
89 Id.
goId.
91 U.S. DEP'T. ST. COUNTRY REP. Hum. RTS. PRAC. 1988, 419 (1989).
92 See infra note 96.
93 See REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. TH REP. OF THE SPECIAL PAR-
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In section four of this part of the Zambian Constitution, discrim-
ination on the grounds of race, gender, religion, language or social
status is dealt with. To appreciate the nature of these rights, it should
be noted that Zambia consists of seven million people with more
than seventy-two Bantu speaking ethnic groups.9 The pursuit of
equality is generally made to meet social and economic needs. How-
ever, between February and April of 1988, 203 trading licenses were
withdrawn from business persons, most of them Asians, in order to
stem black marketeering. This revocation was considered a discrim-
inatory act by most observers. 95
Thus, an interesting paradox exists within Zambia. Zambia is a
vocal supporter and strong proponent of human rights at the regional
and international levels. 96 Consequently, Zambia is in the forefront
of human rights and provides tangible support for self determination
in Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Mozambique and South Africa. In
addition, Zambia serves as a country of first refuge for stateless and
other displaced persons in the region. Simultaneously, the Zambian
government continues to abridge fundamental human rights of its
citizens. The solution to the problem lies in a fresh and renewal
commitment to preserve the rights of Zambia's constituents.
C. A New Approach to Human Rights Law in Zambia
As stated earlier, the primary function of any police force is to
facilitate the peaceful and unbridled enjoyment of individual rights
and freedoms in the state. In the execution of these functions, police
LIAMENTARY SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED MONDAY JULY 9, 1990, 1 (1990). Though
it focused on the democratization of the ruling party to make it responsive to the
needs of the people, the committee practically endorsed the reintroduction of the
multi-party system of government by eliminating provisions in the Party Constitution
which make it supreme over other institutions in the country. It did not, however,
call for the abolition of the one-party state, but rather indicated that UNIP should
be revamped to face challenges of the movement on multi-party democracy and the
impending referendum on the multi-party system which was scheduled for October
17, 1990.
94 Id.
9I Id.
See generally U.S. DEP'T ST. COUNTRY REP. Hum. RTS. Pi, AC. 1979, at 233;
U.S. DEP'T ST. COUNTRY REP. HuM. RTS. PRAC. 1980, at 313; U.S. DEP'T ST.
COUNTRY REP. HUM. RTS. PRAc. 1982, at 360; U.S. DEP'T ST. COUNTRY REP. HUM.
RTS. PRAC. 1983, at 421; U.S. DEP'T ST. COUNTRY REP. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 1984,
at 381; U.S. DEP'T ST. COUNTRY REP. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 1985, at 381; U.S. DEP'T
ST. COUNTRY REP. HUM. RTS. PRAc. 1987, at 349; U.S. DEP'T ST. COUNTRY REP.
HUM. RTS. PRAC. 1988, at 412.
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must balance the competing interests of individual rights with the
derivative rights and interests of the state. Balancing the two sets of
values is the subject of the restrictions on human rights in article 26
of the Constitution. 97 Under this article, fundamental human rights
are subjected to powers of police and state security forces in the
event of war or national emergency under article 30 of the Consti-
tution.9 Typically, article 30 is applied in regard to detention. 99
Therefore, the security and peaceful enjoyment of fundamental
rights are subordinated to the mandate of police and state security
forces under the Zambian regimes. Since the mandate of police power
is constitutional, both the police and state security forces must strictly
comply with the law in exercising their authority. Case law in which
Zambian courts have succinctly elucidated on this principle has been
alluded to above.100
From the perspective of human rights law in Zambia, vis-a-vis the
specific mandate of police power and also the general attributes of
rights and powers of a sovereign state, the complete and unabridged
enjoyment of rights must be protected, even where purposes of na-
tional security, public order, defense, public safety, public morality,
or any such actions or laws are involved.
The issue of laws restrictive of fundamental human rights, yet not
unreasonable, is a conceptual misnomer in a democratic society. First,
from a regulatory point of view, this formulation shifts the burden
from the state to the victim, whose rights have been infringed, to
97 ZAMBIA CONST. art. 26.
,a Id. art. 30.
Legislative history of the law on emergencies and preservation of public security
goes back to the period immediately before the independence of Zambia. On the
attainment of independence, the President assumed full executive powers similar to
those enjoyed by his predecessor. These powers included detention powers which
are delegable to appropriate police officers and state security forces. These powers
had been invoked by the colonial governor three months before independence to
deal with the Lumpa-Lenshina Mulenga uprisings in the eastern and northern portions
of the country. Pursuant to section 5(3) of the Preservation of Public Security Act,
Parliament is empowered to extend declarations of the colonial governor now vested
in the President. Under this authority, the Governor's declaration on the Lumpa-
Lenshina Mulenga uprisings continued into the present. It can be revoked by the
President or the National Assembly, or it lapses within seven days of a new President
assuming power other than the incumbent in power according to the Constitution
(Amendment) Act, No. 5 Z. GOV'T GAzETTE 189 (Supp. 1969). Detention powers
contained in the Preservation of Public Security Act have been used to respond to
various situations ranging from conditions of liberation wars, political instability,
and purely criminal activities.
'0 See supra footnotes 53-59 and accompanying text.
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show cause why the state should not violate his rights. This burden
supports the postulation that the state usurps rights that are properly
vested in the individual.
Second, the only state action reasonably justifiable in a democratic
society is a valid and legitimate one under fundamental human rights
provisions. If such action or law contradicts these provisions, it must
inherently offend notions of democracy.
Third, democracy symbolizes a government by the people, essen-
tially a government whereby primordial authority is vested in the
people to be exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system
of representation reflected in a free electoral process. This concept
differs markedly from democratic centrism, a feature of any one-
party state in which party members participate in policy discussions
at all levels. 10' The one-party system is more closely related to prin-
ciples of oligarchy than to the traditional concept of democracy. As
such, two contradictory principles cannot form the basis for dimin-
ishing rights and freedoms in specific cases.
Fourth, a postulation that the "participatory" disposition of the
Zambian one-party state rendered it more in line with attributes of
democracy and therefore justifies restrictions of basic rights if state
action is necessary in a democratic society, is neutralized by the
essence of the concept of democracy itself, namely the unrestricted
freedom of people to self govern. Their representatives in government
constitute their agents. Since the people have declared their basic
rights and freedom under articles 13 through 26 of the Constitution
to be fundamental, the state lacks authority to vest in itself the right
to serve purported interests of the state by limiting democracy.
The commitment to complete enjoyment of fundamental human
rights as expressed under articles 13 through 26 of the Constitution,
as long as they do not impinge on the rights of others, stems from
the proposition that policy justifications limiting complete enjoyment
of basic rights and freedoms constitute second-tier'cu prescriptive norms
already addressed by laws, rules, and regulations of public order.
The legitimacy and authority of these limitations are from consti-
tutional norms. However, these norms were not designed to supersede
,0, Members of the party and the nation as a whole are, by the nature of the
system itself, required to follow decisions ultimately made by the Central Committee
of the Party and the Office of the President.
102 "Second-tier" means the secondary level of formulating norms of laws governing
societal conduct, distinguished from the primary or organic levels upon which norms
of fundamental human rights are created.
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or override the inherent enjoyment of basic rights contained in the
Constitution.
There should be a commitment to full enjoyment of basic rights
and freedoms formulated and recognized in the Constitution, except
where they transgress the rights of others. Therefore, fundamental
human rights are not about torture, inhuman treatment, or detention
by state sanction, but instead represent an affirmation of the sanctity
of life through law. Any articulation by the state to justify their
preemption in specified cases under the guise of state sovereignty
inherently undermines these fundamental principles.
If these basic rights and freedoms are considered derogable or
revocable at the whim of the state, then it would follow that death,
torture, and other forms of cruel and inhuman treatment or punish-
ment would be conscionable in those state-justified circumstances.
This view is erroneous and not constitutionally sound. The goal is
just the opposite, namely to formulate and enshrine these natural
rights recognized as safeguards against any abuse, erosion or abridge-
ment. Abuse of human rights is the same whether it occurs overtly
through a tangible display of force by individuals, or by instruments
of the state to carry out prohibited actions in the name of national
security, defense, public order or other policy considerations. If it is
illegal for individuals to derogate fundamental human rights, it is
also wrong for state instruments of power to do so. The Constitution
represents an independent power base to govern the diversity of
Zambia's citizens and promote the uniqueness of individuality. 0 3 The
Constitution is based on fundamental human rights, as reposed in
the individual. Since constitutional foundation represents the collective
will of the people, humanity at this level cannot be diminished in
any way. Any such attempt conceptually leaves the entire constitu-
tional mechanism in disarray because the power base upon which it
was founded has been eroded. Constitutional preemption of basic
individual rights treads on this delicate and most fundamental tenet
of organized society. Therefore, legal circumstances do not exist where
it is proper to reduce, restrict, or take away fundamental human
rights. Moreover, preemption may not be inserted in the organic law
to strip such rights. The Constitution cannot sanction the demise of
life in deference to expansive modalities of state rights.' °4 There are
,o0 See generally Mwalimu, supra note 4, at 157.
10 As of 1988, 28 countries objected to the death penalty, 18 others allowed it
for very exceptional criminal activities only, and 128 countries permitted it for
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no state rights without fundamental human rights, including rights
of those who have been delegated to govern or direct the state's
course.
The process and practice of punishment in the case of wrongdoing
is justified. In practice, these functions must necessarily be secondary
under the wide umbrella of policy justifications. The bond of hu-
manity is cemented by this consent to be bound by societal norms.
Those who do not consent prima-facie are not bound and by im-
plication must find a different level of consent or face expulsion
from one society to another. Incidents of dissent in various societies
and the courage of "dissidents" testify to this proposition. Until they
have found an association or polity with whom they can forge a new
compact, they may as well remain stateless. Therefore, no criminal
act or civil wrong should be committed against anyone protected by
this compact as generally manifested in the constitution, custom, or
tradition holding a particular society together. Anyone in contraven-
tion of this compact is subject to the domain of state sovereignty as
the only agent permitted by the collective will of the people to enforce
and oversee the sanctity of individual rights expressed in the consti-
tution. Under the second-tier permitting state or governmental action,
sanctions against those engaging in recalcitrant behavior are properly
within the ambit of rights and interests of a state. However, the state
can only carry out and execute these functions to the extent that the
Constitution of Zambia permits. Fundamental human rights, or the
Bill of Rights as the case may be, are the only portion of the
Constitution fundamentally prohibited from being infringed upon by
anyone, including the state itself. The converse must be considered
sound-that the state, being the preeminent agent of the collective
will of the people, must ensure that recognition of these fundamental
rights and freedoms are respected at all times by both the state and
the individual. Such is the solemnity of fundamental human rights.
Government is established for the preservation of rights of citizens
and other inhabitants in society. From the preservation of their rights,
state rights and interests are founded and secured. A government
established for purposes other than the security of citizens' rights
lacks the mandate to rule. Therefore, violation of fundamental human
rights by state instruments directly and immediately ruptures gov-
ordinary and exceptional crimes. Practically all of Africa falls in the last category
allowing capital punishment. For details, see LAW LmBARY oF CoNGREss, FoREIGN
LAW SURVEYS, CAPITAL PuNIsHmENT 1 (August 1988).
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ernmental authority and legitimacy. Concurrently, any government
which does not realize the essence of fundamental human rights as
its base of authority is similarly culpable and negligent in the duty
of a government to secure and safeguard the fundamentality of basic
rights of the individual.
Basic or fundamental human rights of the individual are traced to
natural and inalienable rights common to all, preserved and collected
in the most fundamental form. The Constitution upon its creation
finds them already in full bloom, original and fundamental. Pre-
existence of a conglomerate of these rights prior to societal organi-
zation demands that the role of the Constitution be confined to
recognition, preservation, respect and enforcement of these rights.
This is necessary to recognize the imperfections in any structural
edifice of humanity.
Therefore, the Constitution, representative of the collective will of
the people, can do no more than ensure that the commonality of
power in each and every individual is embodied in this instrument
to ensure the complete exercise of rights. This equality must preserve
the sanctity of the human person rather than an imposition of the
will of the state over and above individual rights. State rights and
interests must remain cognizant of their original source and be de-
rivative of individual rights collected in an instrument representative
of their collective will. Individual rights must be sanctified. Only in
preservation, recognition and enforcement of human rights can the
Constitution truly be the organic and fundamental law of the land.
It is also unsound for a basic law to secure and guarantee rights
on one hand and essentially deny them on the other. These rights
must be balanced in a court of law under a process requisite for a
determination of breach.
The government cannot justify derogation of fundamental rights
due to extraordinary circumstances contained in the Constitution. The
government may take action through powers properly issued under
the Constitution. Fundamental rights are not bargainable or nego-
tiated in the Constitution, otherwise there would be no need for
subordinate laws upon which policy finds expression. Rights are
bargained and negotiated outside the Constitution, as legislators look
into this instrument for guidance. Alternatively, they may be bar-
gained while looking to the Constitution for direction. Therefore,
any government and its operatives functioning under the rule of law
must be subjected to this proposition. Those who violate the law
tread on this delicate and important protective shield of the individual
against state incursions into his or her private life and also against
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transgressions of others in society. Breach of norms occurs at various
levels in the interaction of society giving rise to functional consti-
tutionalism. These include breaches by organized polities themselves.
Whether breach occurs due to individual or state transgressions, the
transgressors must be ascertained and sanctioned. As such, the gov-
ernment cannot, as a privilege of the state, constitutionally deprive
another person of their natural rights. This premise stems from the
fact that fundamental human rights contained in the Constitution of
Zambia, as in other sub-Saharan African countries, are superimposed
over and above all other constitutional norms and subordinate laws
issued under them. 05 Law is for order and peace and not for violence
and destruction.
Consequently, no phrase better signifies the unity of individuals
than "we the people." The fact that the people themselves have
united to create an organization, association or entity to be governed
under the rule of law signifies the supremacy of the organic law of
the land, namely the Constitution, custom or practice upon which
society is founded. In essence, the source of fundamentality of human
os See, e.g., articles 3 to 19 on fundamental human rights of the Constitution of
Mauritius, 1968 as amended, 1 REv. L. MAUITrUS 5 (1981); articles 11-26 of the
Constitution of Liberia on fundamental human rights, BLAUSTEIN & KITTY, Liberia
in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORMD 1, 18 (A.P. Blaustein & G.H.
Flanz eds. Supp. September 1985); the preamble to the Constitution of Seychelles,
1979 as amended, OLSON & PRICE, Republic of Seychelles in CONsTrrUTIoNs OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD i-xii & 1, 14 (A.P. Blaustein & G.H. Flanz eds. Supp.
July 1983). The Seychelles preamble enumerates fundamental rights in the Consti-
tution. Although this is a good example of commencement of basic rights provisions
in the first part of the constitutional document, they are declaratory rather than
justiciable. Fundamental human rights are not a declaration of intention as the
Seychelles Constitution indicates, but rather the very basis of the constitutional
mechanism of the state. For examples on limitations of fundamental human rights
by constitutions of sub-Saharan Africa, see generally EwEzuKWA, LESSICK & KEENER,
Nigeria in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTmIES OF THE WORLD 1 (eds. A.P. Blaustein
& G.H. Flanz eds. Supp. June 1987); JoNES, SAWYERR & FERRIS, Sierra Leone in
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTImS OF THE WORLD, 1 (eds. A.P. Blaustein & G.H.
Flanz eds. Supp. June 1989); LARIN & KuKUBO, Botswana in CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE CoUT mIES OF TIE WORLD 1 (eds. A.P. Blaustein & G.H. Flanz eds. Supp.
June 1985); BLAUSTEIN & HOLT, Gambia in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD 1 (A.P. Blaustein & G.H. Flanz eds. Supp. 1983); BLAusTEIN, MENEZES
& RUSH, Kenya in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUTRmIES OF THE WORLD, 1 (A.P. Blaustein
& G.H. Flanz eds. September 1988); RUSH & HACKWILL, Zimbabwe in CONSTITUTIONS
OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, 1 (A.P. Blaustein & G.H. Flanz eds. Supp.
September 1987); KAKOOZA, KIAPI, HOLT & KEENER, Uganda in CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, 1 (A.P. Blaustein & G.H. Flanz eds. Supp. September
1986).
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rights in the constitution stems from the recognition of "we the
people." This phrase is not synonymous exclusively with group rights
but is also a fundamental predication of the human aspect of the
individual as the basis of state creation.
Conceptually, even the proposition that these constitutions set against
themselves is inherently flawed, because there is only one source to
predicate enjoyment, namely the organic norms of fundamental hu-
man rights. Since fundamental organic norms cannot be used against
themselves to prescribe and formulate liability, they must be tested
against something else in the Constitution more superior than fun-
damental human rights. However, there is nothing more fundamental
than basic human rights through which the state's rights and interests
are founded; therefore, fundamental human rights must serve as the
unrestricted source for all other norms.
The current state of emergency leads to excessive use of dentention
powers. The use of emergency powers must be constrained and nar-
rowly restricted to legitimate applications of national security. How-
ever, judicial review of these powers ensures redress for wrongful
application. This practice must be vigilantly pursued. It is vital that
police and state security forces be made fully cognizant of the value
of respect for the human rights tradition. Prisoners' fundamental
human rights must be preserved at all times. Police and state security
forces constitute societal agents, and in their dealings with the anti-
social elements they must articulate and reflect the highest sense of
honor and values of the law-abiding elements of society. Therefore,
one of the primary reflections of the law enforcement function is to
accentuate the positive attributes of compliance to norms of a civil
society. As much as penal sanctions are necessary, they must be
subordinate to the principles of rehabilitation and the need to prepare
a perpetrator for reentry into society.
IV. CONCLUSION
In short, an examination of human rights practices indicates a
general respect for human rights in Zambia, but also reveals a con-
sistent disregard of the rights of prisoners and detainees during the
course of arrest or interrogations, especially in cases pertaining to
national security. Reports of the use of brutal force and other inhuman
treatment of prisoners and detainees have been documented.1 6 Fur-
106 See supra note 96.
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thermore, documented reports of unsanitary conditions, understaff-
ing, and overpopulation in prisons constitute potential or actual
grounds of abuse of inmate rights. These must be remedied through
citizen awareness programs and the disciplining of offending officers
through administration and criminal sanctions, including dismissal
from public service and prison terms.
However, no government program concerning the proper interaction
between law enforcement agents and the general public can succeed
without the respective understanding and appreciation of individual
human rights. Since law enforcement agents and the general public
can only respect and protect that which they can understand, an
educated and aware citizen is a valuable asset. If the level of un-
derstanding is minimal, respect will be correspondingly low. Thus,
absent public awareness and understanding of the fundamentality of
the rights enshrined in the Constitution, no amount of government
representation will solve the problem of human rights abuse.
Coincident with public and police awareness of basic human rights
is the issue of accessibility and contact between the public institutions
and the people for whom they are designed to serve. This accessibility
ensures familiarity between the ordinary citizen and government in-
stitututions, especially those units in continuous contact with the
public. Law abiding members of the community must be free to
interact with institutions of state power such as the police and state
security forces. The pride of law enforcement must be reflected in
the proper balance between the security of public institutions and
public accessibility to the same. Only a citizen, unintimidated by the
functions of the state, aware of his rights, and free to interact with
all the instruments of state power, can informatively and effectively
contribute to the development of the national state. Above all, there
is no greater challenge to the success of a government than the need
to ensure the general education of all segments of society regarding
fundamental human rights of the individual.
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DEVELOPMENT WITHIN HUMAN RIGHTS
REVIEW ARTICLE
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT. David Forsythe.
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989. Pp 369.
Dr. Ranee K.L. Panjabi*
We live in a world of glaring contrasts and contradictions. Each
of us views the polarities of human life-affluence on the one hand,
destitution on the other. We all despair at the suffering of the poor
who now make up the majority of our planet. We shrug helplessly,
caught in the relentless orbit of our own lives, unable to find either
the time or the fundamental inclination to come to grips with and
seriously resolve the dilemma of economic inequity. We shake our
heads, we feel sympathy, even compassion. We open our wallets and
salve our consciences and go back to our busy lives. Nevertheless,
the problems go on, worsening each day. The combined nations of
the world spend well over $1.8 million a minute for military purposes, I
a needless expense if the aim is killing, for malnutrition, in any event,
kills 40,000 children per day. 2 Malnutrition is a "free" killer, the
agent of some grim Malthusian ordering of life which picks on the
most vulnerable as its victims. If all the technology currently available
to the world were to be harnessed to improve the quality of life
globally rather than regionally, there might be less contrasts and
fewer contradictions. Yet this task, so simple to formulate on paper,
is currently impossible to implement in practice. This is one instance
where human problems have apparently gone beyond human solu-
tions. It is not the lack of capacity but the lack of will to resolve
this crisis which has bedeviled all efforts at a solution.
For once, history has not been a friend but a stern teacher. The
past demonstrates a marked pattern of exploitation: colonial exploi-
tation, gender exploitation, racial exploitation, and class exploitation.
The habit appears to be an ingrained feature of human life. Why
* Associate Professor, Memorial University, Canada; L.L.B. (Hons.) University
of London, England.
I R. GOF, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 292 (1990).
2 D. FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT at x (1989).
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should anything be different now? Possibly because the main thrust
of political and social revolution in the second half of the twentieth
century has been that exploitation is no longer tolerable or acceptable.
While the meek have by no means inherited the earth, they are loudly
and vociferously clamoring for a share of it. If this demand is matched
by the physical violence that bursts forth from a realization that one
has been the victim of gross inequity, who knows what the future
holds.
Thus far, the reactions to the clamor have been to stifle it (by
imposing left or right wing dictatorships); to concede without loos-
ening the stranglehold (by granting political but not economic free-
dom); to deflect the anger (by encouraging cosmetic social change);
to grant benefits which the recipients pay for (by incorporating un-
employment insurance and medical care); and to share the wealth
(by minimal inclusion of acceptable elements of society into the circle
of comfort, if not affluence). You may ask, who are the exploiters?
To some extent, all of us are participants as exploiters and exploited.
As consumers in the West, we exploit the developing world to satisfy
our craving for the cheap products that allow us to enjoy a life of
consumer spending. Women in the West are exploited by a pattern
of gender discrimination. Men in the West suffer as well when an
unstable economy deprives them of their livelihood. There are no
clear demarcations between the exploiters and the exploited. Thus,
solutions remain difficult to implement.
If the proliferation of war, revolution, malnutrition and environ-
mental destruction provide a daunting challenge, one must also realize
that never in the history of the earth has there been so much awareness
of global problems. Millions of human beings are knowledgeable
about the situation, millions are being informed every day about the
problems that plague our planet. The potential for harnessing this
global mental energy has never been greater. If the world is indeed
a global village, there has never been a better time for people to
come together to tackle and overcome these obstacles.
There are, of course, priorities. First, the resolution of at least
some festering political crises would go a long way to enthusing and
galvanizing global action in the human rights arena. At the time of
writing, the government of the United States, having won a brilliant
victory in the Gulf War, is devoting its energies to solve the prolonged
problems of the Palestinian need for a homeland. Should the United
States succeed in this important mission and also guarantee peace
for Israel, this would be a very significant achievement.
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The second priority is economic. We simply cannot afford to ignore
the growing economic problems of our time or to apply band-aid
measures of treatment which do nothing to alleviate the injustice.
That the need for resolution is urgent is indisputable. The world's
population grows by "over one million every five days with nine-
tenths of this increase in the poorer countries of the Third World." 3
Each year sixty million new, young workers compete for jobs in the
least developed countries. 4 The world's population, a mere 1.6 billion
in 1900, will grow to seven billion by the year 2000. 5 These statistics
are all the more alarming when we consider that inhospitable climatic
and land conditions presently force 90%'o of the world's population
to live on less than 10% of its land. 6 "In the early 1980s, it was
estimated some 450 million people in the Third World (about 14%
of their total population) were living in extreme poverty and another
800 million (25%) in conditions of absolute poverty." 7
Since the end of the second World War, nations around the world
have experimented with rapid industrial development which was once
considered a universal cure for the ills of the planet. The naivete of
the 1950s and 1960s in believing that huge hydro-electric power pro-
jects and large industries would be a panacea has now become evident.
Too often, development without a human face brought cultural shock,
uprooting of people from their homes, benefits for the elite, ex-
ploitation for the majority. While GNP's rose, the quality of human
life frequently declined.
In recent years, the experiences of those decades have gone through
agonizing reappraisals. The result has been a renewed emphasis on
making an explicit connection between development and human rights.
This process would improve economic conditions within a framework
of human rights values and would be sensitive to cultural needs and
susceptibilities. The possibilities of such an approach underlie most
of the contributions to David Forsythe's Human Rights and Devel-
opment.
The volume consists of contributions to a conference on human
rights and development. Participants from a number of countries
gathered at the Hague in June 1987 for an exchange of ideas. David
I G. LOESCHFR & L. MONAHAN, REFUGEiES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 38
(1989).
4 Id. at 56.
1 GOF, supra note 1, at 492.
6 Id.
7 FORSYTHE, supra note 2, at 48.
1991]
GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L.
Forsythe, the editor, is President of the Human Rights Research
Committee of the International Political Science Association. When
a book has over twenty contributors, it can be hard to gain a sense
of cohesive purpose from it. Fortunately, Forsythe provides this by
categorizing the articles into "four orientations: a focus on the private
sector, a focus on the public sector, country studies, and an integrated
or general analysis. ' '8 Forsythe culls the kernel of all the articles by
suggesting that the central theme proposed by the contributors is that
"the key to better implementation of internationally recognized hu-
man rights in the Third World rests with political choice." 9
This book is useful for students of international law, political
science and human rights. Though law professors and political science
educators might already be familiar with some of the political and
historical examples, the views, ideas and perceptions are quite inter-
esting. Forsythe has been careful to present the work of Western and
non-Western authors, giving the book an international flavor which
is useful for students. Undoubtedly, the book is most likely to benefit
the undergraduate university student of human rights. I am presently
teaching such a course and observed the reaction of my students
when I read from "Testimony I" in Mariclair Acosta's contribution
to this book. The chapter on Women's Human Rights Groups in
Latin America 10 partly concerns a forty-one year old woman from
San Salvador whose husband (a student and photographer) "disap-
peared" after a term in prison. Eventually she found his mutilated
body in a dump and learned to live with her nightmare by assisting
other women facing similar problems.' My students were obviously
shocked by the testimony. The silence of a usually very vocal, large
class spoke eloquently of their feelings.
The contributors to the "Private Sector" category of the book
describe conditions in Latin America, the Philippines, Nigeria and
India. The interest in human rights in these nations is clearly evident
from these studies. Testimony from El Salvador:
The people of El Salvador are at war because they are tired of
being exploited .... The people are tired to death of being hungry
.... Our real struggle is for human rights; and for us, human
rights are the rights to work, to go to school, to join a union, to
Id. at xiii.
9Id.
10 Id. at 3-18.
11 Id. at 5-11.
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say what we want .... These are the rights of the people. Human
rights are part of life .... 12
As 2% of El Salvador's population is estimated to own 60% of its
land," it is inevitable that the cycle of poverty and repression can
only be terminated by determined action in favor of human rights.
Arguably, the very existence of such gross inequity is a type of rights
violation.
That such problems have spilled over into other societies is also
inevitable. El Salvador has produced thousands of refugees, men,
women and children who have fled to neighboring countries and the
United States. The active implementation of human rights is the single
most important need for the people of that troubled nation. Such
active implementation would require more than the formation of
human rights groups.
Contributor Richard Claude mentions the attempt by President
Corazon Aquino of the Philippines to require that human rights be
taught throughout the Filipino educational system. 14 The idea was
enshrined in the new Filipino Constitution of 1987 which stated: "The
State shall enforce the teaching of human rights in all levels of
education, as well as in non-formal training, to persons and insti-
tutions tasked to enforce and guarantee the observance and protection
of human rights.' ' 5
If development with a human face is to be the priority of the
present and the future, education is still a classic method to awaken
people; to inform them and to equip them to become intelligent
watchdogs of their government's actions. While science and human-
ities train young people to lead a productive life, human rights
education can help them to evaluate the quality of that life and to
ensure that they are not forced to become hapless victims of social,
political and economic exploitation. An awareness of the possibilities
and limitations of each human right will create a more informed,
more mature citizenry in every nation. Such education ought to
emphasize that "rights" require a sense of responsibility in the greater
interest of the entire community. Only by opening up human rights
possibilities through education can we hope to demonstrate that ex-
ploitation need not necessarily be an inevitable feature of human life.
12 Id. at 14.
1I Id. at 18 n.15.
4 Id. at 30.
15 Id.
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While it may be idealistic to assume that all the world will "convert"
to human rights, the alternatives for our planet are so bleak that
some action has to be taken urgently to change traditional attitudes.
Human rights have to be enlarged from the world of lawyers and a
few thousand activists and brought into the parlance of everyday life
for millions of men and women. Given that they know about the
problems that plague this world, would it not be worthwhile to present
them with a frame of reference within which they can formulate
some solutions? Given that there is a global lack of leadership to
tackle these problems with courage, ultimate answers may have to
come not from above but from below, in grass-roots campaigns which
deal with issues on the level of each nation, province, district, village,
or even each household.
The emphasis on education might serve to mitigate one serious
offshoot of development-namely, the violations of human rights
which can accompany extensive economic development. One of the
great ironies in this field of human rights studies is that development
which ought to inspire positive connotations can often be perceived
as a major threat to human rights. A number of contributors deal
with this topic.
As Jack Donnelly points out, "[c]onventional wisdom holds that
short and medium-run sacrifices of human rights are required to
achieve rapid development.' '16 The assault of development projects
on fragile cultures has sometimes caused suffering out of all pro-
portion to the benefits of the "development." Development has
occasionally been used as a catch-all to impose majority ways of life
on indigenous minorities. Development has been invoked to justify
brutal repression as traditional economic systems have been forced
into alien, largely Western molds. If development is to be perceived
as a positive force for improvement in the quality of human life,
that has not yet happened in much of the Third World despite the
plethora of industries, factories, dams and power projects which now
mark the landscape of ancient nations.
That shrewd observer of world problems, Mahatma Gandhi once
asserted that "[i]ndustrialism is ... a curse for mankind. Exploitation
of one nation by another cannot go on for all time. Industrialism
depends entirely on your capacity to exploit, on foreign markets being
open to you, and on the absence of competitors.' '1 7 Though Gandhi's
16 Id. at 305.
17 M. Gandhi, YOUNG INDIA, Dec. 11, 1931.
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preference for the simplicity of village life may be an impractical,
and for many, an undesirable alternative, he did have a pragmatic
idea which still has validity sixty-six years after he wrote in 1925:
"industrialism is like a force of Nature, but it is given to man to
control Nature and to conquer her forces. His dignity demands from
him resolution in the face of overwhelming odds. Our daily life is
such a conquest."' 8
The conquest of the negative concomitants of development may
not be easy, but there is emerging now a near-universal realization
that development within human rights is not only a preferred alter-
native but a vital necessity. If the political leaders of some Third
World nations have not accepted the idea, their peoples are certainly
leaning in that direction. In the face of looming environmental dev-
astation and increasing poverty, who can deny the cry for development
with a human face. Hence, the earlier emphasis on "trade-offs" or
on the necessity for human rights sacrifices to achieve development
has to be adjusted in the face of historical experience. Contributor
Jack Donnelly suggests that "human rights trade-offs, except at the
very early stages of the move from a traditional to a modern economy,
are not required by the imperatives of development. Rather they are
contingent political choices, undertaken for largely political not tech-
nical, economic reasons."' 9 Donnelly also believes that "[iun at least
some circumstances, development simply does not require a growth-
first strategy, with its attendant sacrifice of social and economic
rights. "20
When development involves active, brutal repression as part of the
process of rights deprivation, the connection between ends and means
has to be made. Can repressive means justify developmental ends?
Ethically and morally, the answer would have to be in the negative.
Practically and pragmatically, the negative answer has been justified
by historical experience. Donnelly argues that "in far too many
instances repression is without significant economic rewards, except
for a tiny predatory elite, and this is capable of no developmental
justification." ,21
If the aim of development is an improvement in the quality of
human life, repression cannot be a concomitant of that ideal. To
"1 M. Gandhi, YOUNG INDIA, June 8, 1925.
'9 FORSYTHE, supra note 2, at 306.
20 Id. at 308.
21 Id. at 314.
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suggest, as Donnelly unfortunately does, that "[s]ome repression
almost certainly is unavoidable, '22 or that repression can be "func-
tional for a particular development strategy, ' 23 is to allow a loophole
for tinpot dictators to violate the rights of their people. While Don-
nelly portrays the present with realism, there is no particular reason
why the reality of today has necessarily to provide the standards for
tomorrow. One could even suggest that the extent of human suffering
occasioned by "development" in the Third World demands that we
create a new reality for the 1990s. Ultimately, development with a
human face must concern itself with human needs, human sensitivities
and human priorities. The challenge for the next century will lie in
implementing this new reality. While it may be somewhat dramatic
to suggest that the survival of our planet depends on it, it is certainly
not difficult to visualize the fate of our world should the present
trends continue.
The methodology for effecting such dramatic change in the mindset
of leaders and elites around the world presents us with a formidable
challenge. While education is the key to generating new attitudes
within developing nations, creating a climate conducive to change
may require both internal and external efforts. Development aid,
channelled to the dissemination of human rights literature, the training
of legislators, and the creation of independent critical media are all
possible routes to this end. Contributor Rhoda Howard proposes that
"if citizens are empowered, especially through literacy, freedom of
the press, and freedom of association, there is a chance that their
internal organizations can undermine repressive government poli-
cies."24
It must be emphasized, however, that external assistance must be
given with grace, not with condescension and definitely not with a
patronizing attitude which can be used by any Third World leader
to refuse the aid in the name of nationalist sensitivities. As any
diplomat knows, walking the fine line between ensuring honest util-
ization of one's foreign aid (a priority on the home front) and
offending a Third World leader or government requires all the skill
and delicacy of a tightrope walker. Hence, while it is important to
demonstrate an enthusiasm for human rights implementation, criticism
of human rights violation can pose problems for foreign governments.
22 Id. at 325.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 231.
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Though United States President Jimmy Carter committed his nation
to a foreign policy that emphasized human rights, 25 the Carter record
in implementing that policy was not very encouraging. 26 The Reagan
Administration went to the extent of attempting to thwart congres-
sional actions (in adjusting foreign aid in favor of human rights) to
support regimes in Argentina, Chile and Guatemala. 27 One critic of
the Carter and Reagan Administrations suggested that "the trouble
with the Carter human rights policy. . . was the inconsistency between
what it originally said and what it subsequently did. The trouble with
the Reagan policy ... was the consistency between what it originally
said and subsequently did."
Contributor and editor, David Forsythe concludes that "[n]o human
rights situation was immediately turned around by manipulation of
economic aid. ' 29 Forsythe offers an historical explanation for this:
One should not expect much positive impact from US bilateral
economic assistance in support of the implementation of interna-
tionally recognized human rights. The US is preoccupied with its
global competition with the Soviet Union; most US economic aid
is politically designed for that competition. US economic aid ...
has declined drastically in relation to the US past and, more im-
portantly, to others in the contemporary world. US bilateral aid,
to the degree that it goes for something more than reward for
political orientations, is more sympathetic to macro-economic growth
according to traditional capitalistic strategies than to focusing on
rights per se .... Specific attention in US economic aid programmes
to rights as rights is marginal and largely cosmetic. 30
It is certainly true that one nation alone, even a donor nation,
cannot have a resounding impact on the global human rights picture
by manipulating its aid. Katarina Tomasevski has pointed out that
some donor states which contribute significantly to development aid
do not make an explicit connection between human rights and aid.
Tomasevski cited the examples of Japan, Saudi Arabia and the
U.S.S.R. 3
23 D. HILL, HUMAN RIGHTS AND FoRIGN POLICY 121 (1989).
26 FORSYTHE, supra note 2, at 180.
27 Id. at 181.
26 K. TOMASEVSKI, DEVELOPMENT Am AND HuMAN RIGHTS 50 (1989), quoting
HuMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: THE FIRST DECADE 1973-1983, p. 46
(1984).
29 FORSYTHE, supra note 2, at 181.
10 Id. at 191.
31 TOMASEVSKI, supra note 28, at 18.
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A further obstacle arises when foreign aid is partly utilized as a
method of assistance to citizens of the donor nation. Tomasevski
stated that "[h]alf of the bilateral aid is tied, and thus spent in the
donor countries themselves. ' 32 When self-interest rather than idealism
dominates development assistance policies, it is difficult for any gov-
ernment to attempt to impose a moral standard in favor of human
rights on the recipient nation.
A solution might involve greater utilization of United Nations
machinery both to express a commitment to human rights and for
channelling development aid. If the major donor nations were col-
lectively to commit themselves to implementing human rights by
distributing their aid through the United Nations and within that
frame of reference, some improvement could be effected.
The Commonwealth of Nations has committed itself to an explicit
linkage between human rights and development. In October 1989,
the Commonwealth announced its decision to establish a "10-nation
group of senior experts to strengthen human rights in countries which
have been accused of abuses." 3  A Commonwealth source was quoted
as suggesting that if developed nations "feel they have a right to
criticize human rights in another Commonwealth country, they should
be willing to do something about it." 34
One has to consider that some of the most generous donor nations,
such as Saudi Arabia, arouse serious international concern about their
own domestic policies with respect to human rights. In such instances
we can only hope that Operation Desert Storm helped blow some
progressive winds of change into the region.
If a desire for more human rights can be generated locally, so
much the better. At the time of writing, the citizens of Kuwait are
agitating for freedom and democratic systems and demanding that
the Emir agree to extensive popular participation in the Government
of Kuwait. Those Kuwaitis who stayed and endured the Iraqi on-
slaught are now among the most vociferous. The Kuwaiti experience
in surviving Iraqi depredations has also led to an insistence by the
women of Kuwait for their human rights.
Contributor Rhoda Howard stresses the importance of empowering
groups in such societies "to claim their rights." 35 Whether the rights
32 Id.
13 The Times (London), Oct. 26, 1989, § 9 at 5-8.
34 Id.
3" FoRsYrHE, supra note 2, at 223.
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gained are political or economic, the positive benefits of such local
agitation can be far more significant than by resort to foreign in-
tervention. There is always a danger that the latter policy could be
construed as an act of external interference. A somewhat extreme
example of local self-empowerment is presently occurring in Iraq in
the attempt by the population of that troubled nation to dismantle
the totalitarian dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. With obvious ref-
erence to a less volatile situation, Howard suggests that "foreign aid
could be geared toward enhancing" freedom of association, freedom
of the press and educational opportunities.16 Howard's emphasis on
internal activism to undermine repressive governments is tuned to the
nationalist sensitivities and cultural susceptibilities of the new nations
of Afro-Asia and the Middle East. As she states: "The best chance
for protection of economic rights, and all other human rights, comes
from changing internal actors, internal policies and internal social
structures, especially relations of power and relations of produc-
tion. " 7
One of the difficulties scholars have faced is in agreeing on a
definition of development. The United Nations Declaration on the
Right to Development states that: "'development is a comprehensive
economic, social, cultural and political process, which aims at the
constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and
of all individuals on the basis of their active, free and meaningful
participation in development and in the fair distribution of benefits
resulting therefrom.'"38 While these works are inspiring, it is quite
apparent that there can be serious contradictions in implementation.
For instance, should the well-being of the majority culture be the
correct frame of reference? How much should the majority sacrifice
to accommodate minority interests? It is quite obvious that "no
uniform and universally applicable model exists as regards the process
of development. ' 39 The country studies in the book demonstrate this
point quite clearly.
Because this book constitutes the proceedings of an international
conference, the contributions detailing conditions in various countries
are reflective of the research interests of the participants. While the
international flavor is interesting, the collection does no justice to
36 Id. at 226.
31 Id. at 230.
38 Id. at 126.
39 Id.
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significant areas of the world and to some relevant problems which
are completely excluded. To have three articles on India also appears
somewhat lopsided but this, of course, could not be helped. More
analysis of the themes of this book and less recitation of chronological
history might have enhanced the country contributions. This is why
the book is recommended largely for the student audience for whom
it will undoubtedly be an eye-opener and an expos6 of conditions in
some nations. As the volume presents donor and recipient perceptions
of development, it is also useful for informing undergraduate and
graduate students about the diversity of opinion on this subject. The
book makes it clear that "[h]uman rights do not function in isolation
but in concrete contexts and situations.' '
By stressing the role of people who are actively working to achieve
their rights, the contributors demonstrate the global interest in human
rights. If this activism can affect the policies of ruling elites in some
nations, there might well be an expansion of "the psychological
universe of obligation. ' 41 This significant ideal, emphasized by con-
tributor Howard and clarified by editor Forsythe, stresses "that the
state is not a toy for the enrichment and comfort of the elite, but
rather is a tool to be used for the maximum good of the nation as
a whole. At a minimum, the elite is obligated to the rest of the
nation to rule for the nation; the people have a right to implementation
of that idea. In larger perspective, under the notion of universal
human rights all elites have presumably an obligation to give some
assistance to realise the recognized rights.' '42
The dimensions of this problem of human rights and development
should not obscure the fact that both human rights and development
are twin pillars required in any society and indeed, indispensable for
its survival. On a related issue, former Tanzanian President Julius
Nyerere commented: "Freedom and development are as completely
linked as chickens and eggs. Without chickens, you get no eggs; and
without eggs you soon have no chickens." 43 A common sense approach
incorporating development and human rights would stress inherent
cohesion rather than artificial division.
40 Id. at 123.
" Id. at 222.
42 Id. at 356-57.
43 R. CLAUDE & B. H. WESTON, HumA RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 141
n.2 (1989).
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
GENDER DISCRIMINATION-EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY-EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
DETERMINES THAT A NON-CONTRIBUTORY
OCCUPATIONAL PENSION SCHEME SHOULD NOT
DISCRIMINATE ON THE BASIS OF SEX. Barber v. Royal
Exchange Assurance Group, 1990 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. -, [1990] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 513.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The late Mr. Douglas Harvey Barber brought a suit against his
employer, Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group (Guardian),'
pursuant to Great Britain's Sex Discrimination Act of 1975,2 article
I On May 26, 1989, with his case pending before the European Court of Justice,
Mr. Barber died. His widow and executrix, Pamela Barber, continued the proceedings
for and on behalf of Mr. Barber's estate with permission from the British Court
of Appeals. 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 552-53 (1990).
2 Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 65, reprinted in BUTTERWORTHS ANNOTATED
LEGISLATION SERVICE (M. Beloff & H. Wilson eds. 1976). The relevant provisions
are as follows:
§ 1 .-(l) A person discriminates against a woman in any circumstances relevant
for the purposes of any provision of this Act if-
(a) on the ground of her sex he treats her less favourably than he treats
or would treat a man, or
§6.-(1) It is unlawful for a person, in relation to employment by him at
an establishment in Great Britain, to discriminate against a woman-
(a) in the arrangements he makes for the purpose of determining who should
be offered that employment, or
(b) in the terms on which he offers her that employment, or
(c) by refusing or deliberately omitting to offer her that employment.
(2) It is unlawful for a person, in the case of a woman employed by him
at an establishment in Great Britain, to discriminate against her-
(a) in the way he affords her access to opportunities for promotion, or
services, or by refusing or deliberately omitting to afford her access to
them, or
(b) by dismissing her, or subjecting her to any other detriment.
(4) Sections (l)(b) & (2) do not apply to provisions in relation to death or
retirement.
In 1986, the Sex Discrimination Act was amended to make discriminatory
retirement ages illegal. However, it does not have a retrospective effect;
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
119 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community
(EEC),3 EEC Council Directive 75/117 on equal pay,4 and EEC
Council Directive 76/207 on equal treatment.' Barber challenged cer-
tain discriminatory practices of his employer's non-contributory pen-
therefore, discrimination prior to the amendment may not be affected. In
addition, the Employment Discrimination Act of 1989 fixed the retirement
age at sixty-five for men and women for the purposes of redundancy benefit.
J. STEINER, TEXTBOOK ON EEC LAw 238 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter STEINER].
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, No.
4300, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
Article 119 [Equal Pay for Men and Women]
Each Member State shall during the first stage ensure and subsequently
maintain the application of the principle that men and women should receive
equal pay for equal work.
For the purpose of this article, "pay" means the ordinary basic or
minimum wage or salary and any other consideration, whether in cash or
in kind, which the worker receives, directly or indirectly, in respect of his
employment from his employer.
4 EEC Council Directive 75/117, issued Feb. 10, 1975; 18 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 45) 19 (1975) [hereinafter Equal Pay Directive].
The Equal Pay Directive merely supplements article 119 by requiring Member
States to implement such laws as would "enable all employees who consider them-
selves wronged by failure to apply the principle of equal pay" to bring their claims
to the proper court for adjudication. Id. at art. 2. Also, the Equal Pay Directive
demands that Member States abolish all laws or regulations which reinforce or
mandate discriminatory practices, and Member States must take measures to eliminate
employer/employee agreements which facilitate discrimination. Article 1 provides:
The principle of equal pay for men and women . .. means, for the same
work or for work to which equal value is attributed, the elimination of all
discrimination on grounds of sex with regard to all aspects and conditions
of remuneration.
In particular, where a job classification system is used for determining pay,
it must be based on the same criteria for both men and women and so
drawn up as to exclude any discrimination on the grounds of sex.
Id.
EEC Council Directive 76/207, issued Feb. 9, 1976; 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
L 39) 40 (1976) [hereinafter Equal Treatment Directive]. The Equal Treatment
Directive is not based on article 119 of the EEC but on the institutions' general
powers under article 235 laying down the principle of equal treatment for men and
women "as regards access to employment, including promotion, and to vocational
training and as regards working conditions and . . . social security." Id. at art.
1(1). Article 2(1) defines the principle of equal treatment as meaning that "there
shall be no discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex either directly or indirectly
by reference in particular to marital or family status." Id. Article 5(1) defines
"working conditions" as including "conditions governing dismissal." Id. Further-
more, this provision may enable the application of the amended Sex Discrimination
Act of 1986. It is possible that a person could bring a claim under Directive 76/
207 against a state employer since that is who the Directive is directly affecting.
STEINER, supra note 2, at 238-9.
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sion scheme of which he was a member. 6 Barber sued Guardian after
being declared compulsorily redundant and fired.7 This termination
reduced his early retirement pension to just the cash benefits provided
for in Guardian's Severance Terms' in lieu of his normal pension
benefits. 9 These terms state that if a man becomes redundant, he is
not entitled to pension benefits unless he has reached age fifty-five. 10
Guardian declared Barber redundant at the age of fifty-two, and thus
he failed to qualify for an immediate pension." The corresponding
pensionable age for a woman is fifty. 2 Guardian paid Barber the
statutory redundancy payment and an ex gratia sum provided under
the Severance Terms. These amounts, however, were substantially
6 Barber v. Royal Exchange Assurance Group, 1990 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at
, [1990] 2 Common Mkt. L. Rep. at 518. The Guardian Royal Exchange
Assurance Group's non-contributory pension scheme was financed totally by the
employer. It was a "contracted out" scheme, meaning it was approved under the
Social Security Pensions Act of 1975. The employee member contractually waived
the earnings-related part of the state pension scheme making the Guardian's scheme
a substitute. Id. "Members of a scheme of that kind paid to the State scheme only
reduced contributions corresponding to the basic flat-rate pension payable under the
latter scheme to all workers regardless of their earnings." Id.
7 "Compulsorily redundant" means an employee is terminated either because of
an injury or illness or is fired.
' Barber, 1990 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at __, [1990] 2 Common Mkt. L. Rep.
at 519. The Guardian's Guide to Severance Terms provided for cash benefits, the
statutory redundancy payment and an ex gratia payment. Id.
9 "The severance terms confer on members of the pension fund who have attained
the age of 55 (for men) and 50 (for women) ... entitlement to an immediate pension
to be calculated in accordance with the rules of the pension fund." Barber, 1990
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at -, [1990] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 519. In the event
of redundancy, employees who have reached these ages were to be regarded as
"retired." Thus, according to the Severance Terms, any member regarded as being
"retired" during the ten years prior to normal pensionable age is entitled to immediate
pension. However, any member who is not deemed "retired" merely receives a
deferred pension as provided by the Severance Terms. In Barber's case, he was not
considered "retired," and thus he received the statutory redundancy payment plus
an amount equal to four or five weeks salary. Had he been considered "retired,"
he would have been entitled to his entire pension. Id.
10 Barber's pensionable age according to the scheme was sixty-two; the corre-
sponding age for women was fifty-seven. Similarly, a five year difference exists for
pensionable age under the state social security scheme. Specifically, the state scheme
establishes a pensionable age of sixty-five for men and sixty for women. Once a
member of the Guardian Pension Fund attains the normal pensionable age as provided
in that scheme, he is entitled to receive an immediate pension.
1 Id. Also, members entitled to deferred pensions payable at the normal pen-
sionable age were entitled to refunds if they were at least forty years old and had
completed ten years service with the Guardian when the employment relationship
was terminated. Id.
12 Id.
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less than those to which a fifty-two year old woman would have
been entitled were she declared redundant. 3
Claiming that he was a victim of unlawful sex discrimination,
Barber initiated proceedings before the British Industrial Relations
Tribunal. 14 The Tribunal dismissed his claim at the first and second
instance." He appealed to the Employment Appeal Tribunal which
also found his claim to be unfounded. 6 Barber then appealed to the
British Court of Appeal which stayed the proceedings and requested
that the Court of Justice of the European Communities (the Court) 7
render a preliminary ruling pursuant to article 177 with regard to
the compatibility of Guardian's pension scheme with EEC law.'"
13 Id.
1 Barber, 1990 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at , [1990] 2 Common Mkt. L. Rep.
at 520.
11 To bring an individual claim under the Sex Discrimination Act one submits a
claim to the Industrial Tribunal. This Tribunal's decision will not bind other courts
but one may appeal to the Employment Appeals Tribunal where a decision is binding.
Recent Development, 10 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 203, 206 (1980).
16 The Employment Appeals Tribunal decided that Barber's claim was unfounded
for three reasons:
(1) Mr. Barber could not base his claim on the prohibition of discrimination
laid down in the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 because, even though there
was discrimination, that prohibition, according to section 6(4) of the Act,
was inapplicable to "provision in relation to death or retirement;"
(2) in [Burton v. British Railways] the Court of Justice decided that the
question whether a person is entitled to a benefit under a pension scheme
is one of access to pension benefits which falls to be resolved not by the
principle of equal pay but by the principle of equal treatment;
(3) finally, Directive 76/207 on equal treatment was not directly applicable
in the United Kingdom, nor could it be relied upon for the purpose of
interpreting section 6(4) of the Sex Discrimination Act, inasmuch as it was
unclear what the consequences of the Burton judgment were with regard
to a claim under an occupational pension scheme.
Barber, 1990 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at -, [1990] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 520.
17 EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at article 173, which states: "The Court of Justice
shall review the legality of acts of the Council and Commission other than recom-
mendations or opinions." The Court has liberally construed this provision to include
any measure intended to have legal effects. BROWN & JACOBS, Tm COURT OF JUSTICE
OF THE EUROPEAN Coim mumi~s 100 (3d ed. 1989) [hereinafter BROWN & JACOBS].
Member States and Institutions may bring an action under article 173(1) as well as
natural and legal persons. Id. at 102-105. A suit may be filed on the grounds that
an act infringes upon the EEC Treaty or on any rule of law relating to its application.
Id. at 116. This cause of action has led the way for the Court to rule on "general
principles common to the laws of the Member States." Id. at 120.
, This provision states:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings
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Pursuant to the article 177' 9 procedure of the EEC Treaty, the
British Court submitted five issues to the Court for consideration: 20
(1) whether benefits in connection with redundancy are "pay" under
article 119 and the Equal Pay Directive2' or whether they fall within
the Equal Treatment Directive22; (2) whether the fact that Barber was
discharged under an employer provided pension scheme was material
to the issue of discrimination; (3) whether the principle of equal pay
was violated; (4) the direct effect of article 11923 and the Equal Pay
Directive2; and (5) the necessity of considering a woman's right to
access to an immediate pension before answering whether article 119
and the Equal Pay Directive are infringed. 25 Held, a non-contributory
concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Com-
munity;
(c) the interpretations of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the
Council, where those statutes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a member
State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the
question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of
Justice to give a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or
tribunal of a member State, against whose decisions there is no judicial
remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter
before the Court of Justice.
EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at article 177.
An article 177 procedure is a means by which national courts, when an EEC law
question arises, may apply to the European Court to obtain a preliminary ruling
on matters of interpretation and validity. STEINER, supra note 3, at 259.
'9 EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at article 177. The purpose of the European Court
of Justice is "to ensure that through the interpretation and application of the EEC
Treaty the law is observed." The Court consists of thirteen judges, one from each
Member State, and a President of the Court, with six Advocates-General to assist.
EEC law takes precedence over all conflicting domestic law. EEC Treaty, supra note
3, at art. 164-67. See also Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 585, [1964]
Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 425, in which the European Court reiterated that it is only
empowered to give rulings on matters of Community law. The Court does not have
jurisdiction to pass judgment on the compatibility of domestic law with EEC law.
Id. The Court stated that where it is asked to answer questions as to compatibility
it will simply render an abstract interpretation of EEC law on the matter in question.
Id.
2 Barber, 1990 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at -, [1990] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep.
at 520-21.
21 Equal Pay Directive, supra note 4.
22 Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 5.
2 EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 119.
24 Equal Pay Directive, supra note 4.
2 In accordance with article 177 of the EEC Treaty, the European Court of
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occupational pension scheme should not discriminate on the basis of
gender in the event of compulsory redundancy, since the benefits
paid are within the scope of article 119, and it is contrary to the
principle of equal pay to withhold a man's pension on the basis that
he has not met the requisite age when a woman in the same position
and of the same age would be entitled to her pension. 26 Barber v.
Justice considered the following questions:
(1) When a group of employees are made compulsorily redundant by their
employer in circumstances similar to those of this case and receive benefits
in connexion with that redundancy, are all those benefits "pay" within the
meaning of article 119 of the EEC Treaty and the Equal Pay Directive
(75/117/EEC), or do they fall within the Equal Treatment Directive (76/
207/EEC), or neither?
(2) Is it material to the answer to Question (1) that one of the benefits in
question is a pension paid in connexion with a private occupational pension
scheme operated by the employer ("a private pension")?
(3) Is the principle of equal pay referred to in article 119 and the equal
pay directive infringed in the circumstances of the present case if
(a) a man and a woman of the same age are made compulsorily redundant
in the same circumstances, and in connexion with that redundancy, the
woman receives an immediate private pension but the man receives only a
deferred private pension; or (b) the total value of the benefits received by
the woman is greater than the total value of the benefits received by the
man?
(4) Are article 119 and the Equal Pay Directive of direct effect in the
circumstances of this case?
(5) Is it material to the answer to Questions (3) that the woman's right to
access to an immediate pension provided for by the severance terms could
only be satisfied if she qualified for an immediate pension under the
provisions of the private occupational scheme in that she was being treated
as retired by the Guardian because she was made redundant within seven
years of her normal pension date under the pension scheme?
Barber, 1990 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at -, [1990] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 520-
21. 2 The European Court of Justice answered the following questions referred to
it by the Court of Appeals:
1. The benefits paid by an employer to a worker in connexion with the
latter's compulsory redundancy fall within the scope of the second paragraph
of article 119 of the Treaty, whether they are paid under contract of
employment, by virtue of legislative provisions or on a voluntary basis.
2. A pension paid under a contracted-out private occupational scheme
falls within the scope of article 119 of the Treaty.
3. It is contrary to article 119 of the Treaty for a man made compulsorily
redundant to be entitled to claim only a deferred pension payable at the
normal retirement age when a woman in the same position is entitled to
an immediate retirement pension as a result of the application of an age
condition that varies according to sex in the same way as is provided for
by the national statutory pension scheme. The application of the principle
of equal pay must be ensured in respect of each element of renumeration
262 [Vol. 21:257
BARBER CASE
Royal Guardian Assurance Group, 1990 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
__, [1990] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 513.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Introduction
European Economic Community (EEC) law in the area of gender
equality, particularly with respect to the question of retirement and
pension plans, is complex. The term "pay," as defined under article
119,27 means "salary and any other consideration, whether in cash
or in kind, which the worker receives, directly or indirectly'"' from
his or her employer. The confusing element of this body of law is
the European Court's distinction between statutory and non-statutory
retirement plans for the purposes of applying the article 119 definition
of pay. In the past, article 119 included neither statutory retirement
and pension benefits nor redundancy pay. 29 Furthermore, the Court
distinguishes legislation defining a social security scheme for workers
generally from legislation relating to state employees.30
Another division in European employment discrimination law was
the definition of "treatment." Treatment as defined in the Equal
Treatment Directive includes not only working conditions but also
matters of social security. 3' The distinction diawn between pay and
social security benefits, for the purposes of the Equal Treatment
Directive, have been the source of much litigation. The litigation
and not only on the basis of a comprehensive assessment of the consideration
paid to workers.
4. Article 119 of the Treaty may be relied upon before the national courts.
It is for those courts to safeguard the rights which that provision confers
on individuals, in particular where a contracted-out pension scheme does
not pay to a man on redundancy an immediate pension such as would be
granted in a similar case to a woman.
5. The direct effect of article 119 of the Treaty may not be relied upon
in order to claim entitlement to a pension, with effect from a date prior
to that of this judgment, except in the case of workers or those claiming
under them who have before that date initiated legal proceedings or raised
an equivalent claim under the applicable national law.
Barber, 1990 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at -, [1990] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 559.
27 EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 119.
2' STEINER, supra note 2, at 228.
29 Defrenne v. Sabena Airlines [II], 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1365, at 1371-
72, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 98, 124.
30 Liefting v. Amsterdam Univ. Hospital, 1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3225, 3227,
[1984] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 702, 705.
31 Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 5, at arts. 5 and 1.
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stems from the fact that Member States were allowed to exclude from
the equal treatment principle the "determination of pensionable age
for the purposes of granting old-age and retirement pensions." 3 2 The
Court routinely gave the "determination of pensionable age" language
a very narrow scope, refusing to apply the exclusion where pensionable
age was determined for any other purpose.3 Several different pro-
visions function as the basis for EEC employment law.
B. Article 119 and Cases Dealing with its Application
Article 119 of the EEC Treaty establishes the general principle of
equal pay for equal work for men and women. 34 This equality principle
applies only in the context of employment. 35 Some commentators
describe equality as one of the foundational principles of the EEC,36
designed to achieve both economic and social objectives. 37 The ec-
onomic goal is to ensure that Member States which implement the
equality principle are not placed at a competitive disadvantage vis-
a-vis those States which continue to discriminate. 38 The social goal
is to achieve "social progress" and to "improve ... living and work-
ing conditions" for all EEC citizens . 9
Although the EEC Treaty contains only one article which specif-
ically addresses the equality principle (article 119),40 the EEC imple-
32 Marshall v. Southampton Area Health Auth., 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
723, 729. [19861 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 688, 695.
33 Id.
34 See EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at article 119 and the accompanying text.
11 Id. Since the Sex Discrimination Act is confined to an economic context, it
does not settle questions as to family organization or division of parental respon-
sibility. See also Hoffman v. Barmer Ersatzkasse, 1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3042,
3047, [19861 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 242, 243 (a father had no claim under the
Equal Treatment Directive for paternity leave on his child's birth).
6 The EEC was formed in 1957 by Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Denmark, Ireland, and the United
Kingdom joined in 1973; Greece in 1981; Portugal and Spain in 1986. See Sir Barnett
Cocks, TIE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT-LONDON: HER MAJESTY'S STATIONARY OFFICE
(1973), for a discussion of EEC rules and practices.
17 Defrenne v. Sabena Airlines (Defrenne II), 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 455,
475 [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 98,117. See also Defrenne III, 1978 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. at 1378, [1978] Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 329, where the Court proclaimed
that "respect for fundamental personal human rights is one of the general principles
of Community law, the observance of which [the European Court of Justice] has
a duty to ensure. There can be no doubt that the elimination of discrimination based
on sex forms part of those fundamental rights." Id.
31 STEINR, supra note 2, at 225.
19 EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at the preamble of article 117.
,0 Id. at article 119 and accompanying text.
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mented equality directives 4' to clarify any ambiguities. 42 For example,
in 1975 the Council of Ministers43 adopted the Equal Pay Directive
to clarify the meaning of "pay" as defined under article 119. 44 This
Directive applies to both the public and private sectors. It defines
concepts of "equal work" and "same work" as "work to which
equal value is attributed;" therefore, equal pay must be given for
identical W'ork as well as comparable work. 45 Also, the Equal Pay
Directive requires Member States to implement legal measures to
enable employees to bring discrimination claims for violations of the
Directive." Articles 3 and 4 of the Equal Pay Directive prohibit
discrimination in collective agreements or provisions contained in legal
regulations. 47 Furthermore, where employers implement job classifi-
cation schemes to calculate pay, they must use uniform criteria to
evaluate men and women." It is important to note that article 119
is the basis for this directive.
The European Court in Jenkins stated that "article 119 of the
[EEC] Treaty applies directly to all forms of discrimination which
may be identified solely with the aid of criteria of equal work and
equal pay referred to by the article in question." ' 49 Although this
statement establishes the supremacy of article 119, it does not clarify
the retirement and pension questions on which the European Court
of Justice's application of article 119 is inconsistent. For example,
Defrenne III established that article 119 is effective against all parties
4 Article 189 of the EEC Treaty defines a directive as "binding, as to the result
to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave
to the national authorities the choice of form and methods." Id. Originally, it was
thought that a directive could not produce direct effects because they are described
as "directly applicable" in article 189. However, the Court in Franz Grad v.
Finanzamt Traunstein, 1970 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 825, [1971] 1 Common Mkt.
L.Rep. 1, ruled that a directive could be directly effective.
41 STEINER, supra note 2, at 225.
41 The Council of Ministers is the principle legislative branch of the EEC.
- Equal Pay Directive, supra note 4; see Jenkins v. Kingsgate, 1981 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 911, 927, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 24, 37, which confirmed that
the Equal Pay Directive's purpose was to elucidate, not alter article 119.
41 Equal Pay Directive, supra note 4, at art. 1 and accompanying text.
46 Id. at art. 2. Necessary domestic implementation was required to be in effect
by February 12, 1976. At the insistence of several countries the deadline for com-
pliance was delayed until August 1978. See Bellace, A FOREIGN PERSPECTIVE IN
COMPARABLE WoRTH: ISSuES AND ALTERNATIVWES 144, Equal Employment Advisory
Council, Washington, D.C. (1980).
Equal Pay Directive, supra note 4, at arts. 3 and 4.
4 Id.
49 Jenkins, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 911, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 24.
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but restricted it to enumeration not extending to dismissal or retire-
ment conditions.50 The Court ruled that there is no general principle
of Community law prohibiting sex discrimination in such circum-
stances. 51 Furthermore, the Court held in Defrenne v. Belgian State
(Defrenne 1) that although payment in the nature of social security
benefits is not excluded from the concept of "pay," as defined under
article 119, social security schemes and pension benefits are settled
by Belgian law and, therefore, do not represent consideration paid.52
The Court's decision rested upon the fact that the social security
scheme was statutory, as opposed to occupational. 51 In Defrenne v.
Sabena Airlines (Defrenne II), the plaintiff, an airline stewardess,
was successful in invoking article 119 against her employer, Sabena
Airlines, to claim the right to pay equal to that of her male coun-
terparts. 54 The Court noted that article 119 applies directly to "pay. 55
However, the Court also held that pension benefits were not "pay"
and, therefore, article 119 did not apply to pension benefits.16
Conversely, the Court held in Worringham v. Lloyds Bank Ltd.
that a plan to pay sums into male employees' occupational pension
scheme and not females' was discriminatory.5 7 The plan differentiated
between men and women under the age of twenty-five. 51 Men con-
tributed five percent of their salaries to the pension scheme, whereas
women under twenty-five were exempt from contributing and could
-1 Defrenne [III], 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1365, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt.
L. Rep. at 312. The Court stated as follows:
Article 119, which does have direct effect, does not extend to incidents of
the work relationship other than pay. The fact that certain conditions of
employment, such as a special age limit, may have pecuniary consequences
will not necessarily bring them within article 119, which is based on the
close connection which exists between the nature of the services provided
and the amount of renumeration. Id.
S1 [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 330.
52 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 445, [1971] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 494. Social
security schemes or benefits, particularly retirement pensions, which are not within
the scope of the national system of social security were not excluded in Defrenne
[I]; however, in Defrenne [III], the Court excluded these occupational pension schemes
from article 119 protection. [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 1365.
53 [1971] Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 496.
14 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1378, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 326.
51 [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 328.
56 Id. at 320.
57 Worringham, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 795, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.
Rep. at 1.
58 [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 3.
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claim no equity in the pension fund upon leaving the bank before
age twenty-fivei 9 Furthermore, the bank funded the men's five percent
in the form of a five percent addition to their annual pay.60 The
European Court held the contributions to be pay as defined by article
119.61
The Court followed Worringham in Bilka-Kaufaus GmbH v. Weber
von Hartz, where it held that a scheme restricting part-time employees'
access to a non-contributory scheme which supplemented social se-
curity was discriminatory. 62 Part-time workers at Bilka were primarily
women. Furthermore, the scheme was contractual, not statutory in
origin and, therefore, the benefits constituted consideration paid by
the employer to the employee.63
Liefting v. Amsterdam University Hospital challenged the statutory/
contractual dichotomy." A statutory pension scheme for civil servants
treated husbands and wives as one person for contribution purposes.65
This resulted in a policy of female civil servants whose husbands
were also civil servants receiving substantially smaller contributions.66
The defendant, citing Defrenne [II], tried to argue that the scheme
was a statutory social security scheme and, therefore, not within the
scope of article 119. The Court disagreed, ruling that a statutory
social security scheme was not per se outside the scope of article
119.67 The principle of equal opportunity was expanded to include
more areas than just pay.
59 Id. at 2.
6o Id.
61 Id.
62 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1607, 1625, [1986] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 701.
613 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1630.
64 1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 377, [19841 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 702.
65 1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 378.
Id. at 377.
67 Id. In interpreting Liefting, one should remember that the legislatively adopted
social security scheme is not the same as a legislatively imposed social security scheme
on workers in general by the State. Thus, the former may be the subject of Directive
86/378, while the latter may be the subject of the Social Security Directive. See
Newstead v. Department of Transport, 1987 E. Comm Ct. J. Rep. 4753, [1988] 1
Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 219. In this case a confirmed bachelor filed a suit charging
that a compulsory deduction for a pension scheme, actually for widows, from male
civil servants and not female was discriminatory. The pension was to be repaid with
interest in the event a civil servant left the service unmarried. The Court decided
that this scheme was occupational in nature under Directive 86/378. Furthermore,
the action failed because it fell within an exception under the Equal Treatment
Directive. See supra note 4, at art. 2(1) and accompanying text.
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C. The Equal Treatment Directive and Cases Dealing with its
Application
In 1976, the Council drafted the Equal Treatment Directive, 68 which
was not based on article 119 but on article 235.69 Its essential purpose
was to enhance opportunities for female employees. 70 The tenets of
the Equal Treatment Directive were equal access to employment
opportunities, vocational training, promotions, and working condi-
tions regardless of sex-thus furthering the abolition of direct or
indirect discrimination based on sex.7' Three exceptions to the Equal
Treatment Directive, however, did allow Member States to distinguish
between men and women where: (1) gender was a determining factor
in the ability of the person to perform the work; (2) the provision
protected women; or (3) the provision promoted equal opportunity
for men and women.
72
The primary obstacle facing the Equal Treatment Directive was the
extent to which it could be "directly effective. 73 Unlike the Equal
" See supra note 4.
69 EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 235, provides:
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course
of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the
Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the
Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and
after consulting the Assembly, take the appropriate measures.
Id.
70 Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 4. In the United Kingdom, the Treatment
Directive has been used to challenge the discriminatory retirement ages prescribed
for men and women, since the Sex Discrimination Act excludes from its scope death
and retirement provisions. STEINER, supra note 2, at 237.
,1 Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 4.
72 Id. at art. 2(2)-(4). The Directive is unclear as to how the exceptions interact
with the principle of equal treatment.
,3 Direct effect refers to an enforceable Community right which is applicable to
all Member States. EEC measures that are binding have vertical effect, meaning
they affect Member States. If it binds parties as well, it is said to have horizontal
effect. Many EEC sex discrimination matters lack horizontal effect, thus leaving an
employee's rights subject to the status of his or her employer. See Defrenne [II],
1976 Eur. Comm. Ct. Rep. at 458, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 122-123, where
Defrenne argued that the principle of equal pay "represents the application of a
general principle of equality which forms part of the philosophy common to the
Member States." Id. The European Court held that article 119 applied horizontally
referring to its economic and social aims and not its general principle of equality.
See infra Marshall v. Southampton and S.W. Hampshire Area Health Authority
(Teaching), 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 725, [1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 688.
The Court strictly interpreted article 1(2) of the Equal Treatment Directive because
of the "fundamental importance of the principle of equality of treatment." Id. at
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Pay Directive which was authorized by article 119, the Equal Treat-
ment Directive was based on article 235, the general law-making
provision of the EEC Treaty. 74 The Court clarified the matter in
Marshall v. Southampton and South West Hampshire Area Health
Authority (Teaching), which held that the Equal Treatment Directive
could be invoked directly against the Member State as an employer;
however, it was not directly applicable against a private person. 75
Marshall's dismissal from a State health agency simply because she
reached pensionable age, which was five years younger than a male's,
was discriminatory and contrary to the Equal Treatment Directive. 76
Marshall raised the "fundamental rights" argument under article
1 1977 established in Defrenne v. SABENA Airlines, (Defrenne [III),78
yet the Court focused its decision on the direct violations of the
Equal Treatment Directive and the Social Security Directive. 79 The
709. Ultimately, the Court held that article 5(1) was directly effective against the
State as an employer or public authority but not against a private employer. Id. at
711.
74 STEINER, supra note 2 at, 241. It was clear that the equal treatment could be
directly effective against the State, yet unclear whether it could be invoked against
the State as an employer. Even more equivocal was the question of whether it could
be invoked against a private person.
7, 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 725, [1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 688;
where the Court stated:
[Ilt must be emphasized that according to article 189 of the EEC Treaty
that the binding nature of a directive, which constitutes the basis for the
possibility of relying on the directive before a national court, exists only
in relation to "each member State to which it is addressed." It follows
that a directive may not of itself impose obligations on an individual and
that a provision of a directive may not be relied upon as such against such
a person.
[1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 711. See also Roberts v. Tate & Lyle Industries
Ltd., 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 703, [1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 714.
76 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 723, 746; (1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 688,
709.
7 Compare Defrenne [II], 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 458, [1976] Comm.
Mkt. L. Rep. at 114. The Court held that article 119 was directly effective against
individuals as well as Member States. Id. at 476; [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at
125.
71 1978 E.Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1365, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 312. This
case established that the elimination of discrimination based on sex is a "fundamental
right." It involved a flight attendant who challenged a provision of her employment
contract which required female employees to terminate employment at the age of
forty. Id. Although the Court proclaimed equal treatment a "fundamental right,"
it rejected Defrenne's claim saying that it lacked basis in Community law because
it did not fall within article 119. Id. at 1378; [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 329.
79 Marshall, 1986 Eur. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 740-43, [1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.
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purpose of the Social Security Directive was to implement the principle
of equal treatment for men and women.8 0
The Social Security Directive (Council Directive 79/7), the equality
directive addressing social security schemes, specifically applied to
statutory schemes providing protection against the risks of old age
and unemployment and implementing the principles of equal treatment
in statutory schemes."' Since the Social Security Directive applied to
statutory social security schemes, its effects must be vertical. That
is, they were only invocable against a State, as opposed to horizontal
effectiveness which referred to private persons. Furthermore, the
Social Security Directive overlapped the Equal Treatment Directive,82
Rep. at 705-06. The Court answered two questions: (1) whether the dismissal of
Marshall violated the Equal Treatment Directive; and (2) if so, whether Marshall
could rely on it in a British court given the inconsistencies between the Equal
Treatment Directive and the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975. The Court held that
the Equal Treatment Directive had been violated and it could be relied upon not-
withstanding the state authority. Id. at 751; [19861 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 712-
13.
', EEC Council Directive 79/7, issued Dec. 19, 1978; 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
L 6) 24 (1979) [hereinafter the Social Security Directive]. The Directive applies to:
(a) statutory schemes providing protection against sickness, invalidity, old age, ac-
cidents at work or occupational diseases and unemployment; and (b) social assistance,
in so far as it is intended to supplement or replace these schemes Id. at article 3(1).
Article 1(1) states that the Directive's purpose is as follows: "to put into effect in
the Member States the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards
access to employment, including promotion, and to vocational training as regards
working conditions." Article 2 applies the Directive to the working population
including "self-employed persons, workers and self-employed persons whose activity
is interrupted by illness, accident or involuntary unemployment and persons seeking
employment-and to retired or invalided workers and self-employed persons." Article
3(3) relates to the implementation of the equal treatment principle in occupational
schemes to be adopted in the future. Article 5 states as follows: "Application of
the principle of equal treatment with regard to working conditions, including the
conditions governing dismissal, means that men and women shall be guaranteed the
same conditions without discrimination on grounds of sex." Article 7 permits Member
States to exclude the following matters from the scope of the equal treatment
principle:
(a) the determination of pensionable age for purposes of old-age and
retirement pensions and possible consequences thereof for other benefits;
(b) benefits or entitlements granted to persons who have brought up children;
(c) wives' derived old-age or invalidity benefits, and
(d)increases granted in respect of dependent wives related to long-term
invalidity, old-age, accidents at work and occupational disease benefits.
Id.
Id. at art. 3.
82 See Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 5, at article 1(1) and accompanying
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since it merely implemented the principle of equal treatment in the
social security field.83
The Council designed Directive 86/378, which was complimentary
to the Social Security Directive," to mandate the implementation of
equal treatment for men and women in occupational, in contrast to
statutory, pension schemes.83 Implementation was required by all
Member States by July 31, 1989;8 yet even before the implementation
of Directive 86/378 an employer's contribution to an occupational
scheme may be deemed as "pay" thus falling under article 119.87
Council Directive 86/378 is nearly identical to the Social Security
Directive; however, it contains no exclusions for survivor and family
benefits. 88 Furthermore, Directive 86/378 expressly prohibits different
retirement ages for men and women.8 9 Both directives allow suspension
of the principle of equal treatment regarding the determination of
pensionable age when granting old-age or retirement pensions and
other similar benefits.9
13 See Burton v. British Railways Bd., 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 555, 576;
[1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 136, 157.
", See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
81 EEC Council Directive 86/378, issued July 24, 1986; 29 O.J. Eua. Comm. (No.
L 225) 40 (1986). This Directive applies to the following schemes:
[S]chemes not governed by Directive 79/7/EEC whose purpose is to provide
workers, whether employees or self-employed, in an undertaking or group
of undertakings, area of economic activity or occupational sector or group
of such sectors with benefits provided by statutory social security schemes*
or to replace them, whether membership of such scheme is compulsory or
optional.
Id. at article 2.
Article 4(a) refers to occupational schemes which provide protection against risks
of old age, including early retirement, and unemployment. Article 5 prohibits in
general terms any discrimination on the basis of sex. Article 6 lists a number of
provisions, including those directly or indirectly based on sex . . . [including] "(e)
setting different conditions for the granting of benefits or restricting such benefits
to workers of one or other of the sexes; (f) fixing different retirement ages .... .
Id.
Id. at article 12. Although implementation expired July 31, 1989, states are
allowed until January 1, 1993 to take "all necessary steps to ensure that the provisions
of the occupational [pension] schemes contrary to the principle of equal treatment
are revised . . . ." Id. at art. 8.
" See Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v. Karin Weber yen Hartz, 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 1607, at 1625-26.
u EEC Council Directive 86/378, issued July 24, 1986. 29 O.J. EUR. CoMM. (No.
L. 225) 46 (1986).
" Id. at article 6(f).
Id. at art. 9.
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Burton v. British Railways tested the scope of the equality direc-
tives.91 British Rail operated a voluntary redundancy scheme in which
women could apply for voluntary redundancy at age fifty-five and
men at age sixty2 Burton filed suit, claiming the scheme was dis-
criminatory. 93 Since the scheme fell within the exemption of the Sex
Discrimination Act of 1975 which excluded provisions in relation to
death or retirement,94 Burton turned to the Equal Treatment Direc-
tive.95 The Court ruled that the Directive did indeed apply to the
conditions and terms of voluntary redundancy schemes. 96 However,
the ages in British Railway's scheme were referenced to the statutory
retirement age and, therefore, the Court was bound to follow Directive
79/7, which permitted States to exclude from the equal treatment
principle "the determination of pensionable age." 97
Another case in which the European Court endeavored to flesh
out the scope of the Equal Treatment Directive was Razzouk v.
Commission.9" The Razzouk Court rested its decision on the fun-
damental right to equal treatment. 99 The plaintiff's deceased wife was
an EEC functionary and upon her death Razzouk was denied a
survivor's pension because the staff regulations for the EEC provided
different survivor's pension schemes based on the gender of the
deceased. 01 0 Citing Defrenne [III], the Court held that "the principle
of equal treatment of both sexes . . . forms part of the fundamental
rights the observance of which the Court has a duty to ensure."''
This case was unique because it applied the "fundamental right"
principle established in Defrenne [111] 102 to equal treatment as defined
11 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 578, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 136. The
criterion for distinguishing between equal treatment and equal pay may be expressed
as follows: the first principle applies to the conditions of eligibility for a benefit,
while the second applies to the benefit given to those who satisfy the qualifying
condition. Id. at 148.
92 Id. at 557; [1982 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 138.
13 Id. at 558; [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 139.
9, Sex Discrimination Act, supra note 3, at sec. 6(4).
91 Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 5.
9 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 575; [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 156.
"I See Social Security Directive, supra note 80, at article 7(a) and accompanying
text.
98 Razzouk v. E.C. Commission, 1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1509, [1984] 3
Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 470.
" Id. at 1530; [1984] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 491.
10 Id. at 1529-30; [1984] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 491.
101 1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1522.
102 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1365, [1978] Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 312.
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under the Equal Treatment Directive as opposed to equal pay under
article 119.
D. Employment Discrimination Laws in Great Britain and
Applicable Cases
Member States of the EEC are subject to the articles of the EEC
Treaty and have a duty to implement article 119 and other equality
directives within their domestic law accordingly. 03 In 1975, the United
Kingdom passed the Sex Discrimination Act' °4 amending the British
Equal Pay Act which had been designed to effectuate the equality
principle contained in article 119.105 In 1970, the Equal Pay Act
introduced the right to equal pay for women in Great Britain by
requiring men and women to be paid equally if they were employed
in "like work" and if a woman's work was "rated as equivalent"
to that of a man. 1°6 The British Equal Pay Act did not satisfy the
EEC's Equal Pay Directive' and the European Commission instigated
103 See Fitzpatrick, European Women Entitled to Equal Pay For Work of Equal
Value, 34 FED. BAR NEws & J. 384 (1987) [hereinafter Fitzpatrick]. The necessary
domestic implementing legislation was required to be in effect by February 12, 1976.
104 Sex Discrimination Act, supra note 2.
1o British Equal Pay Act, 1970, ch. 41 [hereinafter Equal Pay Act]. The relevant
provisions as originally enacted are as follows:
1.-(1) The provisions of this section shall have effect with a view to securing
that employers give equal treatment as regards terms and conditions of
employment to men and to women, that is to say that (subject to the
provisions of this section and of section 6 below),
-(a) for men and women employed on like work the terms and conditions
of one sex are not in any respect less favourable than those of the other,
and (b) for men and women employed on work related as equivalent (within
the meaning of subsection (5) below) ....
Id.
However, as originally enacted the Equal Pay Act excluded provisions relating to
death or retirement:
(1) [N]or shall that requirement extend to requiring equal treatment as
regards terms and conditions related to retirement, marriage or death or
to any provision made in connection with retirement, marriage or death;
and the requirements of section 3(4) of this Act shall be subject to cor-
responding restrictions.
(2) Any reference in this section to retirement includes retirement, whether
voluntary or not, on grounds of age, length of service or incapacity.
Id.
106 Id. The Equal Pay Act did not satisfy the law of the 1975 Equal Pay Directive
because it was a "like work" act and the Equal Pay Directive refers to "work to
which equal value is attributed."
I'" The Equal Pay Act was limited because in order to determine comparable
worth it required, first, a job evaluation study. Second, only certain job evaluation
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proceedings to require compliance with the Directive.'°0 This prompted
Great Britain to pass the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 which
attempted to bring British law into compliance with the Equal Pay
Directive. 09
To dissolve ongoing discrimination in pension plans, the Sex Dis-
crimination Act required "equal access" to pension schemes for men
and women. Yet it still permited sex discrimination when it arose
out of a "provision in relation to retirement.""10 The British Em-
ployment Appeals Tribunal construed this exception broadly. In Rob-
erts v. Cleveland Area Health Authority,"' the Court ruled that a
female hospital worker who was forced to retire at age sixty, while
her male counterpart did not have to retire until sixty-five, could
bring no discrimination action under the Sex Discrimination Act
because section 6(4) of the Act exempts pension provisions establishing
one's retirement age from the general rule." 2 The absence of pro-
visions relating to retirement and pensions resulted in a challenge by
the European Commission of the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 on
three grounds. First, the mechanisms employed by the United King-
studies were permitted. Third, the only way to have a job evaluation study performed
was with the consent of the employer. Few employers agreed to'this and, therefore,
the comparable worth provision of the Equal Pay Act had little or no meaning.
See Fitzpatrick, supra note 103, at 385.
-o The Commission of the EEC sent a letter to Great Britain on April 3, 1979,
to inform the government that proceedings would begin if Great Britain did not
comply. The Commission requested Great Britain to comply with article 119 on May
9, 1980. Great Britain did not comply so proceedings began on March 18, 1981.
See Note, United Kingdom Laws Fail to Satisfy EEC Equal Pay Directive Requiring
Equal Pay for Men and Women for Work of Equal Value: Commission of the
European Communities v. United Kingdom, 18 TEX. INT'L L. J. 380 (1983).
-o Fitzpatrick, supra note 103, at 385.
110 While "equal access" applies to pensions schemes, provisions in the Equal Pay
Act relating to death and retirement were deleted from the "equal access" require-
ment:
(A) An equality clause and those provisions-
(a) shall operate in relation to terms relating to membership of an occu-
pational scheme (within the meaning of the Social Security Pension Act of
1975) so far as those terms relate to any matter in respect to which the
scheme has to conform with the equal access requirements of Part IV of
the Act;
(b) by subject to this, shall not operate in relation to terms related to death
or retirement, or to any provision made in connection with death or re-
tirement.
Equal Pay Act, supra note 105.
Roberts v. Cleveland Area Health Authority, 1978 I.C.R. 370.
1,2 Id. at 375; C.f. Sex Discrimination Act, supra note 3, at sec. 6(4)(excluding
provisions relating to death or retirement).
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dom were inadequate to remove discriminatory provisions in collective
agreements and rules governing independent employers. Second, the
exemptions in the 1975 Act for private households and small un-
dertakings violated the equality directives; and third, the exclusion
of the midwife from the 1975 Act also violated EEC directives." 3
The European Commission prevailed on the first and second counts
before the Court of Justice." 4
Reacting to the decisions in Commission v. United Kingdom and
Marshall, the United Kingdom amended the Sex Discrimination Act
in 1986."' First, section 6(4) was amended to render unlawful, in
specified circumstances, discrimination with regard to retirement on
the basis of sex." 6 Second, the amended Sex Discrimination Act
prohibits an employer from dismissing an employee on the basis of
an age limit which discriminates between the sexes. "' These amend-
ments are consistent with the holding in Marshall."8 However, the
amended Sex Discrimination Act excludes a "provision in relation
to retirement" including benefits, facilities and services unless it is
related to a woman's dismissal or demotion which would violate the
Equal Treatment Directive rather than the Sex Discrimination Act.1 9
"3 Commission v. United Kingdom, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3431, [1984] 1
Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 44.
114 Id.
" Sex Discrimination Act, supra note 2. The 1986 amendment to the Sex Dis-
crimination Act includes provisions to end discrimination in retirement schemes.
Furthermore, the Employment Act of 1989 fixed the retirement age at sixty-five for
men and women. Neither of these two acts is retrospective. However, if a person
is a state employee suffering from discrimination prior to the Acts' entry into force,
he or she may have an action under the Equal Treatment Directive, since it was
designed to directly effect claims against a state employer. See Marshall, 1986 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 725, [1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 688, in which the Court
clarified two questions: (1) whether a different retirement age for men and women
breached the Equal Treatment Directive and (2) if so, whether Mr. Marshall (the
plaintiff) could rely on it. In this case the Sex Discrimination Act and the Equal
Treatment Directive were at odds on the discriminatory retirement age question.
After much deliberation, the Court decided that the Equal Treatment Directive had
been breached stating " where a person involved in legal proceedings is able to rely
on a Directive against a State he may do so regardless of the capacity in which the
latter is acting, whether employer or public authority." Id. On the other hand, a
Directive is only binding on "each member State to which it is addressed." EEC
Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 189. This is avoided if the Member State concerned
has correctly adopted and implemented the Directive into national law.
116 Sex Discrimination Act, supra note 2.
117 Id.
"I Marshall, 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 725, [1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep.
688.
119 Sex Discrimination Act, supra note 2.
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This is motivated by Britain's refusal to have the Sex Discrimination
Act apply to an employee's entitlement to redundancy pay or oc-
cupational pensions. 20 In other words, the amended Sex Discrimi-
nation Act still allows discrimination in retirement plans. The paradox
here is that the Marshall Court was very concerned with separating
employment questions from social security questions and guaranteeing
the former complete protection under the Equal Treatment Direc-
tive.' 2 ' Regardless of the British government's intention to exclude
redundancy pay, redundancy pay is an employment question, not a
social security question. 22
The United Kingdom's reluctance to fully implement article 119
and the equality directives into its national law is evidenced by the
discriminatory exclusion of retirement plans in the Sex Discrimination
Act of 1986. This perhaps was remedied by the European Court's
decision in Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein Westfalen.123
In Von Colson, the Court, applying the Equal Treatment Directive,
stated that interpretation of the directive does not have to conform
to the interpretation of national legislation subsequent to the adoption
of the directive concerned because Community law takes precedence
over all provisions of national law. 124 Von Colson established the
principle of "indirect effects" which challenges Great Britain to
interpret its national legislation pursuant to EEC law. 125 "The answer
should be that [Great Britain] will make every effort to maintain
consistency.' ' 26 However, commentators argue that "British Courts
do not even voluntarily uphold the principle and that many decisions
violate its spirit."' 2 7 Obstacles to British application of the funda-
'2 See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Van Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1984 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 1891, [1984] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 430. The case involved two women
imprisoned at a public prison which also housed male prisoners. The women brought
suit pursuant to the Equal Treatment Directive.
124 Id.
12, Id. "Indirect effects" refers to the effects of EEC law on a Member State's
national law.
126 Legislation, The Sex Discrimination Act, 50 MOD. L. R. 934, 937 (1989)
[hereinafter Legislation]. After Von Colson, 1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1891,
[1986] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 430, there was speculation as to how far the
United Kingdom courts would go in referring terms of the EEC directives to in-
terpretation of the Sex Discrimination Act of 1986.
127 Note, Fundamental Misconceptions About Fundamental Rights: The Changing
Nature of Women's Rights in the EEC and Their Application in the United Kingdom,
31 HARv. INT'L L.J. 565, 589 (1990).
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mental right of sexual equality include the principles of parliamentary
sovereignty, stare decisis, the problem of sources, and jurisdictional
restraints. 128
III. ANALYsis
In Barber v. Royal Exchange Assurance Group,'29 the European
Court of Justice took an important step toward achieving equal
treatment for men and women under pension plans. The Court rea-
soned that private occupational pension redundancy benefits do qual-
ify as "pay" under article 119.130 The difficulty which the Court had
in reconizing this fundamental concept of equal treament indicates
a reluctance within the United Kingdom (and perhaps the European
institutions) to fully implement the principles of equality. 3' The ev-
olution of the European Community case law, though meandering,
finally has resulted in a reasonable rule of law consistent with the
mandate of the Court.132
In Defrenne [III], the European Court of Justice elevated freedom
from sex discrimination to the status of a "fundamental right." The
Court defined a contractually mandated retirement age to be a "work-
ing condition" rather than "pay," thus negating the "fundamental
right" principle established under article 119. The Court stated un-
equivocally that "fundamental personal human rights is one of the
128 Id. at 590. First, parliamentary sovereignty is an obstacle to the application
of the fundamental right. While British courts interpret parliamentary acts in the
light of "fundamental rights," the Acts of Parliament remain supreme. Furthermore,
British courts have either construed legislation in line with EEC law or upheld
inconsistent national legislation on the grounds that the relevant EEC directive lacked
direct effect. Id. at 598. Secondly, the British court's adherence to stare decisis
weakens the fundamental right to be free from sex discrimination, since the British
courts follow precedence rather that uphold the fundamental right. Id. at 599-600.
Third, "[tihe sources of the fundamental right for British courts must be an EEC
directly effective traditional measure or an ECJ [European Court of Justice] judgment
applying the right, since the right itself is not directly effective." Id. United Kingdom
courts might apply the fundamental right of sexual equality more readily if the EEC
Treaty expressly declared it as fundamental or held to be directly effective. Id. at
601. Fourth, "[s]o long as the fundamental right lacks direct effect, an Industrial
Tribunal may not have jurisdiction to consider it." Id. at 602.
'2 Barber, 1990 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at -, [1990] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep.
at 514.
130 [1990] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 513.
3I See generally, Burton, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 576, [1982] 2 Comm.
Mkt. L. Rep. at 136 ; Defrenne [III], 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1365, [1978]
3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 312.
32 BROWN & JACOBS, supra note 17, at 119-20.
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general principles of Community Law, the observance of which [the
European Court] has a duty to ensure. There can be no doubt that
the elimination of discrimination based on sex forms part of those
fundamental rights."' 3 Inexplicably, however, the Court recanted its
declaration for fundamental rights by demoting the so-called "fun-
damental right" to a "qualified right."
The Court's characterization of a mandatory retirement age as a
working condition not subject to article 119 is inconsistent with
principles of non-discrimination. By denying the plaintiff the right
to equality in this respect, the Court declared that the fundamental
right contained in article 119 excludes dismissal or retirement con-
ditions. 134 Implicit in the concept of a fundamental right is the notion
that the right is so basic and essential that even in the most ques-
tionable circumstances it should be preserved. Furthermore, if the
right is fundamental, a violation of such a right in any form would
be subjected to the strictest scrutiny. 13S In Defrenne III, the Court
curiously declared freedom from sex discrimination a fundamental
right when in fact it refused to enforce it as a fundamental right. 36
The fundamental rights argument has been relied upon in other
EEC discrimination cases. For instance, the Razzouk Court also relied
on the fundamental rights principle'3 which holds equal treatment
as a fundamental right which the Court has a duty to protect. 38
While seeming to advance the fundamental rights principle, the Court
actually may have taken this bold step because the equality directives
do not apply to the EEC institutions. On the other hand, Razzouk
could be seen as affirming the fundamental rights principle laid down
in Defrenne III. Without actually following Defrenne III, the Razzouk
Court held that equal treatment was a fundamental right, whereas
Defrenne III denied protection.
"I See Defrenne [Il], 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1365, [1978] Comm. Mkt.
L. Rep. at 312, 329 (Elimination of sex discrimination is part of the fundamental
personal human rights).
114 [1978] Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 330.
"5 R. DwoRIN, TAKnWO RiGHTs SEMOUSLY 184 (1977). Dworkin distinguishes
"fundamental rights" from other rights by saying that "fundamental rights" are
rights "in the strong sense;" and no special grounds justify interfering with a
"fundamental right." Id. at 190.
136 Defrenne [III], 1978 Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1365, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.
Rep. at 312.
137 Razzouk, 1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1509, [1984] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep.
407.
3 Id. at 1529-30, [19841 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 490.
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The Razzouk holding is desireable for several reasons. First, the
Court dispensed with the formalities of interpreting article 119. Al-
though technically article 119 would not have applied since Razzouk
dealt with a survivor's pension scheme and not "pay," the Court
creatively upheld the principles of article 119 by pointing out that
Razzouk did not actually seek application of article 119. Instead
Razzouk's application to the Court used the words "in conformity
with the principles laid down in article 119 of the EEC Treaty .... ,, 19
Rejecting a more formalistic approach, the Court found in favor of
Razzouk. Ordinarily, the Court would have rejected Razzouk's claim
outright on the basis that article 119 did not apply to a survivor's
pension scheme. Instead the Court adhered to the spirit, not the
letter, of article 119140 and construed "the principles laid down in
article 119" to mean equality of treatment for both men and women
and stated that the principle "forms part of the fundamental rights
the observance of which the Court has a duty to ensure."'' 4'
Interestingly, both Defrenne [II] and Razzouk involved discrimi-
natory contracts relating to employment, yet the Court treated each
case differently. In Defrenne [III], the termination of a woman's
employment contract at the age of forty was deemed to be a "working
condition" relating to "treatment," and thus was not "pay." The
survivor's pension scheme in Razzouk was also said to constitute
"treatment," not "pay." However, in contrast to its decision in
Defrenne III, the Court held the scheme to fall within the principles
laid down by article 119. The conflict in these two cases raised the
question of whether "treatment" properly falls within the scope of
article 119, or whether a plaintiff, complaining of merely discrimi-
natory treatment, must rely on the Equal Treatment Directive which
the Court has not proclaimed to be a per se "fundamental right."
If treatment falls within the scope of article 119 as implied by Raz-
zouk, it may actually fall under the definition of "pay," since treat-
ment does have pecuniary consequences. However, if article 119 does
not apply and treatment falls only within the scope of the Equal
Treatment Directive and related directives, plaintiffs suffering dis-
crimination will be granted relief only in limited circumstances.
The "fundamental right" argument was used effectively in Mar-
shall, which was decided under the Equal Treatment Directive' 42 rather
139 Id. at 1520 [1984] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 481.
11o Id. at 1530, [1984] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 491.
I4 d. [1984] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 491.
142 See supra note 5.
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than article 119.143 Marshall contended that "the elimination of dis-
crimination on grounds of sex forms the part of the corpus of
fundamental human rights and therefore one of the general principles
of Community Law." The Court interpreted the Equal Treatment
Directive to facilitate the fundamental right to equal treatment. How-
ever, the Court retreated from its earlier tortured interpretation of
article 119 in Razzouk, in part due to the fact that Marshall involved
a Member State and not a Community institution. This interpretation
foreclosed acceptance of the fundamental right principle of Razzouk.
The Court found this to be significant because, although articles in
the EEC Treaty apply to private parties as well as Member States,
directives only address Member States. This lends credence to the
vertical effects versus horizontal effects distinction.'" Marshall seems
to set the stage for equal treatment, as defined under the Equal
Treatment Directive rather than article 119, to gain fundamental right
status; yet the Equal Treatment Directive only directly effects Member
States. Given that the directive does not apply to individuals, the
decision is somewhat hollow.
Besides an unwillingness on the part of Member States to implement
article 119 and related equality directives, the Court has bound itself
by its continued distinction between "pay" and "treatment." Log-
ically, there is not principled basis for distinguishing between "pay"
and "treatment." 45 The pension benefits one expects to receive upon
retirement are just as much a part of one's compensation as the
141 Marshall, 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 728, [1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep.
at 688-689.
- The rationale for giving a directive any effects at all is that Member States
must only rely, even in their own national courts, on laws consistent with the EEC
Treaty, including any directives. The conclusion is the vertical (meaning affecting
the Member States) - horizontal (meaning effecting private parties) distinction. Leg-
islation, supra note 126, at 934.
14, In the United States, the terms "pay" and "treatment" are settled by Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. 2000(e) [hereinafter Title VII]. For
instance, Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 487 U.S. 223 (1978),
held that unequal pension plan contributions for male and female employees based
on actuarial tables reflecting a woman's greater life span violated the sex discrim-
ination provisions of Title VII. Furthermore, in Los Angeles Dept. of Water, the
United States Supreme Court extended this nondiscrimination principle to unequal
benefits payments. Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity &
Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983). Following the decisions
in Manhart and Norris, nearly all employers have adjusted their pension plans to
conform to the requirements the two decisions set forth. EEOC Policy Guidance
On Retroactive Relief for Discriminatory Employee Retirement Plans, [Jan. - June]
Pension Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 103 (Jan. 16, 1989).
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wages he or she receives at the end of the week. Pension and retirement
plans which the Court has repeatedly excluded from article 119 pro-
tection should fall within the employment contract just as pay does.
Consideration runs from the employer to the employee in the form
of pay, benefits, pension and retirement benefits. In return, the
employee performs his job according to the employer's directions.
Since the Court refused to apply article 119 to social security
schemes, pension schemes, redundancy pension schemes and other
matters that do not qualify under the restrictive definition of "pay,"
plaintiffs were able to recover in very few circumstances. To be
protected, the plaintiff must first be an employee of the State under
Marshall, since the Equal Treatment Directive does not apply to
private employers,' thus only state employees will be able to obtain
relief under the Equal Treatment Directive. Second, the Court must
decide that the discrimination in fact amounts to "pay."' 47 The Court
followed this reasoning in Worringham. 4 Although the case involved
an occupational pension scheme which ordinarily is excluded from
article 119, the Court deemed the contributions to the scheme to be
"pay."' 49 If the Court had decided otherwise, the plaintiff would
have been unable to gain relief because the Equal Treatment Directive
does not apply to occupational schemes. Lastly, if the Court rules
that directives have "horizontal" as well as "vertical" effect, plaintiffs
who are not State employees would have another avenue of relief.
By taking this step, the Court would recognize the economic and
social goals underlying article 119150 and give credence to the notion
of equality of treatment as a "fundamental right."''
The pecuniary consequences of pension and retirement schemes,
including redundancy plans, is apparent. For example, if an employer
forces a female to retire five years earlier than her male counterpart,
this amounts to five years less that she will be paid. By the same
token, denying Barber his full redundancy pay simply because he
'" 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 724, [1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 689.
,,1 See Worringham and Humphreys v. Lloyds Bank Ltd., 1981 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 767, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 1; see also Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v.
Weber von Hartz, 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1607, [1986] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep.
701.
"18 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 767, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 1.
1,9 Id. at 795.
11O Defrenne [II], 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1378, [1976] Comm. Mkt. L.
Rep. at 111.
"I Defrenne I1, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1365, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.
Rep. at 312.
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had not met the requisite age for a male, when a similarly situtated
women would have received the pay, is discriminatory."52 This, in
turn, means Barber was denied pay based on his gender which article
119 prohibits as discrimination.' If the European Court were to
abandon its strict, inadequate definitions of "pay" and "treatment,"
it could freely uphold the "fundamental right" principle it declared
it was mandated to ensure in Defrenne [II]. 4 Furthermore, this
would enable the Court to attain the economic and social goals article
119 was intended to meet. 55
The European Court has broken some significant ground in Barber.
First, it held that the fact that certain benefits are paid after ter-
mination of employment does not prevent them from being "pay"
as defined under article 119.156 Furthermore, the Court went on to
state that article 119 applies even where redundancy compensation
derives from legislation rather than from the contract of employ-
ment. 57 Second, the Court made a blanket statement that occupational
pension schemes, contributory or noncontributory, were part of the
consideration paid by employers to employees, so long as the scheme
was in no way financed by the state.' The Court also stated that
a sex-differentiated age condition with respect to pensions paid under
a contracted-out private occupational pension scheme was contrary
to article 119.' 59 The rule applied even where the difference was based
on pensionable ages set by the national social security scheme.60
Lastly, the Court unequivocally granted direct effect of article 119
to private occupational pension and redundancy schemes by defining
these schemes as components of renumeration. 6
152 Barber, 1990 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at -, [1990] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep.
at 519.
-, EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at article 119.
'" 1978 E.Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1378, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 312.
- [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 329. The economic goal is to ensure that
Member States which implement the equality principle are not placed at a comparative
disadvantage vis-a-vis those states which continue to discriminate. The social goal
is to improve living and working conditions. Id.
156 Barber, 1990 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at -, [1990] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep.
at 523.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id. The direct effect of article 119 may not be relied upon in order to claim
entitlement to an occupational pension with effect from a date prior to May 17,
1990, except in the case of workers (or those claiming under the articles) who have
prior to that date already initiated legal proceedings or raised an equivalent claim
under the applicable national law. Id.
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Barber is unprecedented in its broad interpretation of article 119
and its application to pension schemes. 62 The Court rejected Defrenne
[I] outright saying, "[play that is prescribed by law does not for that
reason fall outside the scope of article 119."'163 The Court pointed
out that in Defrenne [III it clearly held that article 119 was particularly
applicable to discrimination stemming from national legislation.' 64
Moreover, the pension scheme at issue in Barber was financed solely
by the employer's contributions and the contributions were paid by
the trustees of the fund. 165 The Court construed these sums paid by
the employer to the trustees of the fund as indirect consideration
and, therefore, tantamount to "pay" as defined under article 119.'66
Although the Court was unwilling to give horizontal direct effect
to the equality directives, specifically the Equal Treatment Directive,
it did concede that a contracted-out private occupational scheme falls
within the scope of article 119. If the Court had decided to give the
Equal Treatment Directive horizontal effect, it would have been forced
to overrule Marshall and was unwilling to do so. However, the
dilemma facing plaintiffs with an unequal treatment claim and the
lack of horizontal effects will be obsolete if the Court decides to
continue applying article 119 to historically unequal treatment issues
as it did in Barber.67
The Barber Court made some very positive changes in the law of
sex discrimination as it pertains to retirement and pension plans. The
162 The decision in Barber has been compared to the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983). The
impact on multinational firms is predicted to be even greater, since more.plan design
features are likely to vary by sex in the EEC than in the United States prior to the
Norris decision. Pension plan options most likely affected include pensions for spouses
and dependents, early and late retirement provisions, bridging pensions and waiting
periods which indirectly discriminate against men or women. Multinational Firms
with Pension Plans Seen Affected by EC Discrimination Ruling, [July-Dec.] Daily
Labor Report (BNA) No. 131, at A-13 (July 9, 1990).
163 Id. at A-13.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id. The Court cites Worringham, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 789, [1981]
2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 523. The Court stated that:
Sums . . .which are included in the calculation of the gross salary payable
to the employee and which directly determine the calculation of other
advantages linked to the salary, such as redundancy payments ... form
part of the worker's pay within the meaning of article 119(2) of the Treaty
even if they are immediately deducted by the employer and paid to a pension
fund on behalf of the employee.
Id.
167 Id.
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Court successfully expanded article 119 without upsetting a private
employer's immunity from the Equal Treatment Directive by estab-
lishing horizontal direct effects. Actually, the avenue the Court took
is more appropriate in light of the previously declared, yet still
developing, fundamental right to sexual equality. Perhaps the most
positive change is the implication that "pay" and "treatment" are
really elements of a greater concept - the employment contract as a
package of terms, benefits and pay.
IV. CONCLUSION
European Economic Community law concerning equal treatment
has suffered through tortured interpretations and harsh results. By
limiting its definition of "pay" to the actual salary an employee
receives, the European Court had found itself trapped between up-
holding traditional European Economic Community definitions and
the fundamental principle of freedom from sexual discrimination.
Unfortunately, the Court spent many years relying on strict inter-
pretations of the articles of the EEC Treaty. Plaintiffs were turned
away without a remedy, since their claim did not qualify as "pay"
under article 119. With the Barber decision, it seems the Court is
broadening its definition of "pay" and, at least, curbing the futile
distinction between "pay" and "treatment" in the area of pension
and redundancy plans.
R. Mace Flournoy
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EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY-ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY-ECONOMIC AND FISCAL INSTRUMENTS-
REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP OF EXPERTS FROM
THE MEMBER STATES PROPOSES THE USE OF
ECONOMIC AND FISCAL INSTRUMENTS TO ATTAIN
COMMUNITY-WIDE ENVIRONMENTAL GOALS
I. FACTS
On November 28, 1989 the Environment Council' of the European
Community2 requested that an independent group of national experts'
prepare a detailed report on the use of economic and fiscal instruments
in the environmental policy of the Community. The purpose of the
report was to evaluate the potential effectiveness of these instruments
in addressing the environmental problems before the EC. The impetus
for this action was the failure of the current regulatory measures4
and the push toward a unified market. Due to the fact that the
experts participated on an individual basis, the report is neither the
official responsibility of the Commission nor of the Member States;
however, it serves as a theoretical framework for a new approach to
environmental regulation by the European Community. 5
The Report of the Working Group of Experts from the Member
States on the Use of Economic and Fiscal Instruments in EC En-
vironmental Policy6 (Experts' Report or Report) is an important point
The Environment Council is composed of the environment ministers from the
European Community's twelve Member States.
2 The European Community (EC) consists of: Belgium, Denmark, Germany,
Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and
the United Kingdom.
I The group of national experts was drawn chiefly from senior environment
department officials from each state. Pienaar, Brussels Takes Stronger Line on
Pollution "Fines"; Radical EC Proposals For "Green Taxes" Will Provoke Stiff
British Resistance, The Independent, Sept. 21, 1990, at 2.
4 Regulatory measures consist of the traditional practice of implementing max-
imum emission levels allowable under penalty of law.
I The Commission is expected to formally adopt this report in the coming months.
Dickson, Carbon Tax Plan Reappears on the EC Agenda, Fin. Times, Aug. 9, 1990,
at 7.
6 Report of the Working Group of Experts from the Member States on the Use
of Economic and Fiscal Instruments in EC Environmental Policy (Sept. 5, 1990)
(available from the Commission of the European Communities) [hereinafter Experts'
Report].
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in the Community's gradual movement from a regulatory policy of
environmental protection to a policy based on the use of economic
incentives.7 Though this concept is not new to the region, the shift
in policy has been dramatically accelerated over the past year.
After the initial request for the Report was made by the Environ-
ment Council, the Environment Ministers convened for an informal
meeting on April 21, 1990, to further address the use of economic
and fiscal instruments. During the conclave, the Ministers reiterated
their commitment to the imposition of a system of EC-wide instru-
ments to complement, and in some instances replace, the regulatory
measures that were currently in effect. The presidency conclusions
to the meeting stated that the "Ministers acknowledged the value of
supplementing existing regulatory instruments ... by the use of
economic and fiscal instruments.''8 A very similar position was es-
poused during the Bergen Conference 9 in May 1990, when an increased
commitment to the use of environmentally driven tax measures was
made. l0
In June of 1990 the European Council, during its meeting in Dublin,
included in its Declaration a chapter on environmental concerns. The
text of the chapter concluded with the following statement:
We therefore call on the Commission to accelerate its work in this
field [of economic and fiscal instruments] and to present, before
the end of 1990, proposals for a framework or guidelines within
which such measures could be into effect by the Member States in
a manner consistent with the Treaties."
This Declaration was followed by the release of a draft report by
the Economic Instruments Task Force. The task force study was
initiated by the Commission in response to its determination that
fiscal initiatives were a necessary component of its environmental
policy. The report 2 called for the use of economic instruments and
stated that the harmonization of taxes within the Internal Market
7 Economic and fiscal instruments used in environmental policy are sometimes
referred to as "ecotaxes" or "green taxes."
8 Experts' Report, supra note 6, at 2.
9 Id. Ministerial Declaration of the Bergen Conference, May 1990.
10 Experts' Report Sets Out Steps Towards EC Environmental Taxation, EC
ENERGY MONTHLY, Aug. 1990, at 1.
1 Experts' Report, supra note 6, at 2.
12 Economic Instruments of Environmental Policy: An Internal Report Prepared
for the Senior Advisory Group on the Environment (Dec. 1990) (unpublished doc-
ument).
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must be accomplished with environmental concerns in mind. 3 These
previous initiatives by various entities within the Community increased
awareness in the potential effectiveness of economic instruments and
resulted in a need for an exhaustive analysis of such a policy.
The Experts' Report proposes a comprehensive system of financial
incentives and penalties to address the increasing problem of envi-
ronmental degradation. The paper is supported by the Italian gov-
ernment, the present holder of the EC presidency, and the Environment
Commissioner, Carlo Ripa di Meana. 14 While the Report calls for
the Commission to formulate proposals on this matter by the end
of 1990, to this date no formal action has been taken. Regardless
of the delay,' 5 this report provided sober reading for those who
doubted that fiscal instruments would be implemented on a Com-
munity-wide scale.' 6
The Experts' Report is comprised of three major sections: an
introduction into the need for market mechanisms; an examination
of the basic elements of economic instruments; and an evaluation of
environmental problems which could be addressed through these in-
struments.
The present structure of environmental control by the Community
consists predominately of regulatory measures. The market mechan-
isms that are in effect are products of individual legislation by Member
States rather than a Community-wide program.' 7 The Report states
The Report disagreed with the traditional view that economic growth and
environmental concerns were mutually exclusive. Rather the task force position was
that with a new commitment to sustained growth, the Community should be able
to reconcile economic development and the environment. EC Official Says Fiscal
Instruments to See Greater Use for Pollution Control, 13 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA)
No. 4, at 151 (April 11, 1990).
14 Mr. Carlo Ripa di Meana has been an enthusiastic proponent of a market
mechanism approach in addressing environmental degradation. Dickson, supra note
5, at 7. Additionally, the Commissioner is pushing hard for a harmonized "green
tax" system to be implemented by the Commission. Pienaar, supra note 3, at 2.
15 One possible explanation is that the Commission believes that this is not the
proper time to increase energy costs, given the uncertainty of energy prices due to
the Gulf War.
1" EC Moves Toward Green Taxes, Fin. Times, Aug. 24, 1990, at European
Energy Report.
17 A number of the more advanced industrial states would prefer that environ-
mental taxes be continued on a national basis rather than be harmonized. The
reasoning is that individual application may work an advantageous distortion of
competition for those countries who already have made some headway in addressing
this problem. Percival, Environment: Green Taxes for Europe? An Inter Press Service,
Inter Press Service, Sept. 25, 1990, at 1.
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that both the regulatory approach of the Community and the na-
tionalistic use of economic instruments are inadequate measures to
address the Community's environmental problems.
Regulatory controls offer no incentive to the polluter to minimize
his waste beyond that which is required by law. The result is that
the cost of the damage to the environment is externalized and must
be borne by the public sector. Through the implementation of fiscal
and economic instruments, the Report attempts to internalize these
environmental costs so that the price of a product or service will
ultimately reflect the actual total cost to the Community. The Report
does not call for the complete abolition of the regulatory controls,
but rather for the simultaneous use of both static regulatory limits
and fiscal instruments.
With regard to the implementation of these instruments by the
Community rather than individual states, the Report points out that
allowing separate systems to evolve would run counter to the planned
realization of an Internal Market in 1992 as set out in the EEC
Treaty.' The Treaty was subsequently amended in 1987 by the Single
European Act.' 9
In addition to being more effective, Community standards avoid
the risk of creating fiscal barriers between various Member States;
a risk which is an inherent part of any nationalistic approach. Thus,
it is clear to the Member States experts that any environmental taxes
which are implemented must be done on the Community level to
avoid potential trade distortions.
One final impetus prompting the Commission to address this issue
was that the Community is the signatory to a number of international
conventions on pollution, and will certainly sign on to more in the
future. In that capacity, the Community is ultimately responsible for
environmental compliance on an international level.
The Report points out the importance of distinguishing between
the incentive impact of economic instruments and the raising of
revenue. The goals of the two are dissimilar, and therefore each
should be conducted in a distinct manner. Obviously the incentive
tax attempts to discourage harmful activity, while the revenue tax
aims to accumulate the necessary funds to address environmental
problems which do occur. One is preventive and the other curative.
18 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
,9 Single European Act, 30 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 169) 1 (1987).
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On an economic level, incentive charges should be budget neutral
and create no additional tax burden.
Once the motive for implementing the market mechanism is de-
termined, the policy and the surrounding conditions will dictate which
fiscal instrument is best suited to address that specific problem. The
mechanisms which are available to effect an alteration of behavior
in a manner that is more favorable to the environment are: 1) en-
vironmental charges and taxes,7° 2) tradeable emission permits,2' 3)
deposit-refund systems, 4) enforcement incentives,2 5) financial aid,23
6) industry agreements, and 7) environmental liability.Y
In order to determine the potential of proposed instruments the
Report lists five criteria for review: 1) the overall environmental
effectiveness or reduction of harmful practices, 2) the economic ef-
ficiency or degree of adjustments made to the price structure, 3) the
practicability of the measure and its administrative costs, 4) the
fairness of the policy and the acceptability to the public as well as
industry, and 5) the economic impact to the Community.
The Report proposes that the Community apply these economic
and fiscal instruments to address both global and regional environ-
mental problems. The strongest proposal is for a drastic incentive
tax on carbon dioxide (C02) emissions to deal with the growing
problem of global warming. The paper urges that such a tax or charge
be implemented in order to internalize the actual cost of the energy
source and to reduce the overall consumption of fossil fuels. Pos-
sibilities suggested are either a tax system or a more moderate system
of tradable emission permits.
As far as direct taxation, an emissions charge determined at the
source of the pollution is the most equitable for industrial waste.
The consumer, due to the number and mobility of the sources, could
be assessed a product charge based upon the contribution of that
o These may be applied as emissions charges, products charges/taxes or tax
differentiation.
2, This creates a secondary market in pollution permits that acts as a component
of a regulatory scheme.
"2 Some examples are performance bonds and non-compliance fees which coerce
the polluter to abide by the regulations that are prescribed.
Though Community subsidies are an option, this contradicts the "polluter
pays" principle of Article 130r.
2, A switch to strict liability places the burden of proof on the polluter and results
in higher premiums for the insured unless he can lower the environmental risks of
his. activities.
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fuel source to the overall global warming problem. 25 Clearly the
desired effect of such a program is a drastic increase in the price of
fossil fuels.
Ozone depletion is the other global issue dealt with by the Report.
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) are the cause of severe ozone depletion.
Given that safer alternative chemicals cost three to five times as much
as the CFCs used today, an incentive tax should be put into place
to force a switch to the available, cleaner technology.
The regional problems addressed by the study run from water
contamination to air traffic noise pollution. The proposed fiscal
instruments are again an effort to internalize the cost of these products
and to put the "polluter pays" principle26 into practical effect. In
order for the "polluter pays" approach to be realized, the polluter
must be responsible for all direct and collateral effects of his actions.
One of the more drastic proposals in the Report concerns a new
approach to agricultural policies within the Community. Agricultural
production is the source of many environmental contaminants to both
the soil and the groundwater supply. These substances include pes-
ticides, as well as nitrates and phosphates found in fertilizers. The
larger problem is found in the present system of price support within
the Community which, through governmental price support, encour-
ages the farmer to maintain the status quo in agricultural methods.
The result is that intensive farming practices which are most harmful
to the environment are encouraged. In response to this problem, the
Experts' Report proposes an abolition of certain types of national
aid, in conjunction with an incentive tax on these agricultural con-
taminants. Due to the effectiveness of the pesticides and fertilizers
in use, a high incentive tax must be applied in order to facilitate a
switch to more environmentally correct methods. One way that the
report suggests to lessen the financial blow on the farmer is to channel
a portion of the revenue raised back to the farmers in the form of
subsidies. Obviously these subsidies must be consistent with the com-
petition guidelines of the Internal Market.
Another proposed solution concerns the Community's high level
of automobile traffic and the subsequent air pollution that results.
2 Such a system would consist of a graduate charge increasing in severity based
upon the level of C02 emissions of the fuel. In essence, coal would be charged a
much higher rate than gasoline.
26 EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art. 130r(2); added by Single European Act, supra
note 19, art. 25, at 12.
[Vol. 21:285
EC ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY REPORT
The Report's response to this issue is a combination of economic
and fiscal measures. First, the report reiterates the need for an excise
tax on carbon fuels, to be harmonized in accordance with the dictates
of the Internal Market. Secondly, it suggests a vehicle or special
consumer tax which could be returned as a subsidy to reduce the
cost of automobiles which employ cleaner technology. Thirdly, it
proposes an annual road tax on all vehicles based upon the auto-
mobile's weight and engine capacity or, in the alternative, upon the
degree of carbon emission. Finally, the report calls for a fixed road
use charge or toll to be applied consistently throughout the Com-
munity in order to prevent fiscal barriers or distortions.
In the area of waste disposal, the Experts' Report calls for a three
part approach. Given in the order of importance, the areas are: 1)
prevention, 2) reuse and recycling, and 3) more efficient treatment,
incineration and land disposal of the waste that is created. To further
these aims the Report proposes a deposit/refund system, as well as
a charge or tax differentiation 27 for harmful products. The degree of
incentive tax should obviously vary according to the risk of the
product.
This Report, given at the urging of the Commission, is a clear
mandate for a comprehensive system of economic and fiscal instru-
ments to address the growing environmental problems within the
Community. In conclusion the Report states:
The development of economic and fiscal instruments of environ-
mental policy is also required at EC level, essentially to cope with
pollution on a transboundary or a global scale, to prevent trade
distortion, and to prevent each Member State from postponing action
to avoid competitive disadvantages, even in the short term.21
This exhaustive analysis of options available to the Commission should
form the basis of the Community's environmental policy and create
support for a shift from the static approach of regulatory limits to
a more dynamic policy of market mechanisms. 29 Report of the Work-
27 Thus, cleaner products would carry a lower tax than dirtier ones. This has
been an effective instrument in the introduction of unleaded gasoline within the
Community. Its attributes are that it is budget neutral and has very little administrative
costs. Commission Expected to Consider Issue of Using Taxes to Promote Pollution
Control, 13 Int'l Env't Rep. Current Report (BNA) No. 10, at 383, (Sept. 26, 1990).
28 Experts' Report, supra note 6, at 19.
29 The implantation of this position has already begun, although not on a formal
level. In a December 20, 1990 "working paper," the European Commission called
for a package of taxes to address the issue of global warming. EC Favors Energy
Tax, Will Sound Out Members First, The Reuter Library Report, Dec. 20, 1990.
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ing Group of Experts from the Member States on the Use of Economic
and Fiscal Instruments in EC Environmental Policy (Sept. 5, 1990).
II. LAW
Environmental concern is not a recent development within the
Member States or the Community. However, at the inception of the
EC none of the three treaties creating the Community contained
explicit provisions granting authority to act in the area of environ-
mental policy.30 Therefore, initial control over environmental issues
remained in the hands of the Member States.
In the 1970s the Community began to move toward the harmonized
control of certain environmental matters. In its progression toward
a single market, the Community began the "General Program for
the elimination of technical barriers within the Community." 3' In-
cluded within this program were several directives which laid down
Community-wide environmental regulatory standards, which in some
instances replaced inconsistent national standards.3 2 Examples of this
type of directive are: 1) measures against air pollution caused by
motor vehicles, 33 2) requirements on the biodegradability of deter-
gents, 34 and 3) limits on the sulfur content of specific fuels. 35 The
Community realized that differing environmental standards would
produce fiscal barriers within the Common Market and undertook
to harmonize their regulatory approach.
In Paris during 1972, national leaders of the Member States of
the Community published the "summit declaration" which expressed
their desire that the Community develop an EC environmental policy.3 6
This declaration was followed up by a draft action program submitted
by the Commission to the Council calling for just such an EC-wide
environmental policy. 3 7 This Community action program has been
modified in 1977, 1983, and in 1987. While this program called for
" In fact, the term "environment" is not found in any of the documents at that
time. Haagsma, The European Community's Environmental Policy: A Case Study
in Federalism, 12 FoRDnAm INT'L L. J. 311, 315 (1989).
1, Council Resolution of May 28, 1969, 12 J.0. COMM. EUR. (No. C 76) 1 (1969).
32 Haagsma, supra note 30, at 316.
3 Council Directive No. 70/220, 13 J.0. COMM. EUR. (No. L 76) 1 (1970).
-- Council Directive No. 73/404, O.J. COMM. EUR. (No. L 347) 51 (1973).
11 Council Directive No. 75/716, O.J. COMM. EUR. (No. L 307) 22 (1975).
3 Declaration of The First Summit Conference of the Enlarged Community,
reprinted in E.C. Bull No. 10, at 14, 20 (1972).
31 Council Declaration of Nov. 22, 1973, on the Programme of Action of the
European Communities on the Environment, O.J. Comm. EuR. (No. C 112) 1 (1973).
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an environmental policy, it did not provide the legal foundation for
one.38
The original EEC Treaty provided only an implied authoritative
basis to implement a Community environmental policy in order to
attain a single market. Article 10O39 grants authority to the Council,
acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, to preside
over all matters that directly affect the "establishment or functioning
of the common market." 4 Thus, the Community could address all
environmental matters which have the potential of erecting fiscal
barriers within the planned Internal Market.
The Single European Act (SEA)41 in 1987 went one step further
by granting the Community express oversight into environmental
matters. First, the SEA amended the Treaty by inserting Title VII,
referred to as the Environmental Title ("Title"). 42 Secondly, the
amending document added a specific reference to environmental pro-
tection to the new article 100a on the harmonization of Member State
legislation. 43 Thus, the SEA gave the Community explicit authority
to continue and expand upon its endeavors in the area of environ-
mental protection.
While the legal basis for unified Community control was achieved,
the enhanced role of the Community in the environment had its
critics. Several states which already enforced high environmental stan-
dards objected to centralized control for fear that the Community
standards would be lower and less effective. The new Treaty addressed
this concern in article 100a(4) by allowing individual states to opt
out of a harmonized standard for reasons of environmental pro-
tection."
Article 130r 5 of the Environment Title provides the substantive
goals of the Community's environmental polices. Due to the broad
31 Haagsma, supra note 30, at 319.
39 EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art. 100.
4 Id.
" Single European Act, supra note 19.
,2 Single European Act, supra note 19, at 11.
43 EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art. 100a(3); added by Single European Act, supra
note 19, art. 18, at 8.
" "If, after the adoption of a harmonization measure by the Council ... a
Member State deems it necessary to apply national provisions ... relating to pro-
tection of the environment . . .it shall notify the Commission of these provisions."
See EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art 100a(4); added by Single European Act, supra
note 18, art. 18, at 8.
41 EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art 130r(l); added by Single European Act, supra
note 19, art. 25, at 11.
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sweep of power that this general aim places with the Community,
the Member States insisted that unanimous Council vote be required
in order to implement any measure based on this article." The Member
States felt that this protection was necessary in order to ensure that
the Community did not abuse its power. 47
The Title sets out four principles that should be used to guide the
EC's environmental policy in article 130r(2). "Action by the Com-
munity relating to the environment shall be based on the principles
that:
1. preventive action should be taken,
2. environmental damage should, as a priority, be rectified at the
source,
3. the polluter should pay,
4. and the environmental protection requirements shall be a com-
ponent of the Community's other policies. 48
It appears that given the broad nature of these principles, the insti-
tutions of the Community can claim a relatively large discretionary
margin. 49 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) should only declare
a regulation or directive based on this article invalid when it is in
manifest error, a misuse of power, or when the institution clearly
exceeds its bounds of authority 0
Within this criteria, the authority for economic initiatives is laid.
The foundation of all fiscal approaches to environmental protection
undertaken by the Member States is the "polluter pays" principle
encapsuled in article 130r(2). 5 The principle states in clear terms that
all who burden or harm the environment are required to bear the
costs of avoiding, eliminating and compensating for these injuries . 2
This principle provides the legal basis for a dynamic approach to the
reduction of pollutants and the development of clean technology.
The "polluter pays" principle does not always exist in pure form.
In some instances environmental regulation will result in severe ec-
EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art. 130s; added by Single European Act, supra
note 19, art 25, at 11.
41 Haagsma, supra note 30, at 337.
48 EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art 130r(2); added by Single European Act, supra
note 19, art. 25, at 11.
49 Haagsma, supra note 30, at 340.
50 Id.
11 EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art. 130r(2); added by Single European Act, supra
note 19, art. 25, at 11.
52 Id.
[Vol. 21:285
EC ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY REPORT
onomic hardship for vital national undertakings. The compromise
solution that has been taken by the states is to adjust the "polluter
pays" principle to comply with the economic realities of a competitive
market through the use of subsidies. Subsidies channel public revenues
to the private concern so that it is able to meet its duty under the
"polluter pays" principle of article 130r(2). This compromise between
the goals of environmental protection and undistorted trade is one
of the substantial problems in the individual application of fiscal
instruments by the Member States.
Though subsidies are used, there are limitations under the EEC
Treaty. Article 92(1)- 3 prohibits all state aids which distort or threaten
to distort competition by favoring certain undertakings or certain
goods as far as they affect trade between Member States. This severe
restriction does not apply to the European Commission, thereby
granting it a free hand to aid those concerns which are unduly
disadvantaged by a stricter approach to environmental protection.5 4
In administering such a fund, the Commission is not restrained as
the Member States are with respect to the creation of distortions
within the market. The result does not conform to the true intent
of the "polluter pays" principle, but provides a practical solution to
the possible severe economic impact of tighter environmental controls.
Article 130r(3) formulates the criteria to be considered before the
Community undertakes any environmental action. The Community
shall take account of:
1. available scientific and technical data,
2. environmental conditions in the various regions of the Com-
munity,
3. the potential benefits and costs of action or lack of action,
4. the economic and social development of the Community as a
whole and the balanced development of its regions."5
However, in taking these factors into consideration, the Community
shall only take action within the environmental field if the desired
objectives can be better attained at the Community level rather than
13 EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art. 92(1).
14 See, European Social Fund, Id. at art. 125; the European Investment Bank,
Id. at art. 130; the European Agricultural Guidance and Guaranty Fund, Id. at art.
40(4).
ss EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art. 130r(3); added by Single European Act, supra
note 19, art. 25, at 11-12.
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through individual state legislation. 6 This allocation of authority is
referred to as the principle of "subsidiarity.1 5 7 Its application allows
the Member States to retain a degree of sovereign control over their
environmental policies.
The last provision of the "Environmental Title," article 130t,58
allows individual states to adopt measures which are more stringent
than those put into place by the Community; provided they are
compatible with the remainder of the Treaty. 9 In order for a Member
State to implement stricter measures, the displaced Community stan-
dard must be intended only as an environmental measure and not
as a means to accomplish additional Community goals, such as the
removal of fiscal barriers. °
Though articles 130r-t grants the Community greater authority for
environmental control, each Member State retains its sovereign power
over its environmental policies, thereby giving articles 130r-t a de-
claratory character. 6' The powers of the Community do not preempt
those of the states under the EEC Treaty, but rather run parallel to
them. 62
One of those powers retained by the states is the use of economic
and fiscal instruments. In the policies of the Member States, taxes
are the most important instruments used to enforce the "polluter
pays" principle. 63 However, there are severe restrictions on these
national instruments which are necessary to prevent unequal com-
petitive positions between the Members of the Community.
Environmental taxes, like all other charges levied by the Member
States, are subject to article 95 of the EEC Treaty which prohibits
any discriminatory taxation of goods imported from another Member
State." This provision deals exclusively with taxes which are imposed
when goods cross borders; it is strictly concerned with the movement
EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art. 130r(4); added by Single European Act, supra
note 19, art. 25, at 12.
17 Haagsma, supra note 30, at 342.
51 EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art. 130t; added by Single European Act, supra
note 19, art. 25, at 12.
19 Haagsma, supra note 30, at 347.
Id. at 348.
61 Id. at 425.
62 Id.
61 Grabitz & Zacker, Scope of Action by the EC Member States for the Im-
provement of Environmental Protection under EEC Law: The Example of Envi-
ronmental Taxes and Subsidies, 26 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 423, 441 (1989).
EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art. 95.
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of products and is an extension of the sovereign power of the Member
States .65
Article 99 of the Treaty deals with the harmonization of indirect
taxes, including environmental excise taxes. 66 The harmonization is
intended to prevent any distortion of competition.6 7 As long as the
Council does not enact provisions calling for the harmonization of
these indirect taxes, 61 the Member States are free to introduce new
indirect environmental taxes.
The harmonization of direct taxes, such as duties and contributions,
is governed by articles 10069 and 100a,70 with the same concern for
preventing distortions within the Internal Market. To this point, no
legislation has been drafted to bring complete control of all direct
taxation, including environmental charges, under the oversight of the
Community authorities .71
The individual states are also free to impose customs duties to
implement their environmental policies with several restrictions. In
order to comply with article 12 of the EEC Treaty, n the charges
must be levied against both outgoing domestic products and incoming
foreign goods. Additionally, the charge must be based on the same
features in the products or be assessed against the same stage of
production. Within that framework, an environmentally oriented duty
may be assessed in the form of an inspection fee, used to determine
the environmental compatibility of the product, as long as the col-
lected funds are not used solely for the benefit of domestic under-
takings .71
EEC Treaty article 100a, introduced by the SEA, relates to direct
environmental charges or taxes and bestows upon the Community a
legal duty to dismantle trade barriers which prevent realization of
the Internal Market. 74 Though this amended provision grants the
Council expanded powers in the area of environmental charges, the
6, Grabitz & Zacker, supra note 63, at 442.
6 EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art. 99.
67 Id.
"' One current example is the excise tax on leaded gasoline, imposed on a state-
by-state basis as an incentive to encourage the use of cleaner unleaded petrol.
69 EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art. 100.
70 EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art 100a; added by Single European Act, supra
note 19, art. 18, at 8.
7' Grabitz & Zacker, supra note 63, at 442.
72 EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art. 12.
71 Grabitz & Zacker, supra note 63, at 443.
7 Id. at 445.
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Member States, under article 100a(4), retain the power to enforce
more stringent national environmental charges even past the point of
complete harmonization. 7
The overall effect of the SEA did not remove the Member States
ability to implement economic and fiscal instruments for the protec-
tion of the environment. However, the addition of the "Environ-
mental Title" gave a mandate to the Council to develop a system
for the practical application of the "polluter pays" principle. 76 Ad-
ditionally, article 100a requires that all measures designed to achieve
a single market must incorporate the environmental dimension.
Until a comprehensive Community plan is introduced, the Member
States may continue to assess environmental charges provided that
they burden domestic and foreign products equally. 77 At this point
the Council has not attempted to harmonize indirect taxes under
article 99 nor have they addressed the harmonization of direct taxes
under article 100a. Therefore, individual states are competent to
implement appropriate economic and fiscal instruments to address
their environmental concerns. 78
Though the Council has not implemented any Community-wide
economic instruments, there are nonetheless several successful ex-
amples which are currently being used on a national basis. Greece
and the Netherlands have imposed tax differentiation systems which
promote the use of motor vehicles that are safer for the environment.
Greece grants a tax break of up to 40% for cars which are equipped
with a three-way catalytic converter. These tax advantages result in
a lower purchase price offered by the dealer. The Netherlands bases
its tax advantage on the quality of the cars' exhaust, and the au-
tomobiles with better emission figures receive a discount on the special
consumer tax which is added onto the Value Added Tax (VAT). 79
This measure is budget neutral due to the fact that the discounts are
financed through an increase in the tax on all other cars. The result
in the Netherlands has been an increase in the sale of these cars from
5% to 60% of the market.80
11 Id. at 446.
76 Id. at 447.
77 Id.
78 Id.
19 "Value Added Tax - a tax assessed on the addition to the original worth of
raw materials or components as they are processed further in manufacturing."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 805 (5th ed. 1983).
10 Experts' Report, supra note 6, at Annex 2-1.
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Germany has used a system of water effluent charges since 1981.
The charge is assessed against industrial as well as individual con-
sumers that discharge certain impurities into the water. The charge
is based on the chemical oxygen demand, the organic halogen com-
pounds, heavy metals and the toxicity to fish. An incentive is offered
to employ the best possible technology to maintain the effluent level
below that permitted; discounts up to 80% are possible. The result
has been a substantial increase in the number of water treatment
facilities, both collectively and privately owned.8'
Denmark employs a deposit-refund program for beverage containers
used for beer, wine and soft drinks. The system results in a nearly
100% return rate of the containers. This system has been approved
by the Court of Justice, with the reservation that it may be invalidated
if the Community harmonizes this area of taxation.8 2
In 1989 Italy introduced a charge on all non-biodegradable plastic
bags which were domestically produced or imported. The charge
trebled the price of the product and the consumption of the bags
declined 40% .3
Several EC Member States have introduced an excise tax differential
between leaded and unleaded gasoline; the purpose being to increase
the market share of the cleaner burning unleaded gasoline. The excise
tax resulted in a drastic decline in the demand for regular petrol and
forced oil companies to withdraw it from the market. This penetration
of unleaded gasoline into the market made the introduction of three-
way catalytic converters possible throughout the Community. How-
ever, the Report points out that lack of concerted Community action
resulted in a loss of efficiency which could have been avoided.8
While presently no program of economic and fiscal instruments is
in place on a Community-wide basis, it appears that there is adequate
authority within the amended Treaty for such a system to exist.
Additionally, the actions of the Member States within this area have
demonstrated the potential effectiveness of this approach in addressing
the environmental issues within the Community.
III. ANALYSIS
The support for the use of economic and fiscal instruments in the
Community's environmental policies stems from the failure of reg-
8, Id. at Annex 2-1, 2-2.
82 Id. at Annex 2-2.
83 Id.
84 Id. at Annex 2-2, 2-3.
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ulatory measures and the desire to avoid the inevitable trade distor-
tions that accompany separate national legislation.
The regulatory controls have failed to effectively address the in-
creasing environmental problems facing the region. The use of this
static method provides no incentive to reduce pollutants below the
permitted levels, and in doing so fails to properly internalize the cost
of the damage to the environment. The historic preference for reg-
ulatory control has been rooted in two beliefs. First, the Member
States and the Community believed that a regulatory limit offered a
greater assurance that environmental quality standards would be met;
the assumption being that sanctions are more effective than incentives.
Coupled with this belief, industry was opposed due to the additional
costs that it expected would be added to production.
The Member States experts discount both positions. Clearly the
system that is in place today is ineffective in protecting the environ-
ment, and this failure will become even more evident with the eco-
nomic growth which will undoubtedly accompany the establishment
of the 1992 Internal Market. In addition, the experts do not adhere
to the traditional notion that environmental protection and economic
growth are mutually exclusive. Rather, there is a new emphasis on
sustainable growth.
Given this mandate for action, the use of dynamic market me-
chanisms is the most promising option. Their success is not only
theoretically attractive, but there is evidence from their use in the
Member States that economic and fiscal instruments can be, if used
properly, powerful tools in managing the environmental assets of the
Community.
The imminence of the completion of the Internal Market provides
the impetus to implement these instruments on a Community-wide,
rather than a national, basis. The requirement that all fiscal barriers
be dismantled prohibits the use of national product taxes which distort
trade; environmental taxes fall into this category. Given the dramatic
structural change that will come about within the Community as a
result of an Internal Market, it is an opportune time to implement
a more effective environmental policy.
Besides the harmonization problems inherent in the state-by-state
use of economic instruments, there is also the issue of effectiveness.
The experts clearly believe that effective action against these regional
and global problems can only be achieved through Community-wide
action. First, individual Member States are not capable of dealing
with transboundary pollution problems. Secondly, only through cen-
tralized control can the Community comply with the international
[Vol. 21:285
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conventions on global problems to which it is a signatory. s5
Finally, the Report concludes that although incentive taxes should
be budget neutral, there is likely to be some use of these instruments
as a means to raise revenue for environmental purposes. Given that
scenario, it is likely that the funds would be returned to the Com-
munity in the form of subsidies, and only the Commission is immune
from the severe restrictions that the EEC Treaty puts on subsidies
as a form of state aid.
The significance of the acceptance of this dynamic approach to
environmental policy is that the environment will become inextricably
linked to all facets of industrial and agricultural economic planning. 6
While the traditional command-and-control system of regulation will
remain in place to a certain degree, economic instruments will offer
a financial incentive to conserve and preserve the Community's re-
sources. 87 This new political approach to the environment is a product
of increased public concern, as well as industry's realization that
further steps are needed. In a recent Community survey, one-half of
the European businesses polled considered environmental protection
an important consideration.88 Even the oil industry expressed its qual-
ified support for the use of reasonable economic instruments in the
place of "rigid command-and-control legislation.' '89 While industry
may not be an enthusiastic supporter of all aspects of fiscal and
economic instruments, this cognizance of environmental issues is ev-
idence that there is support for increased Community action on this
front.
While there is an increased awareness that action needs to be taken,
there is also a predictable amount of concern over the economic cost
8 One example is the acceptance of the Montreal Protocol by the EC. This
international agreement requires community-wide reductions in the level of use and
production of ozone depleting CFCs. See Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer, opened for signature Sept. 16, 1987, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,489,
26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987).
" Statements by Mr. Robert Hull, Advisor to the Director-General for Environ-
ment, Nuclear Safety, and Civil Protection of the European Community Commission.
European Community Will Encourage Industry Conservation Through Carrot-Stick
Approach, 13 Int'l Env't Rep. Current Report (BNA) No. 16, at 539 (Dec. 19,
1990).
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 During the European Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT), Gilbert
Portal, the Secretary General of the European Petroleum Industry Association (Eu-
ropia), voiced the oil industry's support for fiscal initiatives. Oil Industry Drags Its
Feet at Transport Ministers' Meeting, European Energy Rep., Dec. 14, 1990, at 1.
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to the Community that a new policy of fiscal initiatives may entail.
Some economic forecasters predict that if a radical shift in environ-
mental policy occurs, resulting in severe fiscal measures which are
harmonized on a Community level, the result could be a cost of 362
billion ECUs ($495 billion) by the year 2005.90 Additionally, concern
exists that the least advanced Members of the Community will bear
a disproportional burden of this cost.91 However, this fear may be
tempered by the prediction that the stronger "green" policy would
also create new opportunities within the Community that could make
the environmental protection market worth more than 150 billion
ECUs within the same time frame.9 2 An additional benefit is that
this new commitment would accelerate the penetration of new, cleaner
technologies, thus giving the Community a competitive edge within
the global market.9 3
On the microeconomic scale, an increase in the use of economic
and fiscal instruments will clearly translate into higher consumer costs,
especially in the energy sector. This increase is a necessary component
of any incentive oriented "green tax."
While the Report by the Committee of Experts deals with the issue
of trade distortions within the Community, it does not address the
effect that the inherent costs of these fiscal instruments will have on
the transactions of EC undertakings outside of the Market. Potentially
these policies could, by forcing EC industries to reduce their reliance
on certain resources, make these undertakings less competitive on the
international scale. In such a system, costs of production will increase
for companies operating within the Community, which will translate
into higher prices for the consumer. However, the non-EC importer
of the same product does not incur those additional costs and is
therefore at a competitive advantage. This is especially true when the
Community addresses global concerns such as the greenhouse gases.
A unilateral reduction in C02 gases serves to benefit the international
community, but only the EC pays the cost for that environmental
90 Measures to Control Pollution Could Cost Western Europe Billions, 13 Int'l
Envtl. Rep. Current Report (BNA) No. 13, at 461 (Nov. 7, 1990).
9" The countries that have expressed opposition to such a program include: Spain,
Portugal, Greece and Ireland. Various Environmental Taxes May be Introduced by
End of 1990, 13 Int'l Envt. Rep. Current Report (BNA) No. 6, at 226 (June 13,
1990).
92 Measures to Control Pollution Could Cost Western Europe Billions, supra note
90, at 461.
93 Id.
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gain. A possible ramification is that Community undertakings will
move production to countries where production costs do not inter-
nalize environmental damage.9
One solution which has been proposed is a variation on the Value
Added Tax (VAT). 95 The system would function by assessing a pol-
lution based tax on every stage of the production and distribution
of a product. 96 The total Pollution Added Tax (PAT) is passed along
to the consumer if the product is sold domestically.97 This tax would
be applied to imported goods on the same basis. 9 However, if the
product is exported, the PAT is excused in order to allow the product
or service to compete on a level playing field within the international
market.
Although such a system aims to permit the unilateral adoption of
more stringent environmental controls, its administration would be
difficult and costly. A more efficient solution to this problem may
be a program of Commission regulated subsidies used to channel
revenue from environmental taxes back to the affected industries to
be used for the development of new technology. Not only would it
be more manageable on a practical level, but it would also provide
the proper incentives to the Community undertakings. The subsidy
approach also avoids the inevitable GATT conflicts" that would arise
if the Community assessed an environmental duty on all goods en-
tering its market.' °°
The release of this Experts' Report laid the groundwork for a
comprehensive system of economic and fiscal instruments; however,
the report itself is not a formal Commission document. Thus, there
'4 Walter, Environmentally Induced Industrial Relocation to Developing Coun-
tries, in ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE: THE RELATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 67 (1982).
91 Comment, Proposal: A Pollution Added Tax to Slow the Ozone Depletion
and Global Warming, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 549 (1990) (authored by Peeyush Jain).
96 Id. at 555.
9Id.
91 Though this would provide an incentive for importers located abroad to reduce
their emissions, such a reduction is unlikely since it would put them at a competitive
disadvantage in every market besides the one employing the PAT.
" General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. p. 5-6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, reprinted in IV GATT, BASIC
INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 1-78 (1969).
-4 A possible problem is that even though domestic products are taxed at the
same rate as foreign imports, the revenue is used solely for domestic purposes and
may be seen as a method to subsidize domestic industry through the use of a 6tuty
on imports. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 99, art. III.
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must be action by the Commission and ultimately by the Council
for such a program to become a reality. There is every indication,
given the action of the Commission and the Council up to this time,
that appropriate measures will be taken in the near future. Addi-
tionally, support exists in the Parliament for measures of this nature
as well.
In December of 1990,the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens'
Rights issued an opinion for the Committee on the Environment,
Public Health and Consumer Protection regarding "financial incen-
tives for measures for environmental protection and on a new Com-
munity approach to reconciling economic and ecological considerations
in a market economy."'' ° The opinion called on the Committee on
the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection to ask the
Commission to submit to Parliament a strategy for applying financial
initiatives in the area of environmental policy in accordance with
articles 100a and 130r of the Treaty. Given the across the board
recognition that these instruments are necessary components of the
Community's environmental policies, it appears that their introduction
is inevitable.
Evidence of the implementation of this approach is already present.
The area which will most likely be initially addressed is that of carbon
dioxide emissions (C02). Mr. Ripa di Meana, the EC Environment
Commissioner, released a confidential proposal to the Commission
to impose a substantial excise tax on gasoline in order to address
global warming and combat excessive energy consumption.102 The
document foresees a five year introductory period culminating with
a tax of $10 per barrel of oil; additionally, the paper suggests that
the fall of prices after the Gulf War may present a "unique window
of opportunity." 03
Shortly after release of the Commissioner's paper, the Commission
proposed a "green tax" on carbon dioxide emissions, focusing pri-
marily on automobiles and power plants.'(" The plan advocates a
graduated tax based on the level of C02 emission. An explanatory
paper has been sent to the Council of twelve environment ministers;
if they react favorably the Commission can be expected to furnish
implementing directives within the coming months.10
10 1990-1991, PARL. EUR. Doc. (Dec. 5, 1990).
102 Pienaar, EC Carbon Tax Proposed, The Independent, Dec. 20, 1990, at 1.
103 Id.
'% Johnson, "Green" Tax on Coal Could Cut Harmful Gas, Says EC, The Daily
Telegraph, Jan. 12, 1991, at 9.
105 Id.
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One sign of the Commission's intent to harmonize environmentally
directed fiscal initiatives is its recent rejection of a German proposal
to provide tax benefits for cleaner burning diesel automobiles. Bonn
planned to grant tax breaks of $358 on new diesels that complied
with emission criteria which were stricter than the recently imposed
Community standard. The Commission held that while the plan was
not a state subsidy, it nonetheless was a trade distortion favoring
cars meeting the non-EC standard. 1°6 The Commission has taken a
strong stance in enforcing its position that no Member State fiscal
instrument may exist which attempts to regulate an area previously
harmonized by the Community. This is a clear indication that the
Commission intends to take the reigns of the region's environmental
policy and that its actions will preempt any existing contradictory
Member State legislation.
From these developments it appears that the Commission is ini-
tiating a move toward the centralized control of environmental policy
through the use of economic and fiscal instruments as envisioned in
the Experts' Report. The Report placed its greatest emphasis on the
problem of global warming, and therefore the Commission has un-
dertaken to address that issue first. While such a step is only one
aspect of the plan of action called for by the Report, its importance
must not be minimized. The successful implementation of a carbon
tax on a Community-wide basis will create the framework for a
comprehensive system of economic and fiscal instruments within EC
environmental policy.
Given that there is no painless or perfect solution to the environ-
mental problems facing the Community, the use of economic and
fiscal instruments is a positive step toward achieving a sustainable
balance between economic growth and environmental protection.
IV. CONCLUSION
Clearly there will be economic costs to a comprehensive program
of economic and fiscal instruments as proposed by the Experts'
Report; however, a much greater cost would result if the Community
did not take steps to rectify the ineffective environmental controls
presently in place. Additionally, any short term damage to Community
undertakings can be mitigated through the use of Commission sub-
sidies.
,01 German Diesel Tax Break Illegal, EC Rules, Reuters, Jan. 16, 1991, at Financial
Report.
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The more important aspect of this policy is that it is an effective
means to address environmental degradation within the Community
through dynamic mechanisms which reduce injury in a way that no
static control can. Through such a program, the undertakings of the
Community are encouraged to develop clean technology that will
grant them a clear competitive advantage in the international market
in years to come. The control of these financial initiatives must come
under the authority of the Commission in order to achieve harmo-
nization required of the Internal Market.
The Community has initiated a new era of environmental policy
that should provide a successful model for the coexistence of economic
growth and environmental protection.
John B. Nicholson
THE CHILEAN APPLES CASE: AN INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT
TO CLAIM DAMAGES FROM THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
INSTITUTIONS FOR NON-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY IS
EXPANDED. Sofrimport S.a.r.l. v. Commission of the
European Communities, No. C-152/88, slip op. at
80, [1990] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 946 (Eur.
Comm. Ct. J. June 26, 1990).
I. FACTS
On March 31, 1988, Sofrimport S.a.r.l. (Sofrimport)' shipped from
Chile a cargo of 89,514 cartons of Chilean dessert apples for import
into the European Economic Community (EEC).2 Sofrimport applied
for an import license for these goods on April 12, 1988 with the
French intervention agency, ONIFLHOR, prior to their arrival at the
port of Marseilles on April 20, 1988.1 ONIFLHOR denied Sofrim-
I Sofrimport S.a.r.l., an importer and wholesaler of fresh fruit, is incorporated
under French law. Sofrimport S.a.r.l. v. Comm'n of the Eur. Communities, No.
C-152/88, sfip op. at 80, [19901 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 946 (Eur. Comm. Ct. J.
June 26 1990).
.2 The European Economic Community [hereinafter EEC] was formed under the
Treaty of Rome. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, opened
for signature, March 25, 1957, 1973 GR. BRIT. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-Il) (official
English trans.), 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1958) (unofficial English trans.) [hereinafter EEC
Treaty]. Article 2 of the EEC Treaty sets forth the purpose of the EEC. It reads:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market
and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States,
to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of ec-
onomic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in
stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations
between the States belonging to it.
Id. at art. 2. The EEC is composed of the following twelve Member States: France,
Belgium, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Greece, Portugal, Denmark, Ireland, and Spain.
S $ofrimport, [1990] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 946, at para. 3. Article XI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT], prohibits quan-
titative restrictions on imports such as quotas, import licenses or other measures by
any Contracting Party. McGovERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION 186 (2d ed.
1986) [hereinafter McGovERN]. The European Community maintains a Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) which systematically imposes quantitative restrictions such
as quotas, tariffs and import licenses on imports to benefit domestic producers. Id.
at 448, 456. The legality of the EC's CAP under the GATT is a source of controversy,
and has been hotly contested by the United States and other members of the GATT.
Id. at 455-6.
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port's application on April 18, while Sofrimport's goods were still
in transit, because of EEC Regulations No. 962/88 and No. 984/88
which stipulated that applications for import licenses pending on
April 18, 1988 were to be rejected.4
Consequently, on May 26, 1988, Sofrimport brought an action
under Article 173 of the EEC Treaty' seeking the annulment of
Regulations No. 962/88, No. 984/88, and Regulation No. 1040/88
of April 20, 19886. Sofrimport also sought an order pursuant to
4 Commission Regulations (EEC) No. 962/88 of 12 April 1988 Suspending the
Issue of Import Licenses for Dessert Apples Originating in Chile, 31 O.J. EUR.
Comm. (No. L 95) 10 (1988) and No. 984/88 of 14 April 1988 Amending Reg. No.
962/88 Suspending the Issue of Import Licenses for Dessert Apples Originating in
Chile, 31 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 98) 37 (1988) respectively suspended the issue
of import licenses for dessert apples originating in Chile. Reg. No. 962/88 came
into force on April 13 and suspended the issue of import licenses for dessert apples
originating in Chile from April 15 to 22, 1988. Reg. No. 984/88 came into force
on April 15 and altered the suspension period to April 18 to 29, 1988. Report for
the Hearing, Case C-152/88, at paras. 4-5.
Article 173 of the EEC Treaty gives individuals the right to challenge EEC
legislative measures in the European Court of Justice when the regulation is of
"direct and individual concern" to that individual. The requirement of direct concern
involves the degree of discretion that the legislative measure leaves to the national
authorities. If the contested legislative measure leaves no discretion, then the affected
claimants are directly concerned. Sofrimport, [1990] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 946,
at para. 9. To be individually concerned, the applicant must be either the direct
addressee of the contested measure or must be affected by the contested measure
by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to the applicant or because of
circumstances which differentiate the claimant from all other persons. Spijker Kwasten
BV v. European Community Commission, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2559, [1984]
2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 284, at para. 8. The right of an individual to judicial review
under Article 173 is very narrow because the "direct and individual concern" test
is strictly construed and difficult to satisfy. Roberts, Judicial Review of Legislative
Measures: The European Court of Justice Breathes Life into the Second Paragraph
of Article 215 of the Treaty of Rome, 26 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 246, 247 (1987)
[hereinafter Roberts]. See also, Bebr, Direct And Indirect Judicial Control of Com-
munity Acts in Practice: The Relation Between Articles 173 and 177 of the EEC
Treaty, 82 MicH. L. REv. 1229, 1248 (1984) (Article 173 results in occasional
unsuccessful attempts by private parties to bring annulment actions challenging
regulations) [hereinafter Bebr]; Stein & Vining, Citizen Access to Judicial Review
of Administrative Action In a Transactional and Federal Context, 70 AM. J. TRANs-
NAT'L L. 219, 223 (1976) (analyzing strict reading of "direct and individual concern"
requirement) [hereinafter Stein & Vining].
6 In Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 1040/88 of 20 April 1988 Fixing Quan-
tities of Imports of Dessert Apples Originating in Third Countries and Amending
Reg. No. 962/88 Suspending the Issue of Import Licenses for Dessert Apples Orig-
inating in Chile, 31 O.J. EUR. Comm. (No. L 102) 23 (1988), the EEC set import
quotas for dessert apples originating in the five apple-producing countries of the
Southern Hemisphere for the period ending on August 31, 1988. This regulation
[Vol. 21:307
CHILEAN APPLES CASE
Article 215 (2) of the EEC Treaty7 that the EEC pay compensation
for damages caused by the denial of its import license application. 8
Included in Sofrimport's complaint was an application pursuant to
Article 186 of the EEC Treaty9 and Article 83 of the Rules of
Procedure for the Court of Justice of the European Communities 0
also called for suspension of import licenses for those countries which had exceeded
their limits and specifically named Chile as being over its 142,131 ton quota.
Accordingly, Reg. No. 1040/88 stated that import licenses for Chilean dessert apples
would not be issued until the end of the 1988 importing year on August 31, 1988.
Report for the Hearing, Case C-152/88, at para. 8. The EEC promulgated Regs.
No. 962/88, No. 984/88 (see supra note 4), and No. 1040/88 pursuant to the system
of surveillance of dessert apple imports from non-member countries established by
Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 346/88 of 3 February 1988 Introducing Special
Surveillance of Imports of Dessert Apples from Third Countries, 31 O.J. EuR.
Comm. (No. L 34) 21 (1988). That surveillance system required an import license
for release of such fruit into free circulation in the EEC. The initial period of
validity of the import license was 30 days, but Commission Regulation (EEC) No.
871/88 of 30 March 1988 Amending Reg. No. 346/88 Introducing Special Surveillance
of Imports of Dessert Apples from Third Countries, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
87) 73 (1988), changed the duration to 40 days. Sofrimport, [1990] 3 Comm. Mkt.
L. Rep. 946, at para. 2.
Sofrimport brought the action for compensation pursuant to Article 215(2) of
the EEC Treaty which provides that "in the case of non-contractual liability, the
Community shall, in accordance with general principles common to the laws of the
Member States, make good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants
in the performance of their, duties." EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 215 (2).
Sofrimport, [1990] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 946, at para. 1.
I Sofrimport sought an order requiring the Community to pay compensation for
the harm caused by preventing it from marketing the Chilean dessert apples until
June 10, 1988 (the date of the interim court order allowing the release of Sofrimport's
imports). See infra text accompanying note 12. The damages claimed by Sofrimport
amounted to f 2,821,959.10, plus interest from the date of the court decision. Report
for the Hearing, Case C-152/88, at para. 16. To assess damages, Sofrimport compared
the price it would have received for the apples in the absence of the import restrictions
to the price it did receive through mitigation. Sofrimport was able to sell 38,548
cartons in transit for f 67.10 per carton, a particularly low price because the market
was flooded with apples banned from the EEC. After the court order on June 10,
1988, Sofrimport sold the remaining apples for f 81.66 per carton. Sofrimport
asserted that the market price for identical apples from Chile in the EEC was f 103
per carton, thus it suffered a loss in the amount of f 2,468,220. Additionally,
Sofrimport claimed storage costs of f 159,787.60, transportation costs (to customs
warehouses) of f 161,000 and repackaging costs of f 32,951.50. Sofrimport also
sought interest at 9.5%. Report for the Hearing, Case C-152/88, at paras. 57-58.
9 Article 186 of the EEC Treaty, supra note 2, reads: "[tihe Court of Justice
may in any case before it prescribe any necessary interim measures."
1o Article 83 of the Rules of Procedure reads: "[aln application for the adoption
of any other interim measures referred to in . . . Article 186 of the EEC Treaty
... shall be admissible only if it is made by a party to a case before the Court
and relates to that case." Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities, 17 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 350) 1 (1974).
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for an order suspending Regulations No. 962/88, No. 984/88, and
No. 1040/88 with respect to the dessert apples then in storage at
Marseilles. "
The President of the Court granted Sofrimport's request for the
suspension of Regulations No. 962/88, No. 984/88 and No. 1040/
88 on June 10, 1988, thus allowing the importation of the stored
apples. 12 Sofrimport's claim for damages continued to be litigated,
and on June 26, 1990, the Court of Justice of the European Com-
munities, held, Sofrimport has standing to challenge the regulations
under Article 173,' 3 and Regulations No. 962/88, No. 984/88, and
No. 1040/88 are void with regard to products in transit to the
Community; 4 in addition, the EEC must compensate Sofrimport's
damages resulting from the application of these regulations. 5
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Regulatory Background
The legal backdrop for the protective measures regarding imports
of dessert apples is set forth in Article 29(2) of Council Regulation
Sofrimport, [1990] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 946, at para. 5.
12 Id. at para. 22.
13 The Court held that Sofrimport is directly concerned by the challenged re-
gulations because they require the national authorities to reject pending applications
for import licenses and thus leaves the authorities no discretion. Id. at para. 9.
With regard to individual concern, the Court found that Sofrimport is in a restricted
group of importers sufficiently well-defined by the fact that Article 3(3) of R~glement
(CEE) Du Conseil du 19 D3cembre 1972 Numro 2707/72 Dfinissant les Conditions
D'application des Mesures de Sauvegarde du Secteur des Fruits et Ugumes, 15 J.0.
Comm. EUR. (No. L 291) 3 (1972), requires the Commission to consider the special
position of products in transit to the Community when adopting protective measures
for fruit and vegetables. Thus, those importers who had goods in transit at the time
the prohibition of import licenses went into effect were differentiated from other
importers and, therefore, were individually concerned. The Court also reasoned that
because Reg. No. 2707/72 gives specific protection to importers with goods en route,
these importers must therefore be able to enforce observance of that protection and
bring legal proceedings for that purpose. Sofrimport, [19901 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep.
946, at paras. 10-13.
'" Id. at para. 21.
"1 Id. at para. 29. The Court also ordered that interest at an 8% annual rate be
paid as of the date of the judgment and that the parties inform the Court within
twelve months of the amount of compensation agreed upon by the parties. Id. at
para. 32.
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No. 1035/72 of May 18, 1972,16 which established the common or-
ganization of the market in fruit and vegetables and provided for
the adoption of protective measures if the Community market is
threatened with serious disturbances. Article 3(3) of Council Regu-
lation No. 2707/72 of December 19, 1972, lays down the conditions
for applying protective measures to fruit and vegetable imports pur-
suant to Council Regulation No. 1035/72.1 Regulation No. 2707/72
requires that any protective measure adopted by the Commission shall
take account of the special position of goods in transit to the Com-
munity."8
On February 3, 1988 the Commission imposed protective measures
on the imports of dessert apples from third countries by adopting
Regulation No. 346/88.19 The Commission, fearing serious injury to
,6 R~glement (CEE) Du Conseil du 18 Mai 1972 Num6ro 1035/72 Portant Or-
ganisation Commune des Marchs dans le Secteur des Fruits et Lgumes, 15 J.O.
Comm. EuR. (No. L 118) 1 (1972). R glement (CEE) Du Conseil du 21 Novembre
1972 Num6ro 2454/72 Modifant le r~glement (CEE) No. 1035/72 Portant Organi-
sation Commune des Marchks dans le Secteur des Fruits et Ugumes, 15 J.O. Comm.
Eup. (No. L 266) 1 (1972), states that:
[a]ppropriate measures may be applied in trade with third countries if:
by reason of imports or exports, the Community market in one or more
of the products referred to in Article 1 experiences or is threatened with
serious disturbances which may endanger the objectives set out in Article
39 of the Treaty....
Report for the Hearing, Case C-152/88, at para. 9.
17 Reg. No. 2702/72, supra note 13, provides that:
1. The measures which may be taken . . . are:
when the situation covered by the first indent of paragraph 1 of that
article exists, the suspension of imports or exports or the levying of
export taxes; ...
2. Such measures may only be taken in so far, and for as long, as they
are strictly necessary.
3. The measures provided for in paragraph 1 shall take account of the
special position of products in transit to the Community. They shall
apply only to products exported from, or intended for, third countries.
They may be limited to products exported from, originating in, or
intended for, certain countries, or to certain qualities, size, grades or
groups.
Report for the Hearing, Case C-152/88, at para. 1 (emphasis added).
1" See supra notes 13, 17.
19 Reg. No. 346/88, supra note 6, introduced a system of special surveillance of
imports of third country dessert apples under which the release of dessert apples
for free circulation within the EC was made subject to the presentation of an import
license issued against the lodging of security of 1.5 ECU per 100 kilograms net.
Report for the Hearing, Case C-152/88, at para. 2. Reg. No. 346/88 provided that
import licenses were to be issued five working days after application unless protective
measures are taken within that period. The initial 30 day period of validity for
import licenses was increased to 40 days by Reg. No. 871/88, supra note 6. Report
for the Hearing, Case C-152/88, at para. 3.
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Community producers, perceived the need for additional protective
measures against the importation of dessert apples. Thus, on April
12, 1988, the Commission adopted Regulation No. 962/88 which
suspended the issue of import licenses for dessert apples originating
in Chile. 20 The Commission considered that the forty day period of
validity for import licenses under Regulations No. 346/88 and No.
871/88 allowed importers sufficient opportunity to obtain import
licenses before shipping their goods, so the Commission provided no
special protection for goods in transit at the time Regulation No.
962/88 was issued. 21
B. Non-Contractual Liability
Article 215(2) of the EEC Treaty provides the standard for non-
contractual liability of the European Community Institutions, and
states that this liability only arises where the act in question arises
out of the performance of an institutional task. 22 In Aktien-Zuck-
erfabik Sch6ppenstedt v. Council of the European Communities,23
the Court interpreted Article 215(2) of the EEC Treaty for the first
time,2 and articulated six elements to be considered in determining
Community liability. The Court ruled that the Community is only
liable for a legislative measure which is: "(1) illegal, because it (2)
violates a superior rule of law (3) which is for the protection of the
- See supra note 4. The Commission took this additional protective measure
because it considered that applications for import licenses covering Chilean dessert
apples exceeded the traditional quantity of imports of such products and that the
continuation of such imports might lead to serious disturbance of the market, so
as to jeopardize the objectives of Article 39 of the EEC Treaty and cause serious
injury to Community producers. Report for the Hearing, Case C-152/88, at para.
4. Accordingly, the EEC promulgated Reg. No. 962/88 which suspended the issuance
of import licenses.
" The preamble to Reg. No. 962/88, supra note 4, states that:
[S]ince the period of validity of import licenses has been fixed so as to
cover amply the dispatch of dessert apples to the Community and to permit
the operators to obtain import licenses before the ships depart, no account
should be taken of goods being transported to the Community other than
those for which import licenses have been issued.
Report for the Hearing, Case C-152/88, at para. 7 (emphasis added).
22 See supra note 7. Article 215(2) liability only relates to activities of the Com-
munity institutions performed in their institutional capacity. Stuart, The "Non-
Contractual Liability" of the European Economic Community, 12 Comm. MKT. L.
REv. 493, 497-8 (1975) [hereinafter Stuart, Non-Contractual Liability].
23 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 975, [1971-73 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8153, at 7752 (1971).
24 Roberts, supra note 5, at 251-52, n. 23.
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individual, (4) in a manner which is sufficiently flagrant and (5)
causes (6) damage".25 In the seminal Bayerische HNL Vermehrungs-
betriebe GmbH & Co. KG and others v. Council and Commission
of the European Communities(HNL)26 case, the Court reiterated the
Sch6ppenstedt formula and adopted an extremely narrow scope for
non-contractual liability of Community institutions. 27 In particular,
the HNL Court established a three part test for community liability
under Article 215(2): (1) a breach of a superior rule of law, (2) which
is sufficiently serious, and (3) the superior rule of law violated was
one for the protection of individuals.
In order to restrict the scope for non-contractual liability of the
Community, the Court in HNL indicated that not all legislative acts
which are found illegal give rise to Article 215(2) liability, 29 and
Roberts, supra note 5, at 251-52. The Schoppenstedt Court held:
In the present case the non-contractual liability of the Community presup-
poses at the very least the unlawful nature of the act alleged to be the
cause of the damage. Where legislative action involving measures of eco-
nomic policy is concerned, the Community does not incur non-contractual
liability for damage suffered by individuals as a consequence of that action,
by virtue of the promise contained in Article 215, second paragraph, of
the Treaty, unless a sufficiently flagrant violation of a superior rule of law
for the individual has occurred.
1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 984, [1971-73 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8153, at 7766 (emphasis added).
1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1209, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 566.
27 Article 215 (2) mandates that non-contractual liability of Community institutions
be in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member
States. See supra note 7. The principles of the Member States governing liability of
public authorities for damages caused to individuals indicate that only in exceptional
cases with special circumstances can public authorities incur liability for legislative
measures which are the result of a choice of economic policy. Therefore, the severe
criteria for non-contractual liability developed in the HNL case are consistent with
the laws of the Member States. Bronkhorst, Action for Compensation of Damages
Under Articles 178 and 215, para. 2, of the EEC Treaty; Stabilization and Devel-
opment, 1983 LEGAL IssuEs EUR. INTEGRAT'N No. 1, at 99, 111 [hereinafter Bron-
khorst].
n T.C. HARTLEY, TI-E FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN CoMMuNiTY LAW 474 (2d ed.
1988) [hereinafter HARTLEY].
2 In HNL the Court held:
Individuals may be required, in the sectors coming within the economic
policy of the Community, to accept within reasonable limits certain harmful
effects on their economic interests as a result of a legislative measure without
being able to obtain compensation from public funds even if that measure
has been declared null and void. In a legislative field such as the one in
question, in which one. of the chief features is the exercise of a wide
discretion essential for the implementation of the Common Agricultural
Policy, the Community does not therefore incur liability unless the institution
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focused on the "sufficiently flagrant" element of the Sch6ppenstedt
test. The HNL Court identified three factors which determine whether
a violation is "sufficiently serious" to warrant damages.30 The first
part of the HNL "sufficiently flagrant" test is the importance of
the superior rule of law that has been violated. 3' The second part of
the test is whether the enactment constitutes a manifest and grave
disregard for the limits of the institution's powers. 2 The final element
of the inquiry is the nature of the injury. This element requires that
the injury be of a special nature, only affecting a small number of
people, and of sufficient severity to exceed a reasonable level of
economic risk in the claimant's sector. 33 Thus, the standard for Com-
munity liability for legislative illegality under Article 215(2) espoused
in HNL and subsequent opinions on the proper measure and proof
of damages make it difficult for an individual to recover damages
because of challenged legislative acts.3 4
Despite the restrictive "sufficiently serious breach of a superior
rule of law for the protection of the individual" standard that was
applied in HNL, the Court has demonstrated some willingness to
concerned has manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits on the exercise
of its powers.
1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1209, at para. 6 (emphasis added). Thus, even though
a legislative measure might be annulled under Article 173, the Community will not
incur Article 215(2) liability unless the Community institution has manifestly and
gravely disregarded the limits on the exercise of its powers. Lys~n, Three Questions
on the Non-Contractual Liability of the EEC, 1985 LEGAL IssuEs EutR. INTEGRAT'N
No. 2, at 86, 114 [hereinafter Lys~n].
0 Roberts, supra note 5, at 254.
11 Id. The superior rule of law breached by the allegedly illegal legislation must
be a fundamental rule or principle of Community law. See also Bronkhorst, supra
note 27, at 104. Note 40, infra, lists some fundamental principles of Community
law recognized by the Court.
32 Roberts, supra note 5, at 254. The essence of the manifest and grave disregard
inquiry is whether the enactment is "arbitrary"; i.e., could not have been enacted
under a reasonable, although mistaken, interpretation of the superior rule of law
at issue. Id. Another interpretation of "arbitrary" is suggested by Lysdn who defines
arbitrary legislative acts as enactments in the absence of an overriding Community
or public interest justifying the measures. Lys6n, supra note 29, at 113.
13 Roberts, supra note 5, at 279.
34 Id. at 280-81. The narrow scope of art. 215(2) of the EEC Treaty has been
reaffirmed by the Court in a line of cases following HNL. E.g., Roquette Freres
SA v. Comm'n of the Eur. Communities, 1989 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1553; Ireks-
Arkady GmbH v. Council and Comm'n of the Eur. Communities, 1979 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 2955; Deutsche Getreideverwertung Und Rheinishche Kraftfutterwerke
GmbH v. Council and Comm'n of the Eur. Communities, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 3017; Interquell Staxke-Chemie GmbH v. Council and Comm'n of the Eur.
Communities, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3045.
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find Community liability in situations where the legislative act adopted
was not illegal. In particular, the Comptoir National Technique Agri-
cole S.A. v. Comm'n of the Eur. Communities (CNTA)35 case man-
ifested a change of emphasis from the culpability of the administration
to the protection of the legitimate interests of the administered.3 6 In
CNTA the Court held that the Community was liable not for the
illegality of the legislative act in question, but rather for failing to
provide transitional measures.3 7 Because the Court in CNTA did not
find that the legislative measure was illegal on its face, but still held
the Community liable under Article 215(2) for the adoption of the
contested regulation, the Court recognized that Community liability
can arise even without meeting the strict HNL test where the adoption
of a legislative act creates liability if it is a result of a manifest and
serious disregard for the limits of the institution's discretionary power."8
C. Legitimate Expectations
The doctrine of protection of legitimate expectations plays a sig-
nificant role in the analysis of Article 215(2)39 non-contractual liability
in the EEC. This is because the protection of legitimate expectations
is a superior rule of law for the protection of the individual, the
11 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 533, [19771 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 171.
36 Stuart, Non-Contractual Liability, supra note 22, at 507.
17 The Court found the Community liable when the Commission withdrew the
payment of monetary compensation amounts for colza and rape seed by Commission
Regulation No. 189/72 - which had immediate effect without warning and without
transitional measures. Bronkhorst, supra note 27, at 101. The Court held:
In the absence of an overriding matter of public interest, the Commission
has violated a superior rule of law, thus rendering the Community liable,
by failing to include in Regulation No. 189/72 transitional measures for
the protection of the confidence which a trader might legitimately have had
in the Community rules.
CNTA, 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 550, [19771 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 188
(emphasis added).
31 Commentators differ in their opinions on the significance of the CNTA case.
Lys6n argues that it may show that the particularity and the gravity of the damage
is unimportant in finding Community liability by holding that protection of legitimate
confidence in Community law is enough. Lys6n, supra note 29, at 113. Similarly,
Bronkhorst suggests that CNTA signifies a separate, less restrictive path to estab-
lishing Community liability for those individuals who have formed legitimate reliance
interests in Community law than the severe HNL test. Bronkhorst, supra note 27,
at 105. On the other hand, Roberts contends that the CNTA case represents a brief
period when the Court relaxed the standard for Community liability under article
215 (2), and the Court subsequently retracted from this relaxed position by adopting
the harsh HNL criteria for non-contractual liability. Roberts, supra note 5, at 253.
19 EEC Treaty, supra note 2.
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breach of which can give rise to non-contractual liability.4 A "le-
gitimate expectation" is defined as:
The particular form of economic prediction for which an economic
agent [private business or individual] can claim legal validity in
Community law, as being a belief that it was legitimate for him to
entertain as to the way in which he would be treated by an ad-
ministration in the application of Community regulations. 4'
A successful claim of legitimate expectations consists of several el-
ements .42 One of the central requirements is the absence of the fo-
reseeability of change in the Community rules or laws. 43 If the applicant
had notice of the change in the law in which he is claiming a legitimate
expectation or. if a reasonably prudent trader would have foreseen
the change, then he will not be able to maintain an action for the
protection of his legitimate expectations." Pursuant to this require-
-o Lys6n, supra note 29, at 115. Superior rules of law include all rules of the
unwritten law of the EEC deemed necessary and thus relevant for the lawful and
proper operation of the Community. Examples of a breach of a superior rule of
law for the protection of the individual include: infringements of human rights,
violations of a legitimate interest [expectation] in Community law, infringement of
a Council regulation by a Commission regulation (a situation which occurred in the
Sofrimport case). Id. Other examples of superior rules of law include the prohibition
of discrimination between producers and consumers within the Community and the
general principle of legal certainty. Bronkhorst, supra note 27, at 104.
41 Sharpston, Legitimate Expectations and Economic Reality, 15 EuR. L. REv.
No. 2 at 103, 105 (1990) [hereinafter Sharpston]. Thus, a legitimate expectation is
a legally protectable general principle common to the laws of the Member States.
See supra note 40.
4- Generally, a claimant seeking damages under Article 215(2) for a breach of
legitimate expectations must prove that he had a legitimate expectation on which he
acted in reliance and suffered loss as a result of the Community legislative measure.
Even then the claimant will not prevail if the Community measure is justifiable by
reason of an overriding matter of public interest. HARTLEY, supra note 28, at 144.
41 Stuart, Legitimate Expectations and Estoppel in Community Law and English
Administrative Law, 1983 LEGAL IssuEs EuR. INTEGRAT'N. No. 1 at 54 [hereinafter
Stuart, Legitimate Expectations]. See also Debayser SA, Sucre-Union SA and Jean
Lion SA v. Director of the Fonds d'Intervention et de R6gularisation du March6
du Sucre, Minister for Agriculture and Minister for the Budget, 1981 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 1291; S.A. Ancienne Maison Marcel Bauche and S.a.r.l. Frangois
Delquignies v. Administration Franqaise des Douanes, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
383.
- Sharpston, supra note 41, at 158. The policy behind not allowing a claim of
legitimate expectations where a prudent trader should have foreseen imminent change
is to not let a trader put himself in a better position by not taking due care than
that in which he would have been had he exercised all due care. Id. at 150. Therefore,
if an institution has given rise to justified hopes the trader may rely on the protection
of legitimate expectations, but if a prudent and discriminating trader could have
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ment that the change in Community law not be foreseeable, the
burden of being informed is placed on the individual claiming legit-
imate expectations. 45
Another requirement for a claim of legitimate expectations is that
the applicant must have acted or refrained from acting on the ex-
pectation. A mere hope for the continuance of the status quo will
not suffice to create a legitimate expectation.6 Also, this theory will
not be upheld where the previous situation was one of no real certainty
so that the contested action produced no real change. 47 Another
element of a successful claim for a violation of legitimate expectations
is that the applicant's claim must be objectively plausible in that a
reasonable economic agent should reasonably be able to form the
belief that his interests would not be damaged by the contested
legislation." Additionally, in situations where the applicant tries to
take advantage of a weakness in the Community system to make a
speculative profit, no legitimate expectations can be formed. 49
The many requirements for a successful claim of legitimate ex-
pectations reveal that it is extremely difficult for an applicant to
prevail in a direct action in obtaining damages from the Commission
or in having a regulation annulled because of a breach of legitimate
expectations. 0 This doctrine is essentially a form of equitable juris-
prudence which strikes a balance between checking the unfairness of
Community acts and refraining from interfering with the proper
exercise of discretionary legislative power.5
foreseen the adoption of Community measures likely to affect his interests, he cannot
plead legitimate expectations. Id. at 109. Also, changes in the underlying economic
conditions or circumstances can give notice of imminent change. Id. at 158.
41 Id. at 159.
- Id. at 158. Evidentiary and damage assessment concerns are the reasons behind
this requirement. Id.
, Id. at 122. See also Soci6t6 C.A.M. SA v. Comm'n of the Eur. Communities,
1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1393; Westzuck6r GmbH v. Einfuhr und Vorratstelle
fur Zucker, 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 723.
48 Sharpston, supra note 41, at 158.
- Einfuhr und Vorratstelle fir Getreide und Futtermittel v. Firma C. Mackprang,
1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 607, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 198. See also
HARTLEY, supra note 28, at 143; Stuart, Legitimate Expectations, supra note 43, at
58.
, Stuart, Legitimate Expectations, supra note 43, at 59. For an example of a
case where a plaintiff prevailed on a claim of legitimate expectations see Meiko-
konservenfabrik v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2539
(winning plaintiff challenged a regulation which had retroactive effect, discriminated
between producers in similar circumstances, and breached plaintiff's legitimate ex-
pectations).
11 Stuart, Legitimate Expectations, supra note 43, at 73.
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III. ANALYSIS
In Sofrimport S.a.r.l. v. Commission of the European Commu-
nities, the Court of Justice of the European Communities held that
the EEC is liable to Sofrimport for damages caused by the contested
regulations because it found a sufficiently serious breach of a superior
rule of law for the protection of the individual.5 2 To reach this
conclusion, the Court noted three important factors: a breach of
legitimate expectations, a breach of Regulation No. 2707/72, and the
fact that the economic risks inherent in Sofrimport's business did
not include a breach of Regulation No. 2707/72.13 Each of these
decisional factors is important, but the linchpin of this decision is
the recognition of the doctrine of protection of legitimate expecta-
tions.5 '
The first of the three reasons mentioned by the court for imposing
liability on the EEC is the doctrine of protection of legitimate ex-
pectations." The Court observed that the purpose of Article 3(3) of
Regulation No. 2707/7256 is to protect importers of goods covered
by that regulation, particularly those traders who have goods in transit
at the time protective measures are adopted,7 from the unfavorable
consequences of protective measures which might be adopted by
European Community institutions. Therefore, the Court stated, Reg-
ulation No. 2707/72 "gives rise to a legitimate expectation the dis-
regard of which constitutes a breach of that superior rule of law. "58
The second basis for the finding of liability also involved Regulation
No. 2707/72 because the Court ruled that the Commission committed
a sufficiently serious breach of Article 3(3) of that regulation. The
Commission committed a sufficiently serious breach of Regulation
No. 2707/72 by completely failing to take account of the position
of traders who, like Sofrimport, had goods in transit to the EEC
when the license prohibition was adopted, without invoking any
overriding public interest.5 9 The third reason provided by the court
52 By finding a sufficiently serious breach of a superior rule of law for the
protection of the individual, the Court held that the HNL test for Article 215(2)
non-contractual liability is satisfied. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
" Sofrimport, [1990] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 946, at paras. 26, 27, 28.
1' See supra text accompanying note 41.
55 Id.
56 See supra notes 13, 17.
I Id.
Sofrimport, [1990] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 946, at para. 26.
9 Id. at para. 27. See supra notes 13, 17. (Reg. No. 2702/72 requires the
Commission to take account of goods in transit to the Community).
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for awarding damages focused on the limits of the risks inherent in
Sofrimport's business. The Court reasoned that the damage alleged
by Sofrimport was beyond the inherent risk of the import transaction
because the purpose of Regulation No. 2707/72 was to limit those
risks with regard to goods in transit. 60
Although the Court provided three reasons for its decision, close
examination of those reasons reveals that the principle underlying the
holding is the protection of legitimate expectations. For example, the
Court emphasized the fact that the Commission failed to invoke any
overriding public interest to explain its breach of Article 3(3) of
Regulation No. 2707/726. One of the basic tenets of the doctrine of
protection of legitimate expectations is that the EEC can absolve
itself of liability for breaching a legitimate expectation if it does so
because of an overriding public interest.62 Here, the Court's reliance
on the absence of an overriding public interest suggests that the
protection of legitimate expectations influenced the Court's finding
of a breach of Regulation No. 2707/72.
The doctrine of legitimate expectations also permeates the third
basis for the Court's holding, which in effect restates that doctrine.
By finding that the risks inherent in Sofrimport's business did not
include the risk of protective measures against goods in transit because
Regulation No. 2707/72 limits those risks, the Court is essentially
stating that Sofrimport had a legitimate expectation that no protective
measures would be adopted. The Court's logic implies that because
of the provisions of Regulation No. 2707/72, the risk of protective
measures affecting goods in transit was not foreseeable to Sofrimport.
Foreseeability of risk is one of the crucial inquiries into whether a
legitimate expectation has formed. 3 Therefore, all three of the reasons
supporting the Court's holding involve elements of the doctrine of
protection of legitimate expectations.
In addition to invoking elements of the doctrine of legitimate
expectations, the three reasons given for the imposition of liability
also satisfy the HNL6 test for a sufficiently serious breach of a
60 Id. at para. 28.
63 Id. at para. 27.
62 In one of the exceptional cases where legitimate expectations led to EEC liability,
the dispositive factor noted by the court was a breach of a superior rule of law
without any overriding matter of public interest. Sharpston, supra note 41 (emphasis
added) (referring to CNTA, 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 533, [19771 1 Comm. Mkt.
L. Rep. 171).
63 See supra notes 43-4 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 26.
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superior rule of law for the protection of the individual. 65 First, the
Court recognized Sofrimport's legitimate expectation in not being
denied an import license once its goods were in transit as a superior
rule of law. This finding comports with the first part of the HNL
test which requires that the rule of law breached be a fundamental
rule or principle of Community law. 66 Second, the Court ruled that
the Commission erred by failing to take account of goods in transit
without justification by an overriding matter of public interest as
required by Regulation No. 2707/72. This failure to follow the stric-
tures of a Council regulation without justification is exactly the kind
of arbitrary legislative act that meets the manifest and grave disregard
of legislative power requirement of the HNL test. 67 Likewise, the
third basis for the Court's holding literally tracks the language of
the final part of the HNL criteria for a sufficiently serious breach.
Both here and in HNL the Court spoke of injury that exceeded the
level of risk inherent in the claimant's business sector. 68 Thus, the
Court's holding seems to rest on both the doctrine of legitimate
expectations and on the HNL criteria for non-contractual liability.
The Sofrimport Court demonstrated a heretofore unseen recep-
tiveness to the doctrine of legitimate expectations, in addition to
basing its decision on that doctrine and the HNL formula. 69 Con-
sidering the restrictive interpretation of standing under Article 17370
and the Commission's argument that Sofrimport had notice of the
adoption of protective measures, the Court had ample grounds for
denying relief to Sofrimport. Article 173 of the EEC Treaty7l allows
an individual to challenge the validity of legislative measures that
directly and individually concern the claimant, but this right to judicial
review is strictly construed and is thus extremely narrow.72 One prin-
ciple that narrows the availability of Article 173 is the rule that no
private person can challenge a general regulation which is defined as
" HNL establishes a three part formula for a breach of a superior rule of law
for the protection of the individual to be sufficiently flagrant to warrant Article
215 (2) liability. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
67 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
- See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
Few cases prevail on a legitimate expectations theory. Sharpston, supra note
41, at 160.
70 See supra note 5.
71 See supra note 2.
72 See supra note 5.
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a regulation that applies to categories of persons treated theoretically. 71
Although the Commission did not contest Sofrimport's right to ju-
dicial review under Article 173, the Court could have dismissed the
action on its own motion had it decided that the "direct and individual
concern" test was not met.
74
Indeed, the Advocate General strenuously argued that the Court
should have denied Sofrimport's claim for relief by dismissing the
action as inadmissable under Article 173.71 The thrust of the Advocate
General's argument is that Sofrimport was not directly and individ-
ually concerned with Regulation No. 962/88 because it is a general
regulation not addressed to a specific and identified group, but rather
to a category of traders who were not and could not have been
identified individually when the measure was adopted. 76 Thus, ac-
cording to the Advocate General, Sofrimport could not challenge its
validity under Article 173 because it failed to satisfy the "direct and
individual concern" test .77
Despite the vigorous arguments of the Advocate General, the Court
held that regulations No. 962/88 and No. 984/88 were of direct and
individual concern to Sofrimport, so an action for annulment under
Article 173 was maintainable. 78 By allowing Sofrimport to challenge
the contested regulations under Article 173, the Court vindicated one
of the primary functions of an Article 173 annulment action which
73 Stein & Vining, supra note 5, at 224. This principle that a private individual
cannot challenge a general regulation underlies the narrow "direct and individual
concern" standard of Article 173. Id.
14 Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, Sofrimport, [1990] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.
Rep. 946, at para. 2.
71 Id. at para. 9.
76 Id. at para. 4. One reason for finding Reg. No. 962/88 to be a general regulation
suggested by the Advocate General is that the Commission could not have known
the identities of the traders who would be affected by the regulation. The identities
of at least some of the traders would be unknown to the Commission because it
affected traders who applied for import licenses after the regulation was adopted.
Id. Another reason that the Advocate General considers that the contested regulation
was general in nature is that the Commission made its decision to institute protective
measures not on the basis of the number of applications lodged, but rather on the
basis of a combination of relevant economic factors in the market. Therefore,
applications lodged by individual traders would simply be a part of the total volume
examined by the Commission. Id. at para. 5. The third reason the Advocate General
advanced for finding the contested regulation to be general was that Reg. No. 962/
88 gave no special consideration to traders with goods in transit, so those traders
were viewed in the same light as all of the other traders. Id. at para. 6.
11 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
78 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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is to allow private parties to protect themselves against illegal actions. 79
Additionally, the Court demonstrated an unusual receptiveness to a
private party's action for damages against the Commission by allowing
Sofrimport to maintain the action because the Court could have
denied Sofrimport Article 173 standing consistently with the strict
construction of that provision.
The second indication of the Court's rare amenability to a private
individual's action for damages under Article 215 (2) lies in the Court's
refusal to adopt the Commission's primary arguments. Specifically,
the Commission argued in favor of denying relief on the basis that
Sofrimport had notice of the possibility of adoption of protective
measures, and, therefore, was not able to form any legally protectable
legitimate expectations. The source of this notice, claims the Com-
mission, is that the wording of Regulation No. 346/8880 put importers
on notice that within five working days of an application being lodged
the Commission might take action to ensure that licenses were not
issued. Thus no legitimate expectation could be formed by an im-
porter.8' In support of this contention, the Commission relies on the
precedent of the Roomboterfabrik "De Beste Boter" BV v. Pro-
duktschap voor ZuiveP2 case where the Court held that a regulation,
whose wording was substantially the same as Regulation No. 362/
88 in that it provided a five day reflection period before granting
export certificates, provided sufficient notice of the possibility that
the application would be denied to defeat reliance. In this case the
Court could have followed this close precedent and held that Sof-
rimport had notice of the possibility that protective measures would
be adopted - notice that would defeat Sofrimport's claim of legitimate
expectations."3 Instead, the Court upheld Sofrimport's legitimate ex-
pectations.
From a broader perspective, the Court's receptiveness to the doc-
trine of legitimate expectations represents a movement to conformity
to the spirit of Article XIII, paragraph 3(b) of the General Agreement
,9 See, Bebr, supra note 5, at 1232.
9 See supra note 4.
Report for the Hearing, Case C-152/88, at para. 46.
1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3331 (Five day reflection period for export certificate
applications held to be a contingent entitlement to certificate because applicant had
notice that "special measures" might be adopted during five day waiting period).
11 Notice of the possibility of a change in the legal circumstances will defeat a
claim of legitimate expectations. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)84 regarding goods in transit. Under
the GATT, goods which are en route when notice of a suspension
of import licenses is given must be allowed entry. 5 On the other
hand, Regulation No. 2707/726 merely requires the Commission to
take account of goods in transit to the Community, and does not
guarantee access to the Community for all products during all in
transit situations.8 7 By upholding Sofrimport's legitimate expectation
that it would be granted an import license, the Court acted consistently
with the spirit of GATT Article XIII, paragraph 3(b) while not
vitiating the wording of Regulation No. 2707/72. Rather than an
absolute requirement for entry of goods en route, the Court uses the
doctrine of legitimate expectations to reach an equitable result of
allowing entry for goods of traders who have no notice of import
suspension before they act in reliance on the current import scheme.
The apparent synthesis in Sofrimport of the HNL test 88 with the
CNTA approach to non-contractual liability89 has broad ramifications
for the future behavior of the Commission. Rather than relying on
legislative discretion as a shield from individuals' claims for com-
pensation under Article 215 (2), Commission regulations now must
meet the more exacting standard of not breaching individuals' legit-
imate expectations. Thus, the Commission will have to provide more
information and notice to the public to defend against the formation
of legitimate expectations. In addition, the Court demonstrated a
rare receptiveness to an individual's challenge of a Commission reg-
ulation. Therefore, the Court in this case opens the door for indi-
' This subsection states in pertinent part:
Any supplies of the product in question which were en route at the time
at which public notice was given shall not be excluded from entry; Provided
that they may be counted so far as practicable, against the quantity permitted
to be imported in the period in question, and also, where necessary, against
the quantities permitted to be imported in the next following period or
periods ....
GATT, supra note 3, art. XIII: 3(b). (emphasis in original).
11 McGovERN, supra note 3, at 192. This requirement takes the form of an
absolute obligation to allow entry. Id.
" See supra note 13.
8 See supra note 17. Although not directly applicable, the provisions of the
GATT are binding on the Community insofar as the Community has assumed the
powers previously exercised by Member States in the areas governed by the GATT.
International Fruit Co. v. Produktschapvoor Groenten en Fruit, 1972 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 1219, [1975] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 1.
" See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
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viduals who have legitimate reliance interests to recover from the
legislative and regulatory entities in the EEC, thus providing a chilling
effect on those regulatory bodies' willingness to test the bounds of
their legislative discretion.
IV. CONCLUSION
The fundamental basis for the European Court of Justice's holding
in Sofrimport is that the Commission of the European Economic
Community breached Sofrimport's legitimate expectations that it would
be able to import its Chilean dessert apples and those legitimate
expectations constituted a superior rule of law for the protection of
the individual. In this case, however, the Court seemed to reconcile
the doctrine of legitimate expectations and the HNL test for non-
contractual liability. Before Sofrimport, the exceedingly strict HNL
criteria were considered a separate path to non-contractual liability
of the Community from cases such as CNTA, which upheld legitimate
expectations as a basis for Community liability. Furthermore, the
Court had ample grounds before it to dismiss the complaint both
for lack of Article 173 standing to challenge the contested regulations
and for a lack of legitimate expectations on the part of Sofrimport.
Both Article 173 standing and a finding of legitimate expectations
are rare occurrences in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of
the European Communities. However, in this case the unusual oc-
curred and the Court imposed Article 215(2) on the Commission.
Sofrimport might be the herald of a new, less stringent approach to
Community liability. In addition, the Court has fulfilled the spirit
of GATT Article XIII, paragraph 3(b) by requiring the Commission
to compensate Sofrimport after the Commission failed to take account
of goods en route when it banned imports of dessert apples. Thus,
the Court may be signaling a more lenient attitude toward Community
liability in the face of the impending formation of the Internal Market
and closer international scrutiny of its import licensing policy.
Douglas C. Turner
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